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ABSTRACT 
Culture and Time Perception: Implications for Mental Representation and Decisions  
Siew Hong Tan 
This thesis examines cultural variations in time perception, as well as the possible influences 
on mental representation and decisions. Building on prior research on cultural differences in 
time-related perceptions, two main time perceptions were identified and focused on, 
namely temporal orientation and the use of time metaphor.  
The temporal orientation line of investigation explores the implications of a stronger 
future versus past orientation among English and Mandarin-speakers respectively. Based on 
Construal Level Theory, temporal orientation is expected to be related to psychological 
distance, which in turn affects the mental representations individuals form. The findings 
supported a stronger future orientation among English-speakers which is also evident in 
their mental representations that vary as a function of temporal orientation. However, 
Mandarin-speakers exhibited neither a strong past nor future orientation. A study 
examining the possible influence of temporal orientation on value judgment revealed a 
complex association between culture and value judgment.  
The time metaphor line of inquiry investigates the use of time metaphors among 
English and Mandarin-speakers and also the possible implications of such tendencies. 
Although previous psychological research implies a possible connection between the use of 
time metaphor and sense of personal control, this relationship is yet to be established. The 
findings showed supportive evidence of a frequent use of ego and time-moving metaphors 
among English and Mandarin-speakers respectively. However, studies examining the 
relationship between the use of time metaphor, perceived personal control, and decisions 
(optimism bias and risk-taking) revealed little supportive evidence of an association 
between them. The findings and a range of methodological and theoretical implications are 
discussed in the closing chapter. 
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Chapter 1: Culture and Time Perception 
 
1.1 The Cultural Perspective 
In April 1943, a report was published in The American Journal of Psychology that 
examined cross-cultural differences and similarities between Caucasians (white Americans) 
and East Asians (Chinese and Japanese) on physiological reactions to an emotional stimulus. 
Participant’s responses to an emotional stimulus were tested and observed by striking a 
large and heavy hammer within a few inches from their hand. The Caucasian participants 
exhibited greater hand movement response and experienced greater change of pulse rates 
whereas the Chinese and Japanese participants experienced greater change of electrical 
resistance and breathing rates. The researchers, Stratton and Henry (1943) summarised that 
the two groups of subjects “differ clearly in their reactions to our emotional stimulus, differ 
frequently and in considerable amount. But oddly, they differed in no such way that the one 
race is found to be generally more reactive emotionally than the other.” This finding 
suggested the possibility that fundamental human processes might have a basis in the 
dimension of culture.  
The integration of culture into the studies of psychology is a controversial one 
because many basic human processes have been argued to be universal in nature (e.g., the 
universality hypothesis about human emotions) and there are different competing 
perspectives in psychological inquiry (e.g., absolutism, universalism, relativism). These 
perspectives vary in the extent to which human psychological processes and functioning are 
considered to vary across different cultures. However, the recent emergence of a stream of 
psychological findings incorporating the aspect of culture have demonstrated that culture 
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plays an important role in shaping and sustaining one’s cognition and behaviour (e.g., Choi, 
Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Cohen, 2009; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Triandis, 1996). By 
using a comparative approach, cross-cultural studies take individuals’ cultural context into 
account such as their sociocultural (e.g., social norms or roles, education, language) and 
ecological context (e.g., subsistence strategy, climate, geographic feature) (Berry, Poortinga, 
Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011), to investigate the extent to which our human 
psychological functions and processes are outcomes of these conditions.  
 
1.1.1 Defining Culture 
There are many ways to define culture and many attempts have been made. In 1952, 
a book published by Kroeber and Kluckhohn contained a comprehensive list of definitions of 
culture proposed over the years. In the conclusion section, they suggest a definition on the 
concept of culture formulated by most social scientists:  
“Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including 
their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., 
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems 
may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning 
elements of further action.” (pg. 181) 
 Generally, members of the same cultural groups are said to share similar cultural 
schemas, which consist of elements such as attitudes, roles, beliefs, norms, practices, values, 
etc. likely to be passed down from one generation to another. The transmission of these 
shared cultural elements among members of a specific community is likely to occur among 
those who use a common language that live within the same geographical area at a 
particular time period (see Triandis, 1996). Research into culture and psychological 
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processes are generally conducted based on the assumption that individuals shared similar 
cultural schemas (Triandis, 1989), the conceptual structures of knowledge that provide 
guidance on understanding and interpretation of daily events and objects.  
In studies of cross-cultural psychological research, one of the most common 
methods to identify and to contrast cultural groups is based on the member’s geographical 
region of origin. For instance, a common comparison in recent cross-cultural research is 
between easterners and westerners (East Asians such as Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans vs. 
Euro-Canadians or North Americans) (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Individuals 
from these two cultural backgrounds have been found to vary systematically in a wide 
variety of aspects such as cultural context (individualism vs. collectivism) (Hofstede, 1991), 
cognition (Nisbett et al., 2001), and self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) among others.  
 A prevalent theme in comparative research of psychology is the contrast between 
individualist and collectivist cultural contexts (e.g., Hofstede, 1991; Triandis, 1989). The use 
of individualism vs. collectivism as cultural frameworks is commonly viewed as a continuum 
with individualism at one end and collectivism on the other (Ho & Chiu, 1994). According to 
Hofstede (2010), individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are 
loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family. 
Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are 
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to 
protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. (p. 92).  
Generally, collectivism is more prevalent in Asian societies (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, 
and Koreans) in comparison to Western societies (e.g., North Americans, Euro-Canadians) 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1996). The distinction of individualism-
collectivism construct has been found to be associated with some basic psychological 
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aspects such as cognition (e.g., holistic/analytical thinking - Nisbett et al., 2001), self-
construal (e.g., independence/interdependence - Markus & Kitayama, 1991), attribution 
style (e.g., Choi, et al., 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994), and perceived personal control (e.g., 
Sastry & Ross, 1998). 
 
1.1.2 Culture and Cognition 
In the literature, one main source of differences between individuals from East and 
West is their distinct cognitive styles (e.g., holistic vs. analytical – Nisbett et al., 2001; 
dialectical thinking - Peng & Nisbett, 1999). There is ample evidence indicating that there 
are systematic cross-cultural differences in our underlying cognitive processes (Ji, Peng, & 
Nisbett, 2000; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett et al., 2001; Norenyazan & Nisbett, 2000; Peng 
& Nisbett, 1999). Westerners tend to have an analytical thinking style which is characterised 
by attending primarily to an object as though it is detached from the field in which it is 
embedded. They focus more on the attributes of the primary object and pay relatively less 
attention to the surrounding context. On the contrary, East Asians are predisposed to think 
holistically. Compared to Western individuals, East Asians focus relatively more on the 
context including the relationship between an object and the field and they also have 
tendency to describe and make predictions based on relational context (Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001). 
 Holistic or relational thinking, with its origins in Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian 
philosophy, is chronically accessible in the minds of individuals with East Asians cultural 
background and is fostered and sustained by cultural contexts (see Nisbett et al. 2001). 
Individuals from East Asian societies perceive objects and events in the world as 
interconnected and the real meaning lies only in relations to the whole. In contrast, 
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individuals with Western cultural background believe that it is possible to decontextualise 
propositions. Their analytical way of conceptualising reality can be traced back to ancient 
Greek philosophy. The world is viewed as a composition of discrete objects and they also 
have tendency to reason about it using categories and rules (Nisbett et al., 2001) 
 A variety of findings support these contentions. For example, Chiu (1972) examined 
East Asians and Americans’ categorisation strategies by presenting them with sets of three 
pictures (e.g. cow, chicken, grass). It was found that Chinese children tend to categorise 
objects based on shared relationship (i.e. cow and grass) whereas American children were 
more likely to categorise objects based on similarity (e.g. cow and chicken). Abel and Hsu 
(1949) found that Chinese-American subjects gave more whole card response to Rorschach 
inkblots than did European Americans, who gave more response that referred only to a part 
of the inkblot.  
Masuda and Nisbett (2001) provides further evidence to cultural differences in the 
use of attentional strategy. Participants from either America or Japan were presented with a 
scene which is full of salient focal fish and also a complicated background (e.g. plants, 
background fish, water animals, bubbles, etc.). They were then asked to report what they 
see in the scene. The results showed that Japanese participants reported more background 
information and attended more to the relational context than did American participants. 
When the background information was replaced by a novel background, the changing of 
backgrounds has relatively little impact on Americans’ ability to recognise the focal objects 
whereas it affects Japanese participants’ recognition accuracy. Masuda and Nisbett 
concluded that Japanese participants’ attention to object and the field is holistic in nature 
and thus their memory is context-dependent. In this case, focal objects are remembered by 
binding them to their backgrounds.  
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The influence of analytical vs. holistic thinking style can also be seen in the way 
individuals incorporate information from social context (Masuda et al., 2008). Japanese and 
American participants were presented with a central cartoon figure that depicted a different 
emotion than those that surround it and participants were asked to judge the emotion of 
the central cartoon figure. The researchers found that Japanese participants’ perception of 
the central figure’s emotion was influenced by those of the surrounding cartoon figures’ 
whereas the American participants’ perception of the central figure’s emotion was not 
affected by those surrounding it. By using eye-tracking, they found that Japanese 
participants spent longer looking at the figures in the background compared to American 
participants. This finding supported their argument that Japanese view emotions as 
inseparable from contextual information whereas Westerners see emotions as individual 
feelings that can be isolated from social context. This study confirmed Asian individuals’ 
attention is largely holistic in nature and their sensitivity towards contextual cues can also 
be observed in the social domain.  
The same principle can be applied to understand the findings of cross-cultural 
differences in the causal attribution style between East Asians and Western individuals as to 
whether it is the field or the object. (i.e., attribution bias - Ross, 1977). The repeated 
findings of East Asians to have greater tendency to attribute event causality to external 
factors (e.g., situational constraints - Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002; Norenzayan, Choi, & 
Nisbett, 2002; group dispositions – Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Morris & Peng, 
1994) to a greater extent than did Western individuals supports the notion of distinct 
information processing style between the two cultural groups. This is likely due to Asians’ 
holistic thinking style which encourage them to pay greater attention to the field or context 
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of object or event hence contextual factors are given more weight when explaining the 
cause of event or behavior.  
On the other hand, Western individuals’ belief that it is possible to decontextualize 
propositions is evident from their relative greater attention to focal objects (Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2001). Following from this, it makes sense that if contextual factors are important in 
explaining causal effects, personal factors (e.g., one’s own actions) should be perceived as 
having less control over an event. Concurrently, if one perceives oneself as the main cause 
of a behavior or event, one should perceive oneself to have greater control over the cause 
of the event. Cross-cultural research comparing perceived sense of control between East 
Asians and Western individuals confirmed this line of reasoning (Sastry & Ross, 1998; Weisz, 
Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984).  
 
Culture and Self-construal 
Another distinction between individuals from Eastern and Western cultures is the 
difference in their conceptualisation of self. One of the core defining features of 
individualistic cultures is the independent view of the self, where the self is viewed as an 
‘individual’ who exists in its own right and independently from their in-groups (Hofstede, 
1980; Hui, 1988; Triandis, 1989; 1996). Individuals from individualistic societies place 
greater emphasis on personal agency or sense of autonomy and prioritise personal 
fulfilment and freedom. One’s own choice and goals are given greater importance over 
social aspects/elements.  
On the contrary, members of collectivistic cultures hold an interdependent view of 
the self. The self is viewed as a part of a collective group and exists interdependently with 
in-groups (e.g., family, ethnic group, nation) (Hui, 1988; Triandis, 1989). Individuals from 
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collectivistic societies are more concerned with harmonious interpersonal relations hence 
social connectedness and norms are emphasized. Groups goals and values are given priority 
as social membership is an integral part of their sense of identity (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, et al., 2002). However, a culture is neither fully individualistic 
nor collectivistic but instead possesses more or less of such characteristics (Singelis, Triandis, 
Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995).  
 
Culture and Perception of Control 
 Sense of perceived personal control was found to be emphasized and valued to a 
greater extent in Western societies in comparison to East Asian societies (Sastry & Ross, 
1998; Weisz et al., 1984). This is consistent with the relatively more and relatively less 
emphasis on personal autonomy in Western and East Asian societies respectively (Triandis, 
1995) and also appears to be congruent with the attributional styles (i.e., internal vs. 
external respectively) observed in these two cultures (Norenzayan et al., 2002).  
The literature on locus of control suggest that individuals differ in the way they 
attribute the cause of event outcomes (e.g., Rotter, 1966). Specifically, individuals who have 
greater internal locus of control perceive event outcomes to be contingent upon one’s own 
action, effort, skills, or ability. In contrast, individuals with greater external locus of control 
perceive event outcomes to be more likely due to external causes that are beyond one’s 
control such as chance, luck, or powerful others (Levenson, 1981; Rotter, 1966).  
The proposed construct of internal locus of control is consistent with the higher 
agentic orientation among individuals in individualistic cultures where one values sense of 
autonomy, the conception that actions or outcomes result from one’s own choice instead of 
from sources or causes that are external to the person. Compared to collectivistic Asian 
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societies, sense of autonomy was given more attention in European philosophical thinking 
(e.g., Plato, Aristotle, and Kant) as autonomy is fundamental in defining an individual as a 
distinct person in modern European societies (Munro, 1985). 
Unlike European societies, personal autonomy was given less attention in ancient 
Chinese societies both in defining what an individual is and also from ethical perspective 
(Munro, 1985). For example, Jen (i.e. 仁 means goodness or benevolence) which is one of 
the core values in Confucian teaching emphasizes the ability of a person to care and have 
concern for other people (e.g., family or people outside family) and is viewed as a 
fundamental basis of humanity. It is possible that in collectivistic societies where there are 
clear norms/rules and where social connectedness/harmony are prioritised, the self is 
perceived as relatively less autonomous (vs. individualistic societies) as one feels more 
oblige to attend to other people in order to preserve a harmonious social relationship. 
Therefore, external forces are inevitably given more weight and perceived as having greater 
influence on the course of event or event outcome. Thus, individuals in collectivistic 
societies have been found to have tendency to emphasize external locus of control to a 
greater extent than did individuals from individualistic cultures (Sastry & Ross, 1998).  
Whilst the locus of control construct (Rotter, 1966) emphasizes a correspondence 
between action and outcome, also relevant is the two-process model of primary and 
secondary control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). The process in which one “attempts 
to change the world so that it fits the self’s needs” is called “primary control” whereas the 
“attempts to fit in with the world and to flow with the current” is termed “secondary control” 
(Rothbaum et al., 1982, pg. 8). Many efforts to understand cultural variation on 
controllability has been conducted by referring to Rothbaum and colleagues’ two-process 
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model especially within the individualism vs. collectivism context (Triandis, 1995). It has 
been argued that members of Western individualistic societies (e.g., Americans) which 
emphasize personal agency1, individual goals, and achievement should be more inclined to 
have greater primary control (one actively seeks to impose change or exert influence over 
the environment). In contrast, in collectivistic East Asian societies where harmonious social 
network and connectedness is highly valued, individuals should place greater value on 
secondary control (to accommodate or adjust to the environment) (Weisz, Rothbaum, & 
Blackburn, 1984a). Taken together, these suggestions and observations of cross-cultural 
variations in sense of perceived personal control support the view that controllability is a 
cultural product which varies according to cultural norms and values.  
 Another relevant observation in the domain of perceived personal control is the 
finding that perceived personal agency is reflected in the language that one uses (Fausey & 
Boroditsky, 2010; Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010). For instance, whether one 
says, “he over-cooked the pie” or “the pie was over-cooked” implies different sources of 
agency and hence shape people’s construal of the event, in this case, pertaining to who 
should be held responsible for the event.  
According to Fausey et al. (2010), the use of agentic (vs. non-agentic) linguistic 
structures was found to be more prevalent in the English language whereas the opposite 
was true for other languages (e.g., Japanese). In the Japanese language, there are different 
descriptions in place to differentiate between accidental and intentional actions. In 
comparison, in the English language, agentic linguistic structures are also used for accidental 
actions. The researchers subsequently found that the use of agentic (vs. non-agentic) 
                                                     
1 Agency refers to the feeling that one can control external events by controlling one’s own actions (Haggard & 
Tsakiris, 2009). To the best of my knowledge, the constructs of “agency” and “sense of personal control” are 
not clearly differentiated in the existing literature. They may be overlapping and hence difficult to distinguish. 
Therefore, “agency” and “sense of personal control” are used interchangeably in the present thesis.  
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language was associated with better agent memory (i.e., who should be held responsible for 
an action). They argued that agentic language shifted people’s attention accordingly thereby 
focusing them more on event’s causal agent. Thus, their observation seems to suggest that 
culture, language and personal agency have an inseparable relationship. 
 
1.2 Culture and Time Perception 
Another aspect of cognition differs between Eastern and Western individuals is in 
their perception of time. The nature of time has been viewed differently in different cultural 
contexts (Castelli, 2015). One of the major distinctions in the cultural concept of time 
between East and West lies in the linear vs. cyclical notion of time. Western societies’ time 
view is greatly influenced by the Judeo-Christian concept, philosophical (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, 
and Kant) and science development (e.g., Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein) (Castelli, 2015). 
Generally, time is perceived as linear and directional with individuals progressing along the 
linear timeline which stretches from the past to the future (Hall, 1983). In contrast, East 
Asian societies such as Chinese, Korean, and Japanese, have world views that are influenced 
and shaped by the teaching of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Generally, East Asian 
societies hold a cyclical perspective of time which implies change and progress are cyclical, 
continual, or possibly repetitive in nature (Castelli, 2015).  
Western society’s linear sense of time is consistent with their belief of constancy in 
the world. Whilst time is perceived as an entity that can be separated into distinct segments 
(i.e., past, present, future) (Graham, 1981), the reality is perceived as consisting of fixed and 
identifiable entities and therefore objects and events can be understood by removing them 
from their context (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). This line of thinking is consistent with their 
analytical thinking style where objects can be attended independently from their field by 
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using rules or categories (Nisbett, et al., 2001). A related observation is a tendency to assign 
causality to internal dispositions including humans (Norenzayan, et al., 2002) and animals 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).  
On the other hand, East Asians’ cyclical view of time is parallel with their belief that 
the world is in constant change or transformation. As the world is perceived as consisting of 
entities that interact constantly and endlessly, reality is always dynamic and subject to 
change. Elements of reality are interconnected and exist in a state of flux and are therefore 
attended to as a whole (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). This line of thinking is consistent with the 
holistic thinking style among East Asians where events or objects are attended by 
incorporating the contextual background (Nisbett et al., 2001). As a result, East Asians have 
tendency to assign causality to contextual or external factors (see review by Choi, et al., 
1999). 
Psychological studies have observed that the conception of self in relation to time 
(i.e., the use of time metaphor) (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013) and the temporal region individuals 
prioritise (i.e., future oriented vs. past oriented) (Ji, Guo, Zhang, & Messervey, 2009) are 
different between individuals with a Western and an Eastern cultural background. These 
time-related tendencies have been suggested to have implications on individual’s cognition 
and judgments (Caruso, et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010; 2013; Guo, Ji, Spina, & Zhang, 2012; Ji et 
al., 2009).  
 
1.2.1 Metaphorical Time Representation 
We say that time flies, it moves, it speeds up. Time is now, is past, is future. It is slow, 
it is fast, it takes forever. Someone is ahead of their time, someone is behind the time. They 
were here before us or we arrived after them. The use of these metaphorical expressions 
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allows us to define reality and convey our feelings including making sense of change or 
order of succession in our daily lives. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) pointed out, “the essence 
of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (pg. 
125). Without awareness, the use of metaphor is extensive in the spoken and written 
languages in our everyday life.  
Metaphorical language is a common part of normal conversation. Whether “things 
are looking up”, “we still have a mountain to climb”, or “we are finally going downhill”, these 
sayings give us an idea of how events are progressing. The use of more concrete concepts 
(i.e., ‘up’, ‘mountain’, ‘downhill’) enable us to illustrate progress of event which is abstract 
in nature in a more tangible way. In fact, most of our conceptual systems (e.g., everyday 
thoughts) are largely metaphorical in nature which allows us to understand abstract events 
and objects by relying on more concrete concepts. The use of these conceptual metaphors 
affects our conceptual system without awareness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and possibly 
independent of the language we use (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). For example, one of the main 
consequences of the use of conceptual metaphor is that it maps our knowledge about a 
topic on a representational structure. For instance, the mapping of spatial metaphor onto 
the dimension of time (Lai and Boroditsky, 2013), as illustrated in the metaphors above.  
As a subjective entity, time is often understood by drawing an analogue from other 
more tangible and more concrete dimensions such as physical distance (i.e., spatial) (see 
Fraassen, 2013; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). Indeed, our sense of time is deeply grounded 
in space as events are perceived as temporally and spatially related. For example, temporal 
relations are frequently used to refer to spatial order (e.g., the steam engine was invented 
before Victorian era). Our experience or sensibility which is grounded in the spatial 
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dimension can be expressed by implying that time is “in motion” from the present (e.g., we 
are approaching the end of the year).  
Although time and space are two deeply interwoven concepts, they have an 
asymmetrical relationship. Psychological research observed that a spatial metaphor is often 
used to describe time (Boroditsky, 2000; Lakoff, 1993) but a time metaphor is less likely to 
be used to describe space (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Lleras, Reali, Alviar, & Bermudez, 
2014). Time is frequently conceived as movement in space and the movement can be 
conceived in one of two distinct spatial-time metaphorical perspectives: ego-moving vs. 
time-moving (Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Margolies & Crawford, 2008).  
In the use of ego-moving perspective, an individual is perceived as an active agent 
moving towards or away from the referent object or event along a stationary timeline (e.g., 
“We are approaching the new year”). In the time-moving metaphor, an individual is 
perceived as a stationary entity in which referent object or event moving towards or away 
from (e.g., “The new year is approaching”). Cross-cultural studies comparing English and 
Mandarin-speakers have found cross-cultural differences in the way individuals mentally 
represent time. Accordingly, English-speakers tend to adopt ego-moving metaphor whereas 
Mandarin-speakers tend to have dominant time-moving metaphors (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013). 
In the literature, it has also been observed that although both English and Mandarin-
speakers frequently use horizontal terms (e.g., front/back) to refer to time, Mandarin-
speakers are more likely to use vertical conceptualisation of time to refer to the temporal 
order of time periods (e.g., day, week, month, year, century, etc.) and also to the succession 
order of event or happenings. For example, “上世纪” (up century) refers to last (i.e., the 
previous) century and “下世纪” (down century) refers to next (i.e., the following) century. 
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These vertical spatial terms are also used in English but not as commonly found in Mandarin 
(Borodisky, 2001). A possible explanation for this could be due to the difference in 
orthography pattern between Mandarin and English (Bergen & Lau, 2012). Whilst English 
text is arranged vertically from left to right, Chinese text is traditionally arranged in vertical 
columns from right to left2. Due to the unavoidable involvement of the difference in native 
writing system between these two languages (Bergen & Lau, 2012), this aspect of time-
related perception will not be the focus of the present thesis. 
 
Ego-moving vs. Time-moving Metaphorical Representation of Time  
The use of temporal languages in many cultures around the world confirm that time 
is often conceived as movement in space, whether we look forward to the future or leaving 
the past behind, the use of these spatio-temporal metaphors helps us communicate 
temporal expression. In English and Mandarin, the two most commonly spoken languages in 
the world, two dominant time metaphorical systems have been identified, namely ego-
moving perspective and time-moving perspective (Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 
2008; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Margolies & Crawford, 
2008).  
In the psychology and linguistic literature, an individual's time perspective is 
obtained by asking the person a question that is seemingly ambiguous and can be 
interpreted subjectively, ‘Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward two days. 
What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?’ This question is widely used in 
research studies to assess individuals’ time metaphors (McGlone & Harding, 1998). There 
                                                     
2 The vertical arrangement in the People’s Republic of China is now less common due to the official switch in 
1956. 
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are two possible answers to this question and an individual's answer will tell us which time 
metaphor is adopted. If one takes a time-moving perspective, then forward is in the 
direction of motion of time, and the meeting should move from Wednesday to Monday. If 
one takes an ego-moving perspective, then forward is in the direction of motion of the 
observer, and the meeting should move from Wednesday to Friday. 
Although individuals are able to represent time in both metaphorical systems3 
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Gentner et al., 1999; Lee & Ji, 2014), psychological research 
found that the use of ego-moving perspective is more prevalent among individuals with a 
Western cultural background whereas the use of time-moving perspective is more common 
among individuals with an Eastern cultural background (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013). In order to 
establish whether the difference in the use of time metaphor between English and 
Mandarin-speakers was driven by the difference in their conceptualisation of time or due to 
the different languages used in the testing materials, Lai and Boroditsky (2013) tested 
Mandarin-English (ME) bilinguals in English or Mandarin and compared their performance 
to that of English monolinguals or Mandarin monolinguals respectively. They observed that 
when ME bilinguals were presented with the English version of the time metaphor question4, 
they were still less likely to take ego-moving perspective compared to English monolinguals. 
When a different group of ME bilinguals were presented with the Mandarin version of the 
time metaphor question5, they were more likely to take ego-moving perspective compared 
to Mandarin monolinguals. The researchers interpreted the outcome as a supportive 
                                                     
3 The use of time metaphor is dynamic in nature as individuals are capable of alternating between the use of 
ego- and time-moving perspectives (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). Therefore, it is important to note that 
whenever this thesis mentions “ego-moving” or “time-moving” perspective, it refers to “more ego-moving” or 
“more time-moving”.  
4
 Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day is the meeting now that it has been 
rescheduled? 
5
 Suppose the clock says it is 1pm now. You need to move it one hour forward. What time will it be adjusted to? 
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evidence of how acquisition of a second language affects bilinguals’ understanding of 
spatio-temporal metaphors. Although the use of different groups of participants and 
different time metaphor questions makes it difficult to infer whether the difference was 
driven merely by general conceptual differences in participants’ understanding of time, the 
results nevertheless suggest that the use of different languages in the formulation of the 
questions was unlikely to be the sole reason of the observed differences.  
People’s metaphorical representation of time can also be affected by their physical 
spatial movement or the thought of experiencing spatial movement (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 
2002; Gentner et al., 1999). For instance, Boroditsky and Ramscar observed that when 
visitors at San Francisco International Airport were asked the ambiguous question about 
Wednesday’s meeting, those who were waiting to depart and those who had just flown in 
were more likely to take ego-moving perspective of time compared to those who were 
waiting for someone to arrive. Similarly, by asking the same question, they found that 
passengers who were on the train connecting San Francisco and San Jose were more likely 
to take ego-moving perspective (vs. time-moving perspective) especially those who just got 
on the train and about to get off the train (vs. middle of journey). It appears that people’s 
thinking about time is related to their bodily spatial movement or even the thought of 
experiencing spatial movement.  
In order to examine the relationship between affect and agency in communication, 
McGlone and Pfiester (2009) examined the use of spatiotemporal words (e.g., 
pass/passed/passing, close/closer, begin/began/beginning) by searching their occurrence in 
a large corpus of spoken and text material (i.e., sample of languages). They found that 
positive events were more frequently encoded by human-agent temporal expressions 
whereas negative events were more likely encoded in event-agent temporal expressions. A 
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subsequent follow-up study conducted using a controlled laboratory setting confirmed the 
findings of their previous study showing that positive past experiences were more 
frequently described in human-agent manner whereas the use of event-agent agency was 
more frequent in negative experience narratives. They concluded that humans prefer to 
attribute positive event’s agency to themselves but instead assigning negative event’s 
agency to the event itself.  
Another study by Lee and Ji (2014) demonstrated how individuals alternate between 
ego-moving and time-moving perspectives as a function of their feelings and the temporal 
location of the targeted event. Lee and Ji found that the use of an ego-moving metaphor 
was more prevalent among those who recalled negative past or positive future experiences 
whereas a time-moving perspective was more common among those who described 
positive past experiences or negative future experiences. Subsequent mediation analyses 
confirmed the mediating role of affect between recollection/anticipation of emotional event 
and the use of time perspective. This study outcome is consistent with the findings of 
McGlone and Pfiester (2009) where the use of time perspective is related to emotion of the 
event. It is also compatible with the suggestion that the use of ego-moving perspective is 
related to the self in motion and thus greater sense of agency compared to the use of time-
moving perspective.  
Another study by Ruscher (2011) which investigated the use of time metaphor and 
estimation of grief duration also lends supportive evidence to this notion. Participants were 
subjected to either ego or time-moving perspective prime prior to a time-estimation task. 
For the time-estimation task, they were asked to imagine the grieving process of a mother 
who has lost her young son then provide an estimate of the mother’s grief intensity and 
duration. Although both groups of participants expected the loss to result in similar amount 
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of grief to the mother, participants who were primed with a time-moving perspective 
estimated the negative affect to last almost twice the estimation given by those that were 
primed with an ego-moving perspective. Ruscher argued that individuals who were primed 
with an ego-moving perspective adopted a more active approach by moving forward (e.g., 
carrying on with normal daily routine) in the grieving period and thus gave a shorter grieving 
period estimation. In contrast, those who were primed with a time-moving perspective 
depicted the mother waiting passively for the grieving period to pass and thus predicted a 
longer estimation.  
Taken together, the above mentioned empirical findings put forward the idea of the 
use of ego-moving metaphor is associated with a self that is active and in motion in relation 
to time whereas the use of time-moving metaphor was associated with a stationary and a 
more passive self in relation to time.  
  
Metaphor: More Than a Conceptual Representation 
Metaphorical expressions are pervasive in daily life, not only to convey complex 
ideas but also to communicate abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The suggestion 
that the use of metaphorical expression might reflect cognitive processing has its root in the 
study of embodied cognition. The pervasive use of metaphorical expressions not only affect 
our cognition (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011) but also has profound 
influences on our perceptual experience (Bolt & Yum, 2010; Glicksohn & Ron-Avni, 1997; 
Lee & Ji, 2014).  
As posited by Lakoff’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), 
our understanding of abstract and complex concepts which cannot be comprehended 
directly can be experienced in the bodily dimension. The study of embodied cognition is 
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grounded on such argument, our conceptual understanding can affect our bodily experience 
which in turn can also be affected by it (see review Reimann et al., 2012). For instance, the 
physical vertical dimensions of up vs. down are analogues of a variety of abstract concepts 
such as positive vs. negative (Meier & Robinson, 2004), control vs. lack of control (Schubert, 
2005), and more vs. less (Joseph, Giesler, & Silvera, 1994) respectively. Furthermore, the use 
of metaphor has been found to have profound influences on the inferences we make 
concerning a concept or an issue in question.  
In an attempt to investigate the influence of metaphorical expression on individuals’ 
reasoning, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) examined how an issue is metaphorically 
framed affects the solution people offer to solve the issue. They presented participants with 
different metaphor expressions to describe an issue in concern (i.e., crime) and had them to 
suggest solutions to the issue. They found that the metaphorical framing of crime seemed 
to invite different solutions being offered to solve the problem (e.g., “crime is a virus” 
corresponded to social reformation and “crime is a beast” corresponded to law 
enforcement). The researchers argued that the metaphorical framing of an issue invited 
different inferences being drawn about the issue in question hence different problem 
solving.  
In studies of time metaphors, it has been found that metaphorical understanding of 
time can exert influence on the way we mentally represent time in spatial terms. Lai and 
Boroditsky (2013) investigated the influence of time metaphors on individuals’ spatial 
representation of time. Participants were exposed to either front-back or up-down 
metaphors and asked to point to the space around them in which these time points were 
located. They found that when participants were prompted with up-down metaphors, they 
were more likely to lay out time along the vertical axis whereas when they were prompted 
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with front-back metaphor, they were more likely to lay out time in horizontal manner. The 
researchers argued that our habitual use of time perspective has immediate implications on 
the way we conceptualise and reason in temporal domains, in this case, the mapping of 
spatial metaphors onto the dimension of time. 
Further downstream influences of metaphoric conceptions of time on perceptual 
experience come from studies related to time estimation. The use of distinct metaphorical 
systems of time (ego-moving and time-moving) appears to influence individuals’ 
perceptions, judgments, and evaluations of time (Boltz & Yum, 2010; Glicksohn & Ron-Avni, 
1997; Ruscher, 2011). For instance, people who adopt an ego-moving (vs. time-moving) 
perspective estimate that less time is needed to reach a goal (Boltz & Yum, 2010), perceive 
time to pass more quickly (Glicksohn & Ron-Avni, 1997), and expect emotional reactions to 
positive and negative events to be more short-lived (Ruscher, 2011). 
For example, Boltz and Yum’s (2010) found that the use of ego-moving perspective 
(vs. time-moving perspective) was associated with lower prospective and retrospective 
estimates of a task’s duration. In other words, participants’ use of ego-moving metaphors 
was associated with the perception that time will go past more quickly, and hence their 
goals will be achieved more quickly.  
 
1.2.2 Temporal Orientation 
Apart from the use of time metaphor, another aspect of time-related cognition 
observed to be different between Eastern and Western individuals is the temporal region 
those individuals emphasize. Although the linkages between the temporal regions (e.g., past, 
present, and future) are perceived to vary individually (Lasane & O’Donnell, 2005), a 
number of cognitive and affective studies (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 
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2013; Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007; Van Boven et al., 2010) 
have demonstrated that individuals from different cultures appear to differ in their 
temporal orientation.  
Temporal orientation6 refers to an individual’s habitual tendency of cognitively 
attending to the past, present, or future (Holman & Silver, 1998; Park et al., 2017; c.f. time 
perspective: Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) or the predisposition to have behavioural or affective 
responses that result from such a tendency (Lasane & O’Donnell, 2005). Previous cross-
cultural psychological research contrasting East and West focuses mainly on individuals’ 
temporal orientation toward past and future (Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009) therefore this 
thesis concentrates on the past and future dimensions. 
 
Temporal Orientation and Psychological Distance 
Many things or events that we bring to mind might not be related to the present, but 
instead to the future or the past. For instance, a movie I watched last night, a day out we 
had last summer; a car I am going to buy when I save enough money, a trip we are going to 
take next month. These events or objects at times might seem within reach or at times seem 
far away from us. This subjective feeling of closeness is coined psychological distance, with 
the ‘self, here, and now’ as a point of reference (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
In the literature, an individual’s temporal orientation is established based on the 
underlying assumption of a perceived linkage between cognition and psychological distance. 
                                                     
6 According to Lasane & O’Donnell (2005), there is a subtle difference between the construct of temporal 
orientation and time perspective although some researchers view them as identical concepts. Whilst time 
perspective refers to the cognitive process of dealing with temporally relevant information, temporal 
orientation refers to the behavioural predisposition associated with the cognitive processes that deal with 
temporally relevant information. Compared to time perspective, temporal orientation is a more restricted 
construct as it involves a behavioural element. As the focus of the current thesis is on the implications of time 
perception on mental representation, judgment and decisions, therefore the present thesis does not make 
such differentiation. 
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As suggested by Ji et al. (2009), a temporal region that is thought of more often should be 
more accessible (come to mind more easily) and should hence be perceived as 
psychologically closer. For example, a past event that is thought of more often should more 
easily come to mind and thus feel subjectively closer.  
The notion of psychological distance is a cornerstone of Construal Level Theory (CLT). 
CLT proposes that distal events - not being experienced directly by the self, here and now - 
can be construed at different levels. Increased psychological distance (e.g., temporal, social, 
spatial, hypotheticality) is associated with an increase in abstractness of construal. 
Specifically, events that are temporally closer in time tend to be represented at a 
low/concrete level that captures the peripheral, incidental, subordinate features of the 
event whereas events that are temporally distant are more likely to be represented at a 
high/abstract level that contains the central, general, superordinate features of the event 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998). For example, “getting healthy” might come to mind when 
planning a diet plan for next month whereas “counting calories” might crop up when 
planning a diet plan for tomorrow.  
The literature of CLT points to a bi-directional association between psychological 
distance and construal, with empirical studies demonstrating that psychological distance 
may influence construal but also can be influenced by it (Liberman, Trope, McCrae, & 
Sherman, 2007; Semin & Smith, 1999). For instance, distant past memory (vs. recent past) 
was described with relatively more abstract descriptions. Conversely, more abstract 
retrieval cues (vs. concrete retrieval cues) triggered the recall of older memories (Semin & 
Smith, 1999). 
The relationship between psychological distance and construal is likely due to a 
deficiency of information we have on remote entities compared to proximal ones (Liberman, 
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Trope, & Stephan, 2007).  For instance, it is probable that we have less knowledge about 
places that are located spatially further away from us (vs. nearby) or we are likely to have 
less information about people socially more distant from us (vs. close friends). This lack of 
knowledge about an entity in question promotes a more abstract representation instead of 
a more concrete one.  
A number of research studies suggest that the schematic representations we form 
about an entity direct our attention to their specific aspects and thereby affect our 
preferences, predictions, and judgments (see review Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2010). 
Accordingly, CLT has been extensively used as a conceptual framework to investigate 
possible downstream influence of psychological distance on domains including facial 
recognition (Wyer, Hollins, Pahl, & Roper, 2015), self-control (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & 
Levin-Sagi, 2006), probability judgment (Wakslak & Trope, 2009), judgment and choice 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998), and ease of information processing (Tsai & Thomas, 2011), 
among others. 
 
Psychological Distance and Mental Representation  
Our ability to construct mental representations of future and past beyond the 
immediate present is contingent upon our ability to cognitively traverse into the future or 
look back on the past. This ‘mental time travel’ relies on cognitive processes involved in 
memory and imagination. Mental simulation is a detailed mental representation of one or a 
series of real or hypothetical events (Taylor & Schneider, 1989), for instance, hypothetical 
constructions or fantasies of potential future events or reconstructions of past experiences 
such as reminiscence of autobiographical memories.  
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Although previous research has demonstrated a connection between psychological 
distance and mental representation (e.g., Liberman & Trope, 1998), relatively little attention 
has been paid to the phenomenal characteristics of mental representations corresponding 
to the psychological distance individuals feel about the event/object in question. However, 
related works examining the connection between temporal distance of future or past 
entities (e.g., events/actions/people) and construal might shed some light on this. 
Temporal distance is closely related to CLT, with the assertion that greater distance 
produces greater abstractness or more high-level construal (vs. proximal distance) 
(Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Semin & Smith, 1999). Take 
Liberman and Trope’s (1998) study for example, in which they compared participants’ 
descriptions of distant future and near future activities. Participants were asked to imagine 
themselves performing various activities (e.g., moving into a new apartment, taking an 
exam) in either the distant future (i.e., next year) or the near future (i.e., tomorrow) and 
then describe these activities. Distant future activities were described with more high-level 
descriptions whereas near future activities were described with more low-level descriptions.  
A similar outcome was found in Semin and Smith’s study (1999) in which they 
investigated the association between construal of past events and temporal distance using a 
similar research paradigm to that of Liberman and Trope (1998). Memory of distant past 
events (vs. recent past events) tended to be described with more abstract narratives. Taken 
together, these findings demonstrate the influence of temporal distance on mental 
representation of both future and past events.  
Notably only temporal distance was manipulated in these studies, and so perceived 
psychological distance of the event/action was never measured. Nonetheless the results 
suggest that psychologically closer events are more likely to be represented at low-level 
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construal whereas psychologically distal events are more likely to be represented at high-
level construal. Accordingly, people’s imagination or memory of temporally closer 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004) or psychologically closer events (Van Boven et al., 
2010) were found to contain greater phenomenal characteristics included sensory details, 
contextual information, and emotionality (e.g., intensity). 
Importantly, variability in mental representation is suggested to be one of the 
contributors of temporal value asymmetry (Van Boven, Kane, & McGraw, 2008), the 
observation that people attribute greater value to a future event than an identical event in 
the past. This has been observed especially among Western individuals (Caruso et al., 2008).  
 
Mental Representation & Temporal Value Asymmetry 
Imagine one day you want to skip a family gathering to attend a major sport event 
with your friends. Would it be better to seek permission from your family beforehand or 
seek forgiveness after? Psychological research seems to suggest you might be judged more 
harshly prior to the event taking place than after the event (Caruso, 2013) especially if you 
are from a Western cultural background.  
Previous psychological research (Caruso et al., 2008) on the relationship between 
temporal asymmetry and judgement observed that people’s judgment varied as a function 
of temporal region (past vs. future). The judgement that people make towards an event that 
will take place in the future does not necessarily equal the one they make in relation to an 
identical event that has taken place in the past. For example, we might be more willing to 
pay more for a product prior to acquiring it than after acquiring it or we might demand 
more money prior to carrying out a job than after carrying it out. This observation that 
people attribute greater value to a future event than an identical event in the past is termed 
  
27 
temporal value asymmetry (Caruso et al., 2008) and it has been observed in people’s value 
and moral judgements especially among Western individuals (Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 
2008; Caruso, et al., 2013). 
In the literature, the temporal value asymmetry effect is exhibited by asking 
participants to assign value to an event or object that will take place at a certain amount of 
time from the present in the future and also towards an identical event or object that has 
taken place the same amount of time from the present in the past. A series of studies 
conducted by Caruso and colleagues demonstrated that Western individuals assign greater 
value to a future event or object than an identical one in the equidistant past (Caruso, 2010; 
Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, et al., 2013). For instance, participants believed that they should 
be paid more money for completing a job and they also pick a more expensive wine for a 
friend to show appreciation when these scenarios were framed in a future condition (vs. 
past condition). These observations suggest that Western individuals assign greater value to 
future event compared to an identical event in the past. 
A reverse temporal asymmetry effect was reported among East Asians (i.e., Chinese) 
(Guo et al., 2012). By using a similar research paradigm as that of Caruso et al. (2008), Guo 
et al.’s (2012) cross-cultural comparison study reported that Chinese participants assigned 
greater value to past events (vs. future). Guo et al. reasoned that Chinese participants have 
a disposition to focus on the past and therefore assign greater valuation to past related 
event/object (vs. future) whereas Canadians individuals are predisposed to attend to the 
future and therefore assigned greater valuation to future-related event/object (vs. past).  
A subsequent experiment in Guo et al. (2012) confirmed this explanation. By asking 
participants to focus on a temporal region (i.e., to think about what they would do in the 
future or about what they had done in the past), those who were induced future-focused 
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assigned greater value to future event whereas those who were induced past-focused 
assigned greater value to past event. Guo et al. concluded that temporal focus accounted 
for their observation of cultural differences in temporal value asymmetry as Chinese 
participants exhibited temporal asymmetry effect as that of the Canadian participants when 
they were induced to focused primarily on the future and the same outcome was also 
observed among the Canadian participants. 
The observation of asymmetrical value being attached to events in different 
temporal regions was found associated with the emotional response evoked by those 
events. Caruso (2010) observed that immoral behaviours tended to be judged as less fair 
when they were described as taking place in the future (vs. past). Participants also reported 
experiencing more intense negative emotional responses when the events were framed as 
occurring in the future. A series of mediation analyses revealed that emotion was a 
significant mediator between the temporal location of an event and judgements of its 
fairness. It was concluded that the inherent value that people attribute to future and past 
events might be underlined by emotional responses evoked by these events.  
Caruso (2010) recruited only Western participants, therefore it is not clear whether 
the same outcome would be observed for East Asians. The findings are consistent with the 
observation that people exhibit more intense emotional responses when they imagine 
experiencing an event prospectively than retrospectively (Caruso et al., 2008; D’Argembeau 
& Linden, 2004; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). Possible explanations for this observation 
include inferences of intentionality and feelings of uncertainty. Thinking about negative 
outcomes that were framed as taking place in the future (vs. past) was found to be 
associated with greater judgments of intentionality and with more intense emotional 
responses (Burns, Caruso, & Bartels, 2012). In addition, compared to past events, future 
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events are less predictable and more ambiguous due to a lack of information or knowledge. 
The greater uncertainty of future events is likely to arouse greater emotional responses 
because they focus our attention and thus are more evocative than are past events (Wilson, 
Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilber, 2005).   
 
Mental Representation & Culture 
Mental simulation is powerful because it enables us to rehearse a potential future 
scenario or to recall a past event. Importantly, the ability to mentally simulate is the key 
that connects our consciousness of the past and the future. It helps us to conceive life 
events as different time points on a continuum (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). This ability is 
important for us to maintain a coherent sense of self by having a sense of continuity 
between the past and the future. For instance, an individual who lost the ability to recall any 
personal past events (i.e., episodic memory) was also incapable of imagining the future (see 
Rosenbaum et al., 2005). In other words, our ability to simulate possible future events is 
closely related to our episodic memory. 
Although the sense of continuity of self is important in sustaining a healthy 
conceptual self, the question of what the self is seems to be culturally influenced. Cross-
cultural research on autobiographical memory has demonstrated that the content of 
memories that people recall reflects the relative emphasis on sense of autonomy vs. social 
connectedness in Western vs. Eastern cultures respectively. For instance, Western 
individuals (e.g., Americans) tend to recall memories with the self as the focus of the event 
whereas Chinese tend to describe more social interactions in their memories (Wang & 
Conway, 2004).  
In terms of future and past episodic thinking, Chen et al., (2015) compared the 
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number of events Chinese and Australian students imagine or recall in regard to some 
specific themes. When asked to imagine possible future events about achievement, 
Australian students managed to generate more events pertaining to this theme compared 
to Chinese students.  On the other hand, when asked to recall events about relationship, 
Chinese students provided more events about interpersonal interactions (e.g., episodes 
with family and friends) than Australian students. These observations suggest that cultural 
norms or beliefs might impact content or reporting of imagination and memory. 
As well as differences, Eastern and Western individuals’ episodic thinking also shared 
some similarities. For instance, Shao, Yao, Ceci, and Wang (2010) examined the relationship 
between self-concept and prospective or retrospective episodic thinking. European 
American and Chinese individuals were asked to imagine and recall autobiographical 
episodes and then provide a description of themselves corresponding to those episodes. 
They found that participants’ descriptions of their future self were more positive in nature 
compared to descriptions of their past self. Importantly, anticipation of future events 
tended to be more positive in valence compared to recollection of past events. This 
tendency is consistent with the positivity bias people typically display when thinking about 
their future (Weinstein, 1980).  
Taken together, the above findings suggest that imagination and memory are self-
serving processes that are sensitive to socio-cultural context. Imagination and memory are 
driven by motivation to sustain our goals and beliefs (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), in this case, to maintain a self that is consistent with 
personal goals or cultural values including an independent vs. interdependent sense of self 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1999) and a more future vs. past oriented frame of mind (Caruso et al., 
2008; Ji et al., 2009) as discussed earlier in the present chapter.  
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1.3 Summary: Culture and Time Perception 
To summarise, psychology and culture has a close and dynamic relationship. Culture 
and cultural differences have been widely researched and studied. Most cross-cultural 
psychological research is conducted based on the assumption that individuals shared similar 
cultural schemas, for example, the conception of how individuals are related to each other 
(i.e., individualism vs. collectivism) and how components are related to each other and also 
to the field (i.e., analytical vs. holistic thinking). Many aspects of these shared schemas have 
been found related to our psychological processes and functioning.  
In the domain of time perception, previous research suggests that East Asians and 
Western individuals differ in two main aspects of time-related perception, namely temporal 
orientation and the use of time metaphor. For instance, Western individuals are relatively 
more future-oriented compared to East Asians who are relatively more past-oriented. The 
observation of temporal value asymmetry also suggests that the primary temporal region 
that individuals attend to may exert influence on other responses (e.g., mental 
representation, emotional response, and judgment). However, exactly how one’s time-
related perceptions and downstream implications such as individual’s mental 
representation and decisions are related remained unclear.  
On the other hand, there are also profound cultural differences in the use of 
metaphorical representation of time between Western individuals and East Asians. 
Although this might not imply the existence of downstream influences, it suggests a possible 
influence of higher cognitive inferences on further judgement and decisions. The present 
thesis intends to answer these questions and also investigate such possibilities.  
There are several reasons to study culture, time perception, and its implications on 
mental representation and decisions. It enables us to gain insight into the cultural similarity 
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and differences on the concept of time, a basic but yet pervasive concept that is 
fundamentally important in its own right. Exploring time-related perception among East 
Asians and Western individuals also opens up the possibility of understanding other 
culturally-related mechanisms, for instance, behind one’s mental representation, judgment, 
and decisions which is ever more important in the present increasingly globalized 
environment.  
 
1.4 Overview of Present Research 
The current research considers how culture and time perception can be brought 
together by exploring possible implications of distinct time-related tendencies for mental 
representation, judgment, and decisions. As the focus of the current research is on how 
culture and time perception affect mental representations and decisions, the contrast will 
be made between native English-speakers from Western individualistic societies and native 
Mandarin-speakers from East Asia collectivist societies. As discussed earlier, culture, 
language, and cognition have a complex and multifaceted relationship. Although it is 
difficult to untangle the effect of linguistic effects from other cultural influence, recruiting 
only native English and Mandarin-speakers from societies that shared similar cultural 
context will increase the possibility that an effect is due to similar cognitive orientation 
instead of linguistic effect. 
Chapter 2 aims to replicate cultural differences findings in the two aspects of time 
perception identified earlier (the use of time metaphor and temporal orientation) between 
East Asians and Western individuals with a focus on Mandarin and English-speakers (Study 
1).  
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Chapter 3 focuses on temporal orientation and its possible downstream cognitive 
influences including mental representation and valuation judgments. It first investigates 
how temporal orientation is related to the mental representation phenomenal 
characteristics of event in question (Study 2 & 3). Next, it examines how temporal 
orientation is related to mental representation as reflected by one’s object value judgment 
(Study 4).  
Chapter 4 has a focus on the use of time metaphor and its potential downstream 
influences. Although previous psychological research implied a possible connection between 
the use of time metaphor and sense of personal control, this relationship is yet to be 
established. The studies (Study 5, 6A, & 6B) presented in this chapter put this to the test. In 
addition, they extend the investigation to explore the association between metaphorical 
representation of time, sense of personal control, and decisions that individuals make. 
Overall, the present thesis intends to contribute to our understanding of how culture 
and time perception are related. In addition, it also aims to further investigate whether 
cultural variability in time perception will have real life implications, such as on our mental 
representation, judgments, or decisions. Lastly, Chapter 5 discusses the findings, limitations, 
and also open questions in relation to these empirical studies and the related literature.  
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Chapter 2 - Cultural Differences in Time Perception 
 
 This chapter aimed to replicate the findings of two aspects of cultural differences 
(between East and West) in time perception as identified in Chapter 1, specifically, the use 
of time metaphor and temporal orientation. Previous research demonstrated that English-
speakers were more likely to use ego-moving metaphors whereas Mandarin-speakers were 
more likely to use time-moving metaphors (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013). In addition, Western 
individuals have been found to be primarily future oriented (e.g., Caruso et al., 2013) 
whereas East Asians have been claimed to have a strong past orientation (e.g., Ji et al., 
2009). The study reported in this chapter attempted to replicate the findings of such cultural 
differences by focusing on English and Mandarin-speakers. In addition, it also attempted to 
examine two novel hypotheses. First, I investigated the relationship between the use of 
time metaphors and one’s sense of personal control. Second, I examined the relationship 
between the use of time metaphors and temporal orientation.  
 
2.1 Culture and Temporal Orientation 
 Previous research into the extent to which people are cognitively biased towards a 
temporal region suggested the phenomenon of temporal asymmetry, the observation that 
people differentially attend to a temporal region (i.e., past, present, or future) (Park et al., 
2016; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). One of the common measures of temporal orientation is 
psychological distance (Caruso et al., 2013; Ji et al., 2009). The proposed relationship 
between temporal orientation and psychological distance is based on the assumption that 
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individuals who attend more to a specific temporal region should place more emphasis on it, 
think about it more, and therefore feel subjectively closer to it (Ji et al., 2009).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, prior research showed cross-cultural differences in 
temporal orientation, with Western individuals having been found to be primarily future 
oriented (Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso et al., 2013; Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 
2009; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007) whereas East Asians are relatively more past-oriented 
(Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009). Compared to East Asians (e.g., Chinese), Western 
individuals (e.g., Euro-Canadians and Americans) have a strong future orientation and a 
weak past orientation. They place more emphasis on future and believe that future events 
can be shaped through implementing plans and actions (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). 
Their emphasis on progress and change as a means to improve quality of life, technology, 
and economic prosperity demonstrate their future-oriented approach mind-set (Nisbett, 
1994). On the contrary, East Asian societies such as the Chinese and Koreans, who are 
influenced by the values of Confucianism tend to place great emphasis on strong traditional 
values and have a stronger past orientation (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Ko & Gentry, 
1991; Yau, 1988).  
Various research studies have demonstrated temporal asymmetry in valuations, in 
which different value is assigned to different temporal regions. For Western individuals, 
future events and actions have been found to be attributed greater value compared to an 
identical event or action in the past. For example, Caruso et al (2008) reported that 
American participants believed that they should be paid more for a job that they expected 
to do one month in the future compared to an identical piece of work that they had done 
one month previously. American participants also reported a willingness to buy a more 
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expensive wine as a present for a friend when they imagined the friend would let them use 
his vacation home in the future, compared to when they imagined using it in the past.  
Using the same research paradigm as that of Caruso et al. (2008, described above), 
Guo et al. (2012) found that Chinese participants believed they should be paid more for a 
job done in the past than an identical piece of work they are expected to do in the future. In 
addition, Chinese participants also planned to spend more money on a thank-you gift when 
they imagined their friend had let them use the vacation home in the past than when they 
imagined their friend would let them use it in the future.  
Apart from the asymmetrical temporal valuations, East Asians also believe that the 
past is highly related to the present (Ji et al., 2009). Ji and her colleagues (2009) presented 
European Canadians and Chinese participants with a theft scenario and a list of clues 
relevant to the potential suspect’s past and present behaviours. Participants were asked to 
judge the relevance of each of the items in solving the case. The authors found that Chinese 
participants considered past information to be more relevant in solving the case than did 
Canadian participants. In addition, East Asian individuals have been found to be more aware 
of the indirect and distal downstream consequences of events, and to assume that events 
will have broader indirect consequences (Maddux & Yuki, 2006).  
In the literature, an individual’s temporal orientation has been determined based on 
their perceived psychological distance towards a time point or event in the past versus 
future. For example, participants were asked to report their perceived closeness of a time 
point in the past or future (Caruso et al., 2013; Ji et.al., 2009) or of a past or future event (Ji 
et al., 2009; Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005). For instance, Ji et al. (2009) asked 
Canadian and Chinese students to report their subjective distance of the same month one 
year ago. They found that Chinese participants (vs. Canadians) rated the same month one 
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year ago and the past exam as subjectively closer to them. A similar outcome was obtained 
when participants were asked to report their subjective distance of a past exam. On the 
other hand, a non cross-cultural study by Caruso et al. (2013) demonstrated that North 
American participants rated one month in the future as psychologically closer than one 
month in the past. Moreover, one year in the future was also rated as subjectively closer 
than one year in the past (Caruso et al., 2013). 
Taken together, these studies show cross-cultural differences in individuals’ 
tendency to be future- or past-oriented. Differences in perceived psychological distance 
may have further implications for mental representations. For example, there is a well-
established link between psychological distance and level of construal – that is, the extent 
to which people interpret and represent information in relatively abstract vs. concrete 
terms (Liberman & Trope, 1998). As discussed in Chapter 1, CLT posits that an increase in 
psychological distance (e.g., temporal, social, spatial, hypotheticality) is associated with an 
increase in abstractness of construal (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
For instance, events perceived to be temporally more distant are more likely to be 
represented in more abstract terms (high-level construals) compared to events that are 
temporally closer (hence psychologically closer) (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Events that have 
occurred in the recent past or will occur in the near future tend to be described in a way 
that is rich in detail and contextual information, whereas events that are further removed in 
time are described in more abstract terms which capture only the central meaning of the 
event (Semin & Smith, 1999; Liberman & Trope, 1998). Consequently, if East Asians perceive 
past time points to be subjectively closer than do Westerners, they might be more likely to 
adopt low-level construals as well. Conversely, if Western individuals feel subjectively closer 
to future time point, they should be more likely to adopt high-level construals as well. As 
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part of the present study’s investigation into cultural differences in time-perception, 
participant’s temporal orientation will be examined and also their level of construal for past 
and future actions.  
  
2.2 Culture and Time Metaphor 
The second time-related perception of interest is metaphorical representation of 
time. As discussed in Chapter 1, in both English and Mandarin, there are two dominant ways 
of metaphorically representing time: ego-moving and time-moving (Boroditsky, 2000; 
Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Gentner, et al., 2002; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Margolies & 
Crawford, 2008). The ego-moving metaphor describes an individual as an active agent that 
moves toward or away from a stationary referent object or event along a timeline whereas 
the time-moving metaphor describes an individual as stationary on the timeline, with the 
referent object or event moving toward or away from them (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009). 
Although individuals are able to represent time in both metaphorical systems, prior research 
has found that the ego-moving perspective is more prevalent among individuals with a 
Western cultural background whereas the time-moving perspective is more common among 
individuals with an Eastern cultural background (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013).  
 
2.2.1 Time, Language, and Perceived Control 
As indicated earlier, humans mentally represent time in dimensions that are 
grounded in physical experience such as spatial terms. The relationship between time and 
space can be easily observed in the phrases we use in everyday activities, whether we are 
getting closer to the new year or moving away from the past; the spring is ahead of us or we 
are leaving winter behind, we rely on the correspondence between time and space in order 
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to convey temporal expressions. The linguistic frameworks of ego and time-moving 
metaphors have been suggested to imply different source of agency about the event in 
question. In other words, they attribute the source of change to different entities (McGlone 
& Pfiester, 2009).  
Consider these two sentences, we are approaching the summer and the summer is 
approaching us. Although these two forms of expressions both express similar temporal 
relationships between the observer and the event, they imply a different source of agency 
with the former implying we as the entity that causes the change by moving forward toward 
a standstill summer. In contrast, in the latter sentence, it was implied that we are the 
motionless entity whereas the summer is the source of agency that moves closer toward us. 
The agency assignments implied by ego- and time-moving metaphors are illustrated in 
Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1 The temporal change conceptual framework of ego and time-moving metaphors 
(McGlone & Pfiester, 2009) 
 
 
Ego-moving Metaphor 
 
 
 
 
We are approaching summer. 
We have already passed the deadline. 
 
 
Time-moving Metaphor 
 
 
 
 
 Summer is approaching. 
The deadline has already passed. 
 
Observer Summer Deadline 
Future Past 
Observer Summer Deadline 
Future Past 
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This interpretation of how agency is assigned using different time metaphors is 
consistent with the way Westerners and East Asians attribute event causality. For example, 
Western individuals are more likely to exhibit fundamental attribution bias (Choi, et al., 
1999) by over assigning event causality to internal dispositions despite the presence of 
situational constraints. On the other hand, East Asian’s holistic thinking style encourage 
them to explain event causality by drawing on a wider range of contextual factors and thus 
they are less prone to the fundamental attribution bias (Choi, et al., 1999; Morris & Peng, 
1999).  
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, various studies (see Nisbett, 2003 for reviews) have 
documented cultural differences in information processing between East Asians and 
Western cultural groups, with Western individuals predisposed to think analytically, 
attending primarily to the attributes of the focal object but paying relatively little attention 
to its surrounding context. In contrast, holistic thinking is more prevalent among East Asian 
individuals. This mode of information processing is characterized by attending to the focal 
object and the surrounding context as a whole. As a result, East Asians attend more to the 
context including the relationship between an object and the field in which it is embedded 
in. They have tendency to describe and make predictions based on relational context and 
find it relatively difficult to disentangle an object from its background (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 
2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).  
In an attempt to demonstrate cultural variation in causal attribution, Morris and 
Peng (1994) compared the way Chinese and Americans students explain the behaviours of 
computer generated animated fish scenes (e.g., a single fish moves toward a group of fish; 
and in another scene a single fish moves away from a group of fish). They found that 
Chinese students were more likely to attribute the cause of the fish’s behaviour to external 
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forces (e.g., one fish follows another fish) whereas American students were more likely to 
attribute the fish’s behaviour to internal forces (e.g., hungry and swim to look for food). In 
the same study, they also analysed and compared the attributional patterns of two 
newspaper reports (i.e., an English newspaper and a Chinese newspaper) on shooting 
murder incidents that occurred in the United States. They found that the English newspaper 
attributed the cause of the incident more to the personal disposition of the murderer (e.g., 
“very bad temper”) whereas Chinese newspaper tended to emphasize situational factors as 
the cause of shooting (e.g., “gunman had recently been fired”). Taken together, these 
findings indicated that Americans tended to attribute causes of events to internal factors 
whilst Chinese individuals tended to assign event causality to external factors.  
The observation of cultural differences in the attribution of event causality (Choi et 
al., 1999) is consistent with the interpretation of agency assignment from time metaphors’ 
linguistic frameworks (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009). The findings of frequent use of time-
moving metaphors (i.e., assign agency to the event itself) among Mandarin-speakers and 
ego-moving metaphors (i.e., assign agency to internal disposition such as the self) among 
English-speakers are parallel with the observation of attribution bias and the preferred type 
of personal control found in both cultural groups respectively.  
 
2.2.2 Culture and Perceived Control 
In 1966, Rotter introduced the concept of ‘locus of control’, based on his observation 
that people have different generalized expectancies. Whilst some people attribute event 
outcomes as the results of their own making (e.g., effort or skills) (i.e., internal locus of 
control), others think that event outcomes are largely due to external factors (e.g., luck, or 
chance) that are beyond their control (i.e., external locus of control) (Rotter, 1966). An 
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individual’s locus of control can be assessed by using the “Internal-External (I-E) Locus of 
Control Scale”. This scale consists of a series of questions that each made up of a pair of two 
statements represents an internal and an external response respectively. The number of 
type of internal (e.g., “People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make”) vs. 
external (e.g., “Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck”) 
statements a respondent agrees with serves as an indication of the type of locus control the 
respondent has.  
As highlighted earlier, the use of two spatio-temporal metaphors are suspected to 
be related to degree of perceived control or personal agency. Agency is the feeling that one 
can control external events by controlling one’s own actions (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009; cf 
internal locus of control, Rotter, 1990). Individuals who adopt an ego-moving metaphor 
perceive themselves to be actively in motion. This should result in higher sense of agency 
compared to those who feel that they are at a standstill. Individuals who endorse a time-
moving metaphor, on the other hand, feel that they are stationary waiting for events to 
move past them. It is suspected that such individuals would profess a lower sense of agency.   
The findings of cross-cultural differences in perceived personal control appear to 
lend supportive evidence to this suggestion. There are well-established cross-cultural 
studies demonstrating that Western individuals place greater emphasis on being able to 
take control compared to East Asians such as Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 1999; Sastry & Ross, 1998; Weisz et al., 1984). In individualistic Western societies, 
individuals are generally perceived as independent and autonomous entities. Personal 
autonomy is highly valued as people are expected to exercise their influence through the 
use of their personal control or agentic action (see Markus & Kitayama, 1999). As a result, 
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one tends to have greater internal locus of control, believe that what happens is mainly the 
result of their own action, effort, or skills (Connor & Shimizu, 2002; Sastry & Ross, 1998). 
In contrast, East Asian cultures are predominantly collectivist in nature (Triandis, 
1989). Collectivist societies have clear norms indicating that individuals are expected to 
maintain harmonious relationships with others. Such expectations encourage cultural 
practices that emphasize social connectedness, roles, and obligations. Members of 
collectivist cultures tend to have an interdependent view of the self, perceive themselves to 
be fundamentally connected to others. Such dispositions might promote greater attention 
to other people, as one needs to accommodate to the needs, feelings, or thoughts of other 
people and also adjust to the surrounding context. This indirectly reduces the amount of 
control one perceives oneself to have (see Markus & Kitayama, 1999). Therefore, individuals 
in collectivist societies tend to have greater external locus of control, believe that events 
outcomes are largely due to factors beyond one’s control such as luck, chance, or fate 
(Connor & Shimizu, 2002; Sastry & Ross, 1998).  
In a study by Iyengar and Lepper (1999), a group of Anglo American and Asian 
American children (i.e. Japanese or Chinese) participated in an anagram-solving task in 
which the choice of anagram was either chosen by children themselves or their mother. 
Children’s performance was measured by the total number of correctly solved anagrams. 
Anglo American children managed to correctly solve most anagrams in the personal choice 
condition and they also spent more time on task compared to those in the mother’s choice 
condition. In contrast, Asian American children performed the best and spent more time in 
the mother’s choice condition compared to the personal choice condition. The authors 
concluded that personal choice was related to greater intrinsic motivation among Anglo 
American children who tended to have independent selves. In contrast, Asian American 
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children who tended to have interdependent selves were more motivated when choices 
were made for them. This observation led to the conclusion that personal choice and sense 
of autonomy are emphasized differently in different cultures.  
Related research supported the idea that sense of personal control plays a different 
role in individuals’ psychological well-being culturally (e.g., Cheng, Cheung, Chio, & Chan, 
2013; Connor & Shimizu, 2002; Sastry & Ross, 1998). For instance, despite external sense of 
control being linked to negative psychological symptoms (e.g., depression, anxiety, or 
psychological distress) among Western individuals, such associations appear to be weaker 
among East Asians (see Cheng et al., 2013 for meta-analysis). This may be an indication that 
the importance of perceived control to psychological well-being is varied systematically 
across different cultures. 
 
Notes on Terminology and Claims 
1. A note on participants. Due to the involvement of linguistic analysis in the use of time 
metaphors, all the analysis in this thesis included only native English-speakers who were 
born in majority English-speaking countries which are predominantly individualist cultures 
(e.g., U.K., U.S., Australia, and New Zealand) and native Mandarin-speakers who were born 
in East and Southeast Asian countries which are predominantly collectivist in nature (e.g., 
China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan). It is worth noting that the comparisons between 
Western and Eastern individuals/societies in this thesis are typically referring to North 
Americans (e.g., European Americans, Euro-Canadians) and East Asians (e.g., Chinese, 
Japanese, Koreans or whose ancestors come from East or South East Asian countries) 
respectively. Previous works suggest that age has a close relationship with time perspective 
which possibly influence other cognition and emotional processing (e.g., Socioemotional 
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selectivity theory; Carstensen, 2006; Nurmi, 1991), therefore this thesis recruited mainly 
young adults (age 18 to 25-year-old) as participants from each of the cultural group in order 
to make a meaningful cross-cultural comparison. Therefore, the discussions and findings 
presented in this thesis refer mainly to individuals in this age group.  
2. A note on testing materials. All the native English-speakers were tested in English 
whereas all the native Mandarin-speakers were tested in Mandarin. The testing materials 
were first developed in English, translated into Mandarin then back-translated to ensure 
that the intended meaning was retained (Brislin, 1970).  
3. A note on inclusion criteria. All of the studies reported here include participants recruited 
mainly from online pools. Therefore, there was a screening process where incomplete 
responses, responses from those other than native English or Mandarin-speakers, responses 
with a duplicate IP address, and responses from participants reporting an age of less than 
18-year-old were excluded.   
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2.3 Study 1: Cultural Differences in Time Perception and Perceived Control 
2.3.1 Introduction  
As highlighted earlier, it is suspected that the use of time metaphor might be related 
to perceived personal control or sense of agency one has. The linguistic frameworks of two 
common time metaphors, namely ego- and time-moving metaphors, were found to imply 
different sources of agency to different entities. Moreover, the interpretation of the pattern 
of agency assignment based on the linguistic framework is consistent with the event 
causality attribution styles (Choi, et al., 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994) and the preferred locus 
of control (Cheng et al., 2013) observed among East Asians and Western individuals.  
However, the relationship between the use of time-metaphor and sense of personal 
control is yet to be established. The present study would be the first to put this to test, to 
examine the relationship between the use of time metaphor and sense of personal control. 
Study 1 sought to both replicate the findings of cultural differences in the use of time 
metaphor and to explore the relationship between individuals’ perceptions of control and 
their endorsement of time metaphors.   
In the existing literature, there are numerous findings showing that East Asians are 
more likely to attribute event causation to situational factors (e.g., contextual influences) as 
opposed to Westerners who are more likely to assign event causation to internal factors 
(e.g., trait or internal disposition of a person) (Choi, et al., 1999; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 
2002; Morris & Peng, 1994).  
The tendency of Westerners and East Asians to assign event causality to different 
factors (internal and external respectively) is consistent with the greater internal and 
greater external control observation in cross-cultural studies (Cheng et al., 2013). In 
Western societies where personal autonomy and agentic action is being emphasised and 
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valued highly, individuals tend to have greater internal locus of control, believe that the 
occurrence of events are contingent upon one’s own ability or actions (Rotter, 1966). In 
contrast, in East Asian societies (e.g., China, Japan, and Korea) where there are strict social 
norms and individuals are expected to maintain harmonious relationships with each other, 
people tend to have greater external locus of control, believe that event occurrence are 
contingent largely on reasons beyond one’s control such as fate, chance, or luck (Sastry & 
Ross, 1998). The divergence sense of perceived control between the two cultures are 
consistent with the frequent use of ego- and time-moving perspective in the Western and 
Eastern cultures respectively.  
In the time metaphor literature, McGlone and Harding’s (1998) ambiguous question 
has been extensively used to determine participant’s metaphorical representation of time. 
However, the question is only a single item measure. There is a possibility that the result 
might be due to a function of language such as linguistic structure rather than perspective 
that one has. Therefore, this study examined participant’s use of time metaphors using 
McGlone & Harding’s ambiguous question and other spatial and clock related ambiguous 
questions. 
Apart from the use of time metaphor, Study 1 also aimed to replicate the 
observation of cultural differences in temporal orientation by comparing the perceived 
psychological distance of an equidistant time point in the past and future. Psychological 
distance is measured as the perceived psychological closeness between the self (i.e., here 
and now) and the event in a specific temporal region (Trope & Liberman, 2010). This study 
attempts to replicate the finding of cultural differences in temporal asymmetry by adapting 
previous measures (Ji et al., 2009). A large sample of English and Mandarin-speakers 
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reported their subjective feeling of closeness to 1 month in the past and 1 month in the 
future. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, psychological distance is closely related to mental 
representation (i.e., CLT), with the assertion that greater psychological distance to be 
associated with greater abstractness or more high-level construal (vs. proximal distance) 
(Liberman, et al., 2002). Therefore, perceived subjective closeness to a time point in the 
future or the past is expected to influence the mental representation participants form. 
Therefore, participants were also asked to complete a measure of construal level to inform 
us of their mental representations of past and future actions. Based on the observation of 
temporal value asymmetry (Caruso et al., 2013; Ji et al., 2009) and CLT (Liberman and Trope, 
1998), I expect English-speakers who should feel subjectively closer (or more distant) to the 
future should form a more concrete (or abstract) mental representation of future actions 
and thus describe future actions by using more low-level construals (or high-level construals) 
(vs. past actions). Likewise, Mandarin-speakers who should feel subjectively closer (or more 
distant) to the past should form a more concrete (or abstract) mental representation of past 
actions and thus describe past actions by using more low-level construals (or high-level 
construals) (vs. future actions). 
Furthermore, as highlighted by a previous study (Caruso et al., 2013), the way we 
mentally represent spatial movement of events in relation to time implies an element of 
asymmetry in the psychological distance of past and future events. This is because, as time 
passes, future events are conceived as getting closer to us and past events are moving away 
from us. This implies a reduced temporal distance between the self and future which should 
in turn result in reduce psychological distance between the self and future. In contrast, as 
time passes the temporal distance between the self and past events increases, and thus so 
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does the perceived psychological distance between the self and past. Following this line of 
reasoning, I expect there to be a relationship between the use of ego-moving metaphor and 
temporal orientation. Specifically, the use of ego-moving metaphor should be related to 
reduced psychological distance to the future and increased psychological distance from the 
past. Study 1 is the first to explore this possibility. 
In summary, Study 1 aims to a) replicate previous findings of cultural differences 
between East and West (specifically English and Mandarin-speakers) in time-related 
perceptions (the use of time metaphors and temporal orientation), b) explore the 
relationship between the use of time metaphor and sense of personal control, and c) assess 
the relationship between the use of time metaphor and temporal orientation.  
 
 2.3.2 Method  
Participants 
Five hundred and three participants participated in this study on a voluntary basis 
either on-line (N = 465) or by completing a paper questionnaire (N = 38). Online participants 
were recruited by posting study links on various psychological and non-psychological 
research websites and social-networking platforms (see Appendix A – Part I for online 
recruitment sources). Participants who completed the paper version of the questionnaire 
were recruited by approaching them directly in the university campus. 
Out of the 503 participants who participated in this study, 237 valid responses were 
included in the analysis after screening process following the inclusion criteria (exclusion 
rate = 52.88%). 112 Responses were excluded due to incomplete data, 45 due to non-native 
English or Mandarin-speakers, 92 were below 18 years-old, and 17 responses were due to a 
duplicate IP address. The valid sample included 135 English-speakers (86 females, 1 missing 
  
50 
data, age 18-68 years-old, Mage = 27.41, SD = 10.59) and 102 Mandarin-speakers (58 females, 
1 missing data, age 19-60 years-old, Mage = 28.52, SD = 7.09). The majority of the English-
speakers were born in the USA (75.9%) and the U.K. (17.3%). The rest of the participants 
were born in Canada (5.3%) and Australia (1.5%). For the Mandarin-speakers, 98% of them 
were born in Malaysia and the remaining 2% were born in China. 34 participants completed 
the paper version questionnaire7 (10 English-speakers and 24 Mandarin-speakers).  
 
Materials 
Participants completed the following series of measures in a fixed order: 
Time Metaphors: Participants were presented with a series of six questions intended to 
measure their metaphorical representations of time and space. In addition to the meeting 
question developed by McGlone and Harding (1998; i.e., ‘Next Wednesday’s meeting has 
been moved forward two days. What day is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled?’), 
participants were also asked a further five questions (Richmond, Wilson, & Zenkin, 2012). 
These included ‘Suppose the clock says it is 1pm now. You need to move it one hour forward. 
What time will it be adjusted to?’ and ‘A book will be re-edited so that ‘page 10’ will move 
forward 5 pages. What page will ‘page 10’ now appear on?’ Three further questions 
presented participants with a row of letters, numbers or figures, with an X appearing over 
one of them. On these items, participants were asked what number/letter/figure X would 
be over if it moved forward a certain number of spaces (see Appendix A - Part II for time 
metaphor questions).  
                                                     
7 A series of 2 Culture (English, Mandarin) x 2 Method (Online, Paper) ANOVAs were conducted, with ego-
moving score, psychological distance to the past, psychological distance to the future, internal locus of control 
score, high-level construal to the past, and high-level construal to the future action as dependent variables. 
There was no significant Culture x Method interaction (largest F(1, 229) = 2.25, p = .14, 
2
p = .01), therefore 
data collection method will not be discussed any further.  
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The question about meeting reschedule and clock reset was randomized across all 
participants. Participants’ responses were classified as ego-moving or time-moving, any 
other responses were treated as missing data. The proportion of ego-moving responses was 
calculated for each participant. This scale displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α 
= .87)  
Locus of Control: Participants completed Rotter’s (1966) Internal-External locus of 
control scale, which consists of 19 items that require participants to choose which of two 
statements they endorse. Each pair consists of an internal-control statement (e.g., ‘People’s 
misfortunes result from the mistakes they make’) and an external-control statement (e.g., 
‘Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck’). One point is given 
for each internal or external response to a statement. The proportion of internal-control 
statements chosen by each participant was calculated.  This scale displayed good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .84). The order of the statements was randomized across all 
participants.  
Temporal Orientation: Participants rated how far away they felt to a point one 
month in the future (i.e. ‘Please think ahead to exactly one month from today. How far away 
does one month in the future feel to you?’), and how far away they felt to a point one month 
in the past (i.e. ‘Please think back to exactly one month ago today. How far away does one 
month ago in the past feel to you?’). Ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely 
close in time; 7 = extremely distant in time). The order of the temporal orientation questions 
was counterbalanced across all participants.  
Construal: Participants completed a series of questions adopted from Fujita, et al., 
(2006) and the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). In this 
measure, participants were required to choose between two descriptions of an action which 
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was identified as occurring either one month in the past or one month in the future. Each 
choice was between a low-level, concrete description (focused on how one would perform 
the action) and a high-level, abstract description (focused on why one would perform the 
action). For example, given the action ‘sweeping the floor,’ participants would choose 
between ‘moving the broom’ (low-level) and ‘being clean’ (high-level). Each participant was 
presented with 31 actions (see Appendix A – Part III for construal questions). Half of the 
actions were in the past condition and the other half were in the future condition. The 
presentation of items was counterbalanced across all participants. All participants answered 
both past and future condition. Half of the participants answered the past condition then 
follow by the future condition. The order of condition was reversed for the other half 
participants. The order of descriptions and items was randomised across all participants. 
The proportion of high-level descriptions chosen for past and future actions was calculated 
for each participant. The scales displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s αpast = .72; 
αfuture = .74 ). 
 
Procedure 
The online study link was open for participation for approximately two months after 
which it was deactivated or removed from the websites. Participants who clicked on the 
study link were first directed to the page which contains a brief introduction of the study. 
They were then asked to give their informed consent for their participation. Participants 
were asked to provide some basic demographic information (e.g. sex, age, first language, 
country of birth, and country of residing at time of participation) prior to the start of the 
questionnaire. Upon completion of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four versions of the questionnaires which 
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counterbalance the sequence of the psychological distance questions (i.e. past and future) 
and action identification questions. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
Post-hoc power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) revealed that with a sample size of 237, 
effect size of 0.45, the power achieved to detect the difference in psychological distance 
was 0.99. 
 
Cultural Differences in the Use of Time Metaphor 
An independent-samples t-test indicated a significant difference between English 
and Mandarin-speakers, t(235) = 16.30, p < .001, d = 2.11 such that English-speakers (n = 
135) selected significantly more ego-moving responses (M = .72, SD = .27) than did 
Mandarin-speakers (n = 102) (M = .16, SD = .26)8. 
Compared to Mandarin-speakers, English-speakers were more likely to provide ego-
moving responses in all the time metaphor ambiguous questions [the meeting question, χ2(1, 
N = 231) = 92.58, p < 0.001; the clock question, χ2(1, N = 235) = 144.06, p < 0.001; the block 
marked ‘X’ question, χ2(1, N = 233) = 78.26, p < 0.001; the 5 people question, χ2(1, N = 236) 
= 38.22, p < 0.001; the book question, χ2(1, N = 218) = 64.21, p < 0.001; and also the 
alphabet question1, χ2(1, N = 232) = 54.32, p < 0.001 (see Figure 2.2)]. 
 
                                                     
8 Additional analysis conducted using only responses on the ambiguous meeting and clock questions revealed 
similar findings, showing that English-speakers (M = .80, SD = .30) were still more likely to adopt ego-moving 
metaphor than Mandarin-speakers (M = .10, SD = .22), t(235) = 20.03, p < .001, d = 2.66.  
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Figure 2.2 Percentage of participants who gave ego-moving responses to the time metaphor 
ambiguous questions for Study 1. 
 
Relationship between Time Metaphor and Sense of Control   
The proportion of Internal Locus of Control responses selected by participants was 
analysed using an independent-samples t-test. The results showed that English-speakers 
selected more internal (vs. external) responses (M = .50, SD = .18) than did Mandarin-
speakers (M = .46, SD = .18), however, this difference was not significant, t(235) = 1.60, p 
= .111, d = .21. I had expected that metaphorical representations of time would predict 
locus of control, such that participants who more strongly endorsed ego-moving metaphors 
of time would also claim greater internal locus of control. However, that relationship was 
not present9 in either the overall sample [r(237) = .01, p = .873], or separately in the 
Mandarin [r(102) = -.16, p = .10] and English-speaking samples [r(135) = -.05, p = .586] (see 
Appendix A - Part IV for the ego-moving response and internal locus of control scatter plots). 
                                                     
9 Additional analysis carried out using only responses on the ambiguous meeting and clock questions revealed 
similar findings, showing that there was no relationship between the use of ego-moving metaphor and internal 
locus of control score in either the overall sample [r(237) = .07, p = .272], or separately in the Mandarin [r(102) 
= -.08, p = .44] and English-speaking samples [r(135) = .01, p = .88]. 
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Cultural Differences in Psychological Distance 
Participants’ ratings of psychological distance to one month in the past vs. future 
were entered as repeated measures in a mixed-model ANOVA with culture (English vs. 
Mandarin) as a between-participants factor. There was a significant main effect of past vs. 
future ratings, F(1, 231) = 25.82, p < .001, η2p = .10, such that the past was rated as 
significantly more distant (M = 4.15, SD = 1.82) than the future (M = 3.37, SD = 1.55). There 
was also a marginal significant difference between cultures, F(1, 231) = 3.87, p = .05, η2p 
= .02, such that English-speakers rated both time points as more distant than did Mandarin-
speakers (See Table 2.1). The culture X past/future interaction was not significant, F(1, 231) 
= 0.70, p = .41, η2p = .003. However, it is worth noting that overall English-speakers rated the 
past one month as more distant.  
 
Table 2.1 Mean ratings of psychological distance as a function of temporal direction and 
culture in Study 1. 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Psychological distance was rated using 
a scale ranging from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate greater distance. 
 
Relationship between Psychological Distance and Construal Level 
The proportions of high-level construal responses selected to describe past vs. future 
actions were entered as repeated measures in a mixed-model ANOVA with culture as a 
between-participants factor. There was a significant main effect of culture [F(1, 235) = 17.15, 
p < .001, η2p = .07] such that Mandarin-speakers selected a greater proportion of high-level 
Past Future 
M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 135) 4.34 (1.82) 3.46 (1.59)
Mandarin (n  = 98) 3.89 (1.80) 3.26 (1.50)
Culture
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construal responses than did English-speakers (see Table 2.2).This difference was not 
moderated by time (past vs. future), [F(1, 235) = 0.14, p = .708, η2p = .001] nor was there a 
significant main effect of time, [F(1, 235) = 0.215, p = .644, η2p = .001]. 
 
Table 2.2 Mean proportions of high-level construal responses on construal measurement by 
temporal direction and culture in Study 1 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Higher scores indicate greater high-
level construal. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it was predicted that temporal orientation would predict 
construal level such that greater psychological distance from a particular point in time 
would correspond to higher-level construal for that time point. However, this relationship 
did not emerge for the overall sample, nor did it emerge when English and Mandarin-
speakers were considered separately. See Table 2.3 for the correlation between high-level 
construal and psychological distance ratings. 
 
Table 2.3 Pearson’s correlation between high-level construal and psychological 
distance ratings by temporal direction and culture in Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
Culture Past Future 
English (n  = 135) .59 (.23) .57 (.24)
Mandarin (n  = 102) .68 (.21) .68 (.19)
Culture Past Future 
Overall sample (N  = 233) .02 .02
English (n  = 135) .01 .12
Mandarin (n  = 98) .09 -.15
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Relationship between the use of ego-moving metaphor and temporal orientation 
As mentioned earlier, it was suspected that the use of time metaphor would be 
related to temporal orientation such that the use of ego-moving perspective would be 
associated with reduced psychological distance towards the future and increased 
psychological distance towards the past. This relationship did not emerge for the overall 
sample. When English and Mandarin-speakers were considered separately, the sole 
significant correlation was a positive relationship between the use of ego-moving 
perspective and rating of psychological distance to the future (r = .19, p = .031) within the 
English-speakers. See Table 2.4 for the correlation between ego-moving metaphor and 
psychological distance ratings. 
 
Table 2.4 Pearson’s correlation between ego-moving metaphor and psychological distance 
ratings by temporal direction and culture in Study 1. 
 
 
Note: * p < .05     
 
 
2.3.3  Discussion of Study 1 
Consistent with Lai & Boroditsky (2013), Study 1 found a strong tendency for English-
speakers to adopt ego-moving metaphors compared to Mandarin-speakers who tend to 
adopt time-moving metaphors. English-speakers were found to prefer ego-moving 
metaphors in all of the individual ambiguous time metaphor questions, while Mandarin-
speakers were more likely to take time-moving metaphor in all of the individual questions.  
Culture Past Future 
Overall sample (N  = 233) .11 .11
English (n  = 135) .09 .19*
Mandarin (n  = 98) -.06 -.06
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In terms of the locus of control responses, English-speakers selected more internal 
responses on Rotter’s I-E scale compared to Mandarin-speakers. However, the difference in 
the responses selected between them was not significant. This was contrary to previous 
studies which found that Western individuals tend to have greater perceived internal 
control than East Asians (Cheng et al., 2013; O’Connor & Schimizu, 2002). It is unclear why 
such results were obtained. It is possible that East Asians cultures are getting more 
individualistic due to greater economic, education, and political developments. For instance, 
recent findings demonstrated that Chinse adults place greater priority on individualist 
factors (e.g., income, health, employment status) over collectivist factors (e.g., support for 
collectivist policies) (Steele & Lynch, 2013). This could explain the overall small difference in 
locus of control responses between English and Mandarin-speakers in this study. However, 
it cannot be ruled out that the use of I-E scale (Rotter, 1966) which adopted forced choice 
paradigm (i.e., present two statements in comparative method) might be less able to 
capture the relative nature of participants’ locus of control scores.  
Following the linguistic interpretation (McGlone & Harding, 1998), one of the novel 
hypotheses predicted was that metaphorical representation of time would be related to 
one’s degree of perceived personal control, specifically, endorsement of ego-moving 
metaphors was expected to be related to higher internal locus of control whereas 
endorsement of time-moving metaphors was expected to be related to higher external 
locus of control. However, the results showed that locus of control was not related to the 
use of time metaphors. One possible explanation for this is that the use of forced choice 
paradigm in I-E scale (Rotter, 1966) does not measure individual’s degree of agreement with 
the statement.  
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Based on the findings of previous psychological studies (e.g., Ji et al., 2009; Caruso et 
al., 2008), it was also predicted that English-speakers would feel subjectively closer to the 
future whereas Mandarin-speakers would feel subjectively closer to the past. With respect 
to the overall pattern of psychological distance ratings, English-speakers rated the same day 
in the past month (vs. future) as subjectively more distant, which is in line with their 
proposed stronger future orientation. However, Mandarin-speakers did not rate the same 
day last month to be subjectively closer than the same day one month ahead.  
A series of construal questions were used to identify participant’s action 
identification level (i.e. low-level or more concrete alternative represents less psychological 
distance; high-level or more abstract alternative description represents greater 
psychological distance). Based on Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003), individuals’ temporal orientation was predicted to be related to the action 
construal one forms towards the temporal region in question. In other words, individuals 
who feel subjectively closer to the future (or the past) should represent future actions (or 
past actions) at a low-level or in more concrete/detailed way. It was predicted that 
Mandarin-speakers who feel subjectively closer to the past would be more likely to use low-
level descriptions for past actions whereas English-speakers who feel subjectively closer to 
the future would be more likely to use low-level descriptions to represent future actions. 
However, this relationship did not emerge as Mandarin-speakers were more likely to use 
high level of descriptions for both past and future actions compared to English-speakers.  
It is possible that holistic processing prompts people to focus on the “big picture” 
which should encourage a more abstract or high-level construal. As previously shown, a 
high-level construal is related to holistic processing (e.g., in facial recognition – Wyer et al., 
2015). This could explain Mandarin-speakers’ higher-level representations of past and 
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future actions in this study, presumably due to their more holistic processing style which 
encourages them to attend to each action as a whole rather than to its integral components.  
The present study was also the first to attempt the investigation on the relationship 
between the use of time metaphor and psychological distance to the past or future. It has 
been suggested that the direction of an event’s perceived movement is asymmetric as past 
events move away from the present as opposed to future events which advance towards 
the present (Caruso et al., 2013). The receding of past events should increase the temporal 
distance (hence an increased in psychological distance) between those events and the self, 
whereas the approach of future events should reduce their temporal distance (hence a 
reduced in psychological distance) from the self. However, correlational analyses revealed 
that the use of ego-moving metaphors was not related to reduced psychological distance 
between the self and future events, nor did it relate to greater psychological distance of 
past events.  
Taken together, the findings of Study 1 partially replicated previously observed 
cultural differences in time-related perceptions especially in relation to the use of time 
metaphors. As highlighted earlier, one’s mental representation of an event is contingent 
upon the perceived psychological distance between the event in question and the self. 
Although the results of Study 1 did not replicate the subjectively closer feelings to the future 
and past by English and Mandarin-speakers respectively, English-speakers’ psychological 
distance ratings were nevertheless in the predicted direction (i.e., they rated the future to 
be subjectively closer than the past compared to Mandarin-speakers). In the next chapter, 
the implications of temporal orientation on one’s mental representation of past and future 
events will be investigated. Specifically, following the predictions of CLT, the degree of 
abstractness (or concreteness) of an event’s mental representation should be related to the 
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perceived psychological distance one feels towards the event in question. Therefore, it is 
expected that an individual’s mental representation of an event would be influenced by the 
dominant temporal orientation one has. Individuals who feel subjectively closer to a future 
event would represent it at a more concrete/detailed level and this tendency should be 
reflected in the phenomenological characteristics of their mental representation of the 
event. Conversely, individuals who feel subjectively more distant from past event would 
represent the event at a more abstract/capture the central meaning level and this should be 
reflected in the phenomenology characteristics of their mental representation. These 
predictions will be put to the test in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter 3 - Temporal Orientation: Implications for Mental 
Representation and Value Judgment 
 
 
One of the defining characteristics of temporal orientation is the extent to which 
individuals attend primarily to a particular period of time (e.g., past, present, or future). 
Individuals’ habitual inclination to be cognitively involved in a temporal region varies cross-
culturally with individuals from Western societies (e.g., Canadians, North Americans) 
attending primarily to the future (Caruso et al., 2008; Ji et al., 2009) whereas East Asians 
(e.g., Chinese) have been found to be oriented towards the past (Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 
2009). The results in this thesis (Study 1 Chapter 2) thus far suggested that English-speakers 
feel closer to the future, however, Mandarin-speakers did not feel closer to the past. This 
result is partially consistent with the previous literature (Caruso et al., 2008; Ji et al., 2009). 
Next, I sought to continue this line of investigation by examining the phenomenological 
characteristics of mental representations among individuals from these two cultural 
backgrounds.  
 
3.1 Temporal Orientation, Psychological Distance, and Mental 
Representation  
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, CLT states that psychological distance is associated 
with mental representation. With respect to temporal orientation, if an individual thinks 
frequently about a temporal region, the events or objects located in that region will be 
easily brought to mind and appear to be more salient and hence psychologically closer (Guo 
et al., 2012). Concomitantly, CLT posits that psychologically closer events tend to be 
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construed in a more detailed, concrete manner compared to psychologically more distant 
events (Trope & Liberman, 2003). In other words, our preferred mental construal varies as a 
function of perceived distance of the event in concern (Liberman & Trope, 1998).  
Taken together, research on temporal orientation and CLT suggests that Western 
individuals’ and East Asians’ predominant temporal orientation might be reflected in the 
phenomenological aspects of their mental representations, which corresponds to the 
psychological distance they feel toward the event in question. Specifically, psychologically 
closer events will be filled with greater contextual details than psychologically more distal 
events.  
One possible explanation for this connection is the notion of perceptual fluency, the 
ease with which individuals process information about an event or object, which is a 
cognitive aspect of imagining and recalling experiences. For example, a close or familiar 
object can be processed more fluently compared to novel ones (e.g., Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2008). Similarly, memories of temporally closer (vs. more distant) events contain more 
detailed contextual information (e.g., spatial, temporal, sensory - D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004).  
 
3.2 Imagination and Memory 
In 1983, Tulving proposed a major characteristic that distinguishes semantic and 
episodic memory, a special type of consciousness termed “autonoetic consciousness” 
typically accompanies our retrieval of episodic memory. Whilst semantic memory refers to 
our general knowledge about the world (e.g., Paris is the capital of France or March is the 
third month of the year), episodic memory represents our recollection of previous personal 
experiences (e.g., last year’s Christmas dinner or my first trip abroad). Our episodic memory 
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enables us to perform mental “time travel”, by allowing us to cognitively travel to the past 
or future in order to re-experience the past or pre-experience the future through our 
autonoetic awareness. Autonoetic consciousness refers to “the kind of consciousness that 
mediates an individual’s awareness of his or her existence and identity in subjective time 
extending from the personal past through the present to the personal future” (Tulving, 1985, 
p. 1).  
By mentally simulating10 a possible future scenario, we can predict and plan based 
on our knowledge of a similar past experience which ultimately allows us to make farsighted 
decisions. For example, frequently mentally simulating a future event increases the 
perceived likelihood that it will happen in the future (Koehler, 1991) which in turn promotes 
decisions that are less impulsive and that prioritise long-term benefits (Peter & Büchel, 
2010). However, our ability to perform mental simulation also has its drawbacks. For 
instance, mental images of desired objects enhance their attractiveness and make them less 
resistible (e.g., craving - Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005). Moreover, intrusive mental 
images that occur involuntarily have been found associated with various psychological 
disorders (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder - Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; 
obsessive compulsive disorder – Klein & Moritz, 2014). 
 As two distinct states of awareness, imagination and memory share some similarities 
as well as differences. Compared to memory, imagination is more uncertain and less 
restricted in nature. For instance, people anticipate future events to be more positive in 
valence compared to past events (Shao et al., 2010), prefer to think that negative future 
events are more likely to happen to others (vs. ourselves) (unrealistic optimism – Weinstein, 
                                                     
10 Footnote: Through this thesis, the term “simulate” and “imagine” will be used interchangeably. 
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1980), and they also overestimate their ability to control future outcomes even when those 
outcomes are entirely determined by external factors (e.g., a lottery; Langer, 1975). 
Importantly, imagination is associated with fundamentally different emotions than memory. 
For instance, nostalgia and disappointment are past-related emotions concerning past 
occurrences (Helm, 2009; Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012) whereas hope and 
fear are future-oriented emotions concerned with possible future events (Baumgartner, 
Pieters, & Bagozzi, 2008).  
 On the other hand, imagination and memory also share some notable similarities. 
For instance, previous research suggests an important link between our imagination and 
memory (see review by Schacter et al., 2012). The act of imagine taps on our memory (e.g., 
our knowledge of the world) in order to simulate future scenarios (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) hence our ability to project ourselves into the future is closely related to our 
ability to remember past personal happenings (Szpunar, 2010). When asked to imagine 
events that will likely occur in the future, people’s mental representation of events that 
involved familiar settings (vs. novel settings such as home vs. North pole) were found to 
contain more sensory details, greater subjective sense of experience, and higher clarity of 
contextual details (Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) - an indication that mental images of 
future episodes are likely to be drawn from past episodic memory. Evidently, cognitive 
neuroscience research shows that our mental simulations of past and future events activate 
similar neural networks (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter, Addis, 
& Buckner, 2008; Szpunar et al., 2007). 
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3.3 Phenomenological Characteristics of Mental Representation 
Images that come to mind of future or past events vary systematically in many 
phenomenological aspects including vividness, emotionality (e.g., valence and intensity), 
contextual information (e.g., sensory and spatial), visual perspective among others 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 2006; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Rice & Rubin, 2009; 
Sutin & Robins, 2007; Van Boven, et al., 2010).  
Accordingly, the phenomenological characteristics of our mental representations are 
contingent upon the perceived psychological distance of the event (Van Boven et al., 2010) 
as well as the actual temporal distance of event in question from the present (D’Argembeau 
& Van der Linden, 2004). Mental representations of recent (vs. distant) events tended to 
contain more sensory and contextual information (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
Johnson et al., 1988).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, variability in mental representation has been claimed to 
be one of the contributors of temporal value asymmetry among Western individuals (Van 
Boven, et al., 2008). For instance, a stronger emotional response during imagination was 
associated with greater value being assigned to a future event/object and a reduced 
psychological distance felt (Caruso, 2010; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). This indicates that 
perceived psychological distance is associated with phenomenology (in this case, emotional 
response) that is generally related to actual psychological distance.  
Further supportive evidence comes from Van Boven et al. (2010) who investigated 
the causal role of emotional response during imagination and observed that emotional 
intensity reduces psychological distance. They examined the effect of emotional intensity on 
psychological distance by manipulating the level of emotional intensity participants felt (i.e., 
participants were assigned either to perform a dance in front of others or to observe other 
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people dance) then reported their psychological distance to the assigned task. It was found 
that greater emotion arousal was associated with reduced psychological distance. 
Altogether, these findings suggest that emotional intensity reduces psychological distance.  
However, the above mentioned empirical research examining the phenomenological 
aspects of mental representation pertaining to past and future events (Caruso, 2010; Van 
Boven & Ashworth, 2007; Van Boven et al., 2010) are not cross-cultural studies.  
In terms of emotional response, studies on affective forecasting might shed some 
light on this. Affective forecasting study using cross-cultural comparison approach observed 
that whilst Western individuals tend to make more extreme prospective affective forecast, 
East Asians seemed less likely to do so (Lam, Buehler, McFarland, Ross, & Cheung, 2005; Tan 
& Wyer, 2012). For instance, Tan and Wyer (2012) compared English and Malaysian 
students with Chinese cultural backgrounds’ prospective and retrospective emotional 
ratings in relation to a target event (i.e., the university break). They found that whilst English 
students predicted greater happiness than their actual experience, there was no difference 
between the prediction and actual happiness level of Malaysian students’. This outcome is 
consistent with previous observations that Western individuals (i.e., Euro-Canadians) 
exhibited greater affective forecast bias compared to East Asians (Lam, et al., 2005) and also 
the temporal asymmetry studies reported above (Caruso, 2010; Van Boven & Ashworth, 
2007; Van Boven et al., 2010). 
Another phenomenological characteristic of interest is the visual perspective in 
which imagination or memory is experienced. Research has established that in some mental 
representations, people adopt the viewing position of an outsider, looking at the course of 
event by using an external point of view. In this perspective, the self is embedded in the 
scene and is viewed from the outside, hence the term third-person (observer) perspective. 
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On the other hand, in other mental representations, people seem to take the original point 
of view, looking at the scene by taking the viewing angle resembles the one in the original 
scene. This is termed first-person (field) perspective (Nigro & Neisser’s, 1983).  
Several factors have been proposed to be associated with the use of perspective 
while imagining possible future events or recalling past occurrences, including assessment 
of personal change (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005); emotionality 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2005; McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Robinson & Swanson, 1993); self-
consciousness or self-awareness (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993); action 
identification (Libby, Schaeffer, & Eibach, 2009), the authenticity of memory (Justice, 
Morrison, & Conway, 2013), and recency of memory (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Sutin & Robins, 
1993) among others. However, given that most of these studies were conducted with 
Western individuals as participants, it remains unknown whether the observed effects 
would vary as a function of individuals’ cultural background.  
Interestingly, culture has been proposed as one of the influential factors in the use 
of visual perspective (see review Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007; Martin & Jones, 
2012). The use of first-person perspective is more common among Western individuals (e.g., 
north Americans) whereas the use of third-person perspective is more prevalent among 
Asian individuals (e.g., Chinese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Indians) including during 
personal memories recollection (Cohen & Gunz, 2002; Martin & Jones, 2012; Sutin & Robins, 
2007), mind wandering (Christians, Miles, Parkinson, & Mccrae, 2013), and online imagery 
(Cohen et al., 2007).  
The systematic variation in the use of visual perspective between Western and 
Asians has been claimed to have its roots in cultural dimensions. For instance, Martin and 
Jones (2012) examined the relationship between memory perspective and cultural 
  
69 
individualism of individuals from 26 countries. Individualism scores were found to be a 
predictor of perspective use during memory recollection (memories for receiving an 
important piece of news) such that the use of first-person and third-person perspective 
were more common among relatively individualistic and relatively collectivistic countries 
respectively. Although this finding is correlational in nature, it is nevertheless consistent 
with the insider vs. outsider phenomenology account put forward by Cohen, et al (2007), 
who claimed that the systematic difference between the characteristics of individualistic 
and collectivistic societies encourage individuals to adopt one perspective over the other.  
According to Cohen et al. (2007), the relative greater emphasis on personal 
autonomy and self-esteem in individualistic (vs. collectivistic) societies encourages 
individuals to adopt an insider’s perspective (i.e., first-person) because one’s internal 
feelings and thoughts are prioritised over the judgments or viewpoints of other people. This 
is because the use of first-person perspective heightens one’s own feelings and thoughts 
which are important for action guidance. On the contrary, an outsider’s perspective (i.e., 
third-person) is far more adaptive and functional in a collectivistic (vs. individualistic) society 
where interpersonal relationships are valued over personal autonomy. It enables them to be 
more aware of how they appear in others’ eyes to ensure that their social behaviour is 
congruent with the expectations of others. This is deemed a more practical approach from a 
social point of view as others’ judgments and evaluations are important for self-assessment 
(Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010).   
The suggestion of a connection between the use of visual perspective and the extent 
to which individuals care about how they appear to others is supported by Uskul and 
Kikutani (2014) who investigated the effect of visualisation on motivation to engage in 
health behaviours. They found that the use of third-person perspective (vs. first-person) was 
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associated with stronger intentions to engage in a publicly visible health behaviour for 
individuals who were more concerned about other people’s evaluations or judgments of 
themselves. This indicates that perspective use is guided by an individual’s concerns, values, 
and goals. 
On the other hand, differences in visual perspective preferences between Western 
and Asian cultures can also be explained by cultural variation in visual attention (Masuda et 
al., 2008). Several experiments using a variety of tasks that involved focal objects being 
presented against a contextual background (e.g., rod and frame task – Ji et al., 2000; the 
underwater scene – Masuda & Nisbett, 2011) confirm that East Asians have difficulty 
ignoring the background information compared to their Western counterparts. This more 
contextual or relationship-oriented attentional strategy is claimed to be a characteristic of 
holistic thinking style in which the essence of understanding is by attending to the elements 
and the field as a whole (Nisbett et al., 2001). 
Conversely, the use of first-person perspective in which one sees the world from 
one’s own viewpoint is more object-focused and thus less attention is paid to the wider 
background. This line of attentional strategy is compatible with Westerners’ more analytical 
thinking style, and their ability to devote their attention largely to the focal objects by 
paying relatively little attention to the contextual background (Nisbett et al., 2001), as 
discussed previously in Chapter 1. Taken together, the cultural variation in visual 
perspective preference between East Asian and Westerners seems to be consistent with 
their preferred attentional strategy and habitual thinking style (holistic vs. analytical).  
Concomitantly, studies examining differences in first-person and third-person 
memory contents (McIsaac & Eich, 2002; 2004) confirmed this line of reasoning. Whilst first-
person memories were found to contain greater amount of information pertaining to 
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emotional, sensory, and psychological aspects that people experience during the course of 
event, third-person memories afforded more details about their own physical appearance, 
actions, and the relative spatial arrangement of objects.  
Accordingly, the present research aims to investigate the phenomenological 
characteristics of individual’s past and future mental representations from cultural 
comparison perspective. If Western individuals are more future oriented, they should pay 
more attention to the future and think about future more often. Consequently, future (vs. 
past) events or objects should be more easily brought to mind and feel psychologically 
closer. Comparably, if East Asians are more past oriented, they should think relatively more 
about the past, and the past should appear to be psychologically closer to them (vs. future). 
Following the prediction of CLT that the characteristics of our mental representations 
toward an entity in question (e.g., people, event, action, choices) should correspond to its 
perceived psychological distance, I predicted that one’s temporal orientation might be 
reflected in the phenomenological aspects of mental representation that individuals form in 
relation to past or future events.  
 
Overview of studies in this chapter 
The studies reported in the present chapter investigated the relationship between 
temporal orientation and mental representation (Study 2 & 3) and explored the potential 
downstream effect of temporal orientation on item valuations (Study 4). English and 
Mandarin-speakers were asked to imagine and recall an identical event (Study 2) and some 
personal events (Study 3) then report phenomenological characteristics of their mental 
representation of these events. Study 4 explored the relationship between thinking about 
the past, mental representation, and valuation judgments of nostalgic items. 
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3.4 Study 2: Temporal Orientation, Culture, and Mental Representation I 
 3.4.1 Introduction 
Building on existing research of temporal value asymmetry which demonstrated that 
individual’s temporal orientation that varies as a function of cultural background influences 
people’s mental representations (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010; Van Boven & Ashworth, 
2007; Van Boven et al., 2010), this study investigated the possibility that the 
phenomenological characteristics of mental representation is grounded in and influenced by 
perceived psychological distance.  
Whilst numerous non-cross-cultural temporal value asymmetry studies (i.e., Western 
participants - Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010, Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007) 
demonstrated that temporal value asymmetry is associated with the mental representation 
phenomenological characteristics (e.g., emotional intensity) in relation to a future event in 
concern, the same is yet to be replicated with East Asian participants.  
The use of visual perspective in mental representation is another phenomenological 
characteristic that varies cross-culturally. Cultural variations in the use of visual perspective 
has been reasoned to be related to the characteristics of collectivistic vs. individualistic 
cultures (Martin & Jones, 2002) or the dominant holistic vs. analytical thinking style 
(Masuda et al., 2008) observed among East Asians and Western individuals respectively.  
Further studies showing that memory contents differ cross-culturally makes the 
suggestion of a connection between perspective use and memory content even more 
compelling. When asked to provide memories from any period of their lives, European 
Americans tended to provide memories with the self as the focus of the event such as 
personal experience, whereas Chinese tended to recall memories that are generally 
“broader”, more socially oriented that contain significant others (Wang & Conway, 2004; 
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Wang & Ross, 2005). In addition, the analysis on Chinese individual’s memory narrative 
showed that they tended to mention other people more often as opposed to themselves 
(i.e., a higher other/self ratio) compared to Americans (Wang & Conway, 2004). This 
tendency appears to be in-line with their interdependent self-view and holistic thinking style 
– seeing elements as embedded in a wider context. As visual perspective used in memory 
retrieval was never measured in the above-mentioned autobiographical memory studies, it 
remains unknown whether their observation of cultural variations in memory content was 
due to the perspective use in recollection.  
The above considerations lead to several predictions pertaining the cultural 
differences in phenomenological characteristics of mental representation as a function of 
temporal orientation. The phenomenological characteristics that are of particular interests 
are psychological distance, emotional intensity, visual perspective, and contextual details 
(e.g., spatial, visual, and sensory details, other/self ratio).  
Firstly, based on CLT and the greater future and past emphasis observations among 
Westerners and East Asians respectively, Western individuals are expected to feel closer to 
an event during imagination (vs. memory) whereas East Asians would feel closer to the 
event during recollection (vs. imagination). 
Secondly, based on previous findings of a greater affective forecasting bias (Wilson 
et al., 2000; Lam et al., 2005) and a greater reported affect when contemplating future 
events (Caruso et al., 2008) among Westerners (vs. East Asians), it is thus predicted that 
English-speakers would report more intense emotional responses during imagination (vs. 
memory) whereas Mandarin-speakers would not exhibit such tendencies. 
Thirdly, it was predicted Mandarin-speakers will be more likely to use third-person 
perspective compared to English-speakers due to the largely social nature of the target 
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event, as previous related work suggests that the use of third-person perspective among 
East Asians is more prevalent in social settings (Cohen & Gunz, 2002). In addition, Mandarin-
speakers’ mental representations should contain greater other/self ratio compared to that 
of English-speakers.  
In order to make a meaningful cross-cultural comparison, participants were asked to 
imagine (two weeks prior to the event) and then to recall retrospectively (two weeks after 
the event) an event characterised by specific traditions: Christmas dinner for English-
speakers and Chinese New Year Reunion dinner for Mandarin-speakers. These two events 
share some similarities between English and Mandarin-speakers such that both are meals 
that often contain substantial food traditionally eaten once a year with family members. 
They are significant and meaningful festive gatherings for family to get together for the 
purpose of celebration. The phenomenological characteristics of their mental 
representations were measured by asking them to complete the mental imagery 
questionnaire adapted and modified from D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006). 
Participants were also asked to provide an account of the event in as much detail as possible. 
These accounts were subjected to content analysis in order to examine the 
phenomenological characteristics of their mental representation (e.g., emotionality, spatial 
details, other visual details, other/self ratio, self-as-agent, and self-as-referent) as well as 
whether the self was mentioned as an agent or as a referent.  
Due to the possibility of cultural differences between the two target events (i.e., 
Christmas dinner vs. Chinse New Year Reunion dinner), the main interest in this study is the 
temporal pattern for each outcome (i.e., main effect of representation type and culture x 
representation type interaction) instead of the direct comparison of culture. 
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3.4.2 Method 
Participants 
The sample size was determined by referencing a related cross-cultural study (Ji, et 
al., 2009). With an effect size of d = .45, G*Power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009) showed that a sample size of at least 62 in each cultural group was required to 
reliably detect a difference in psychological distance with 0.80 power. Ninety-seven English 
students from University of Plymouth (89 females) and 120 students in China (74 females) 
participated in this study online11. They ranged from 18 to 25 years-old. English students 
were recruited using psychology student pool at University of Plymouth. They participated 
in the study in-exchange for course credit. Chinese students were recruited using an online 
survey platform (www.sojump.com). They participated in the study in-exchange for a 
chance to take part in a lucky draw contest.  
Only 57 English-speakers and 44 Mandarin-speakers were included in the analysis 
after data screening exercise. The responses were excluded because: did not complete the 
questionnaire within the designated time frame (4 English-speakers and 10 Mandarin-
speakers); non-native English/Mandarin-speaker (1); did not participate in the target event 
(1); did not provide a written account of the target event (1); and provided written accounts 
unrelated to the target event (7). 
 
Materials 
Participants completed the mental imagery questionnaire that was adapted and 
modified from D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006) which contained 17 questions that 
                                                     
11 Out of the 97 English students who completed the first part of the study, 64 completed the second part of 
the study. Out of the 120 Chinese participants who completed the first part of the study, 61 completed the 
second part of the study. 
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were presented in random order. The rating scales used to assess participants’ 
phenomenological characteristics of event representation are shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Design  
This study adopted a 2 Culture (English, Mandarin) x 2 Representation type 
(Imagination, Memory) mixed-ANOVA design, with culture being a between-participants 
variable and representation type as a within-participant variable. 
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Table 3.1 Rating scales used to assess the phenomenological characteristics associated with imagining/remembering future and past events in 
Study 2. Adapted and modified from D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006).
 
Brief description of rating scale
A future event/Past experience may feel quite close or quite far away, regardless of how long ahead/ago it will occur/actually 
occured. How far away does this event feel to you: 1 = very close; 7 = very far away
While imagining/remembering the event, my visual perspective was: 1 = entirely looking through my eyes to; 7 = I can see myself 
in the imagination/memory
Average of pre-experiencing/re-experiencing and mental time travel
Pre-experiencing/                  
Re-experiencing
While imagining/remembering the event, I felt as though I was experiencing/reliving it: 1 = not at all; 7 = completely
Mental time travel While imagining/remembering the event, I felt that I traveled forward/back to the time when it would happen/happened: 1 = not 
at all; 7 = completely
My imagination/memory for this event involved visual details: 1 = none; 7 = a lot
Average of sounds  and smells/tastes
Sounds My imagination/memory for this event involved sounds: 1 = none; 7 = a lot
Smells/tastes My imaginatin/memory for this event involved smells/tastes: 1 = none; 7 = a lot
Average of clarity of location , clarity of object layout , and clarity of people layout
Clarity of location My imagination/memory for the location where the event will take place/takes place was: 1 = not at all clear; 7 = very clear
Clarity of object layout The layout of objects in my imagination/memory for the event was: 1 = not at all clear; 7 = very clear
Clarity of people layout The layout of people in my imagination/memory for the event was: 1 = not at all clear; 7 = very clear
My imagination/memory for the time of day when the event will take place/takes place was: 1 = not at all; 7 = completely
While imagining/remembering the event, I felt the emotions I would feel/felt if/when the event occurred: 1 = not at all; 7 = 
completely
If/When this event happened, my emotions would be/were: 1 = not intense; 7 = very intense
If/When this event happened, my emotions would be/were: 1 = very negative; 7 = very positive
This event is important to me (it involves an important theme or episode in my life): 1 = not at all important; 7 = very important
While imagining/remembering the event, it comes to me in words: 1 = not at all, 7 = a lot
While imagining/remembering the event, it comes to me as a coherent story and not as an isolated scene: 1 = not at all; 7 = 
completely
Feeling emotions
Visual perspective
In words
Coherent story 
Intensity
Valence
Personal importance 
Oher sensory details
Spatial context
Psychological distance
Temporal information
Characteristic
Autonoetic consciousness 
Visual details
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 Procedure  
The study took place December 2016 and February 2017. The target event for study 
was Christmas dinner (25th Dec 2016) for English-speakers and Chinese New Year Reunion 
dinner (27th Jan 2017) for Mandarin-speakers. The data cut-off time was within 3 days from 
the 2 weeks before/after the target event. All the participants completed the study online. 
Participants completed the study over two sessions. In the first session, participants 
received the imagination questionnaire approximately two weeks before the target event. 
In the second session, they completed the recall questionnaire approximately two weeks 
after the target event.  
Participants who clicked on the study link were first directed to a page which 
contained a brief introduction of the study. They were then asked to give their informed 
consent for their participation followed by some basic demographic information (e.g. sex, 
age, first language, country of birth, and country of residence at time of participation) prior 
to the start of the questionnaire. 
Participants were asked to make sure that they pay full attention while completing 
the study and turn-off background music or video. After reading the instructions, they were 
instructed to close their eyes to spend one minute imagining the coming Christmas Dinner 
(or Chinese New Year Reunion Dinner for Mandarin-speakers) in as much detail as possible. 
Participants clicked the ‘continue’ button when they were ready to start the task and a 
‘beep’ tone went-off when the one minute was up. After that, they spent four minutes 
writing down an account of the event they have just imagined in as much detail as possible. 
Participants were informed that they were not required to disclose any information they 
feel uncomfortable with or do not wish to disclose.  They then completed the mental 
imagery questionnaire adapted from that of D’Argembeau & Van der Linden’s (2006).  Upon 
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completion of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed. Participants were 
contacted approximately two weeks after the target event to complete part-two of the 
study. In the second part of the study, they were asked to repeat an identical procedure as 
in part-one of the study, instead of imagining they were asked to recall the target event. 
 
Mental representation account coding:  
The event accounts provided by participants were subjected to narrative coding. The 
account coding exercise intended to extract further information about the 
phenomenological characteristics of participants’ mental representations. A coding scheme 
was developed based on the categories of phenomenological characteristics in the mental 
imagery scale (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006) and a cross-cultural autobiographical 
memory study (Wang & Conway, 2004) that coded memory content using several variables. 
All the account coding was performed using participants’ responses in their original 
language.   
Two coders who were blind to the study hypothesis coded the accounts 
independently. Mandarin and English-speakers’ accounts were coded by a native Mandarin-
speaker and a native English-speaker respectively following the same guidelines. A third 
(bilingual) coder coded both data set for inter-coder reliability estimates. The agreement 
between two coders was 90.45% for English accounts and 87.40% for Mandarin accounts.  
Disagreements about coding were resolved by referring to the coding rules.  
It is worth noting that due to the involvement of two different languages, an 
identical concept might need different numbers of words/characters to express in different 
languages, therefore number of items/components (i.e., distinct idea) will be used as an 
indication of account length instead of number of words/characters. This applies to all the 
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phenomenological characteristics account coding. To give an example, for descriptions in 
relation to sound, ‘telling jokes’ and ‘lots of laughter’ were coded as 1 item each 
respectively. Similarly, ‘笑声连连’ (continuous laughs) and ‘鞭炮声’ (the sound of fireworks) 
were coded as 1 item each respectively. 
Emotionality. The number of emotional items/components in participants’ accounts 
was coded and counted for each account.  
Sensory details such as sound and smells/tastes. The number of sound and 
smells/tastes related items/components in participants’ accounts was coded and counted 
for each account respectively. 
Spatial details. The number of spatial details (e.g., object, people) related 
items/components in participants’ accounts was coded and counted. 
Other visual details. The number of other visual details (e.g., colour, specific item 
description) in participants’ accounts was coded and counted.  
Other/self ratio. The number of every other people and self-related components was 
counted and an ‘other/self ratio’ was calculated for each account. This includes all the first-
person and third-person pronouns, titles, names (e.g., I, me, mom, brother, she, them). The 
number of the self being mentioned was broken down according to the function of the self 
in the account: 1) self-as-agent – the self being referenced as an agent or a source of action 
(e.g., I read the jokes inside the Christmas cracker out loud; we all have a glass of wine); and 
2) self-as-referent – the self being used as a referent (e.g., my grandma is so proud of me; 
the dog is sat begging for food next to me).  
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3.4.3 Results 
Post-hoc power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) revealed that with a sample size of 101, 
effect size of 0.45, the power achieved to detect the difference in psychological distance 
was .72. See Appendix B for imagination and memory account examples. 
 Prior to conducting the analysis, the self-reports for “autonoetic consciousness” 
were produced by averaging the responses to “feeling of pre-experiencing (or re-
experiencing)” and “feeling of traveling forward (or backward) to the event happening time” 
(Cronbach’s αimag = = 0.78; Cronbach’s αmem = 0.78); similarly, the ratings of spatial context 
were produced by averaging responses regarding the “clarity of location”, “clarity of object 
layout” and “clarity of people layout” (Cronbach’s αimag = 0.71; Cronbach’s αmem = 0.71). 
In order to understand if phenomenological ratings differed according to culture, 
representation type, and type of phenomenological characteristic, a repeated-measure 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with all the phenomenological 
ratings (28 measures) as dependent variables, culture as between-participants variable, 
whereas representation type and phenomenological characteristic as within-participant 
variables. As shown in Table 3.2, using Pillai’s Trace, all the main effects (all F’s > 13.52, p’s 
< .001) and the interaction effects (all F’s > 5.57, p’s < .02) reached statistical significance. 
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Table 3.2 Results of MANOVA performed for the phenomenological ratings by culture, 
representation type, and type of phenomenological characteristic for Study 2 
 
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001. 
 
Next, a series of univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each of 
the phenomenological characteristic with culture as a between-participants variable and 
representation type as a within-subject variable. The means, standard deviations, main 
effects, and interaction effects are presented in Table 3.3 as a function of culture and 
mental representation type. The result analysis will be broken down and presented in three 
sections, namely psychological distance, visual perspective, and all the other 
phenomenological characteristics. 
V F
Hypothesis 
df
Error 
df
η
2
p 
Culture 13.52 *** 1 99 0.12
Representation 0.45 80.98 *** 1 99 0.45
Phenomenal 0.80 26.15 *** 13 87 0.80
Culture*Representation 0.06 6.04 * 1 99 0.06
Culture*Phenomenal 0.45 5.57 *** 13 87 0.45
Culture*Representation*Phenomenal 0.48 6.14 *** 13 87 0.48
Multivariate Test
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Table 3.3 Self-reports of phenomenological characteristics of mental representations by culture and mental representation type for Study 2. 
 
Note: Values for autonoetic consciousness and spatial context refer to mean average. Rating scales: psychological distance: 1=very close; 7=very far 
away; visual perspective: 1=entirely looking through my eyes; 7=I can see myself in the imagination/memory; autonoetic consciousness: 1=not at all; 
7=completely; visual/sounds/smells/tastes sensory details: 1=none; 7=a lot; spatial context: 1=not at all clear; 7=very clear; feeling emotions: 1=not at all; 
7=completely; emotion intensity: 1=not intense; 7=very intense; emotion valence: 1=very negative; 7=very positive; personal importance: 1=not at all 
important; 7=very important; in words: 1=not at all; 1=a lot; coherent story: 1=not at all; 7=completely.  
Means not sharing a common subscript (a, b) are not statistically different at p < .05.    
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001. 
Eng vs Man Ima vs Mem
M SD M SD M SD M SD F η 2 p F η
2
p F η
2
p 
Psychological distance 3.26a 1.78 4.09b 1.65 3.39 1.98 3.16 1.72 2.22 .02 1.64 .02 5.09 * .05
Visual perspective 3.19 2.26 3.44 2.32 5.27 1.58 5.32 1.44 31.64 *** .24 0.59 .01 0.28 .00
Autonoetic consciousness 4.68 1.31 4.76 1.20 5.48 0.96 5.57 1.20 15.61 *** .14 0.46 .01 0.00 .00
Visual details 6.33 0.81 6.40 0.86 5.75 0.94 5.84 0.89 17.77 *** .15 0.53 .01 0.01 .00
Sounds 4.60 1.80 4.14 1.69 5.59 1.13 5.43 1.17 20.92 *** .17 3.12 .03 0.73 .00
Smells/tastes 4.46 1.79 4.84 1.76 5.09 1.27 5.16 1.26 3.19 .03 1.78 .02 0.87 .01
Spatial context 6.23 1.02 6.35 0.85 5.67 0.88 5.85 0.79 11.30 *** .10 2.76 .03 0.10 .00
Temporal information 5.26 1.60 6.05 1.25 5.73 1.00 6.09 0.94 1.67 .02 13.09 *** .12 1.79 .02
Feeling emotions 5.09 1.46 5.21 1.19 5.73 1.02 5.80 1.09 8.93 ** .08 0.51 .01 0.04 .00
Emotions intensity 5.23a 1.15 4.84b 1.40 5.50 1.11 5.43 0.97 4.70 * .05 3.05 .03 1.49 .02
Emotions valence 6.28 0.98 5.79 1.37 5.89 1.17 5.75 1.08 1.22 .01 6.23 * .06 2.00 .02
Personal importance 5.70a 1.35 5.18b 1.40 5.75 1.42 5.73 1.13 1.60 .02 4.90 * .05 4.12 * .04
In words 3.93 1.64 3.81 1.74 5.32 1.18 5.27 1.42 28.62 *** .22 0.30 .00 0.06 .00
Coherent story 4.86 1.57 4.98 1.47 5.55 1.52 5.84 1.12 9.13 ** .08 2.35 .02 0.40 .00
Main effects Interact. effects
Eng/Man*Ima/Mem
English (n  = 57) Mandarin (n  = 44)
Imagination Memory Imagination Memory
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Psychological distance 
There was a culture X representation type interaction, F(1, 99) = 5.094, p = .026, η2p 
= .049. Post-hoc tests analysis using Bonferroni adjustment (α = .025) revealed that English-
speakers felt psychologically closer to the event during imagination (vs. memory), F(1, 99) = 
7.185, p = .009, η2p = .068 whereas there was no difference between Mandarin-speakers’ 
imagination and memory ratings, F(1, 99) = 0.421, p = .518, η2p = .004. Cross-cultural 
comparisons showed that there was no difference between English and Mandarin-speakers’ 
psychological distance ratings during imagination [F(1, 99) = 0.108, p = .743, η2p = .001], 
however, Mandarin-speakers felt psychologically closer to their memory compared to 
English-speakers, F(1, 99) = 7.559, p = .007, η2p = .071. 
 
Visual perspective12 
Mandarin-speakers reported that their mental representations were more likely to 
be in third-person perspective compared to English-speakers, F(1, 99) = 31.643, p < .001, η2p 
= .242.  
 
Other self-report phenomenological characteristics 
 In relation to main effects of representation type (i.e., imagination vs. memory), 
both cultures rated their memory to contain clearer temporal information than their 
imagination, F(1, 99) = 13.093, p < .001, η2p = .117. The target event was also rated as 
emotionally more positive [F(1, 99) = 6.230, p = .014, η2p = .059] and personally more 
                                                     
12 Previous research (Huebner & Fredrickson, 1999; Rice & Rubin, 20009) observed that females tended to 
experience third-person perspectives more than males. Therefore, a repeated-measure ANOVA with culture 
and gender as between-participants variables and the use of visual perspective as within-participant variable 
was conducted. There was no significant main effect or interaction effect of gender on the use of visual 
perspective (all F’s < 1.677, p’s > .198).  
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important during imagination compared to memory [F(1, 99) = 4.902, p = .029, η2p = .047]. 
The effect of time point on personal importance was moderated by culture [F(1, 99) = 4.124, 
p = .045, η2p = .040] with post-hoc analysis (Bonferroni adjustment α = .025) revealed that 
English-speakers rated the event to be more important during imagination (vs. memory) 
[F(1, 99) = 10.339, p = .002, η2p = .095] whereas the difference was absent for Mandarin-
speakers [F(1, 99) = 0.015, p = .903, η2p < .001]. 
For emotional intensity ratings, I was interested to know whether English-speakers 
would show greater affective forecast bias compared to Mandarin-speakers who should be 
less likely to do so. Therefore, a separate paired sample t-test was conducted for each of the 
cultural group respectively. The results showed that English-speakers reported experiencing 
more intense emotional response during imagination (vs. memory) [t(56) = 2.065, p = .044, 
d = 0.31] whereas the difference was absent for Mandarin-speakers [t(44) = 0.401, p = .691].  
 
Mental representation account coding  
In addition to the mental imagery scale, participants also provided a short account of 
their mental representations. All the account coding were subjected to a 2 Representation 
type (imagination, memory) x 2 Culture (English, Mandarin) ANOVAs for each of the 
phenomenological characteristic respectively included frequency of items/components 
related to emotions, sensory details of sound, sensory details of smells/tastes, spatially 
related details, other visual related details, the ratio of other/self, the frequency of other 
people, the self as an agent, the self as a referent in the accounts. Together with means and 
standard deviations of account coding counts, the main effects and interaction effects as a 
function of culture and representation type are presented in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Means and standard deviations of mental representations account coding counts by culture and mental representation 
type for Study 2. 
 
Note: n1 represents the sample size for emotionality, sound, smells/tastes, spatial details, and other visual details whereas n2 represents 
the sample size for other/self ratio, frequency of others, self-as-agent, and self-as-referent counts.  
Means not sharing a common subscript (a, b) are not statistically different at p < .05.       
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001.
Eng vs Man Ima vs Mem Eng/Man*Img/Mem
M SD M SD M SD M SD F η 2 p F η
2
p F η
2
p 
Emotionality 0.88 1.02 1.07 1.64 0.68 0.83 0.57 0.62 3.49 .03 0.09 .00 1.40 .01
Sound 2.14a 1.48 1.05b 0.91 0.77 0.86 0.61 0.87 30.02 *** .23 19.07 *** .16 10.58 ** .10
Smells/tastes 0.26a 0.58 0.51b 0.87 0.25 0.44 0.20 0.46 2.23 .02 2.12 .02 4.48 * .04
Spatial details 2.68a 1.79 1.58b 1.48 0.84 0.96 0.70 0.76 38.47 *** .28 14.44 *** .13 8.79 ** .08
Other visual details 2.39a 1.99 1.26b 1.41 0.55 0.85 0.70 0.98 28.01 *** .22 7.51 ** .07 13.29 *** .12
Other/self ratio 1.95 2.10 1.32 1.36 3.17 2.33 2.61 2.29 8.66 ** .11 4.84 .07 0.18 .00
Others 6.12 3.73 5.84 3.75 3.77 3.40 3.98 3.07 12.70 *** .11 0.10 .00 0.39 .00
Self-as-agent 3.79 2.90 4.32 3.11 0.70 0.85 1.18 1.32 58.34 *** .37 4.09 * .04 0.10 .00
Self-as-referent 1.56 1.66 1.72 1.68 0.20 0.51 0.18 0.45 48.12 *** .33 0.19 .00 0.34 .00
Main effects Interact. effectsEnglish (n 1 =57; n 2 =50) Mandarin (n 1 =44; n 2 =21)
Imagination Memory Imagination Memory
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As can be seen from Table 3.4, regarding the main effect of culture, English-speakers’ 
accounts contained more sound-related components [F(1, 99) = 30.017, p < .001, η2p = .233], 
more spatial details related components [F(1, 99) = 38.471, p < .001, η2p = .280], and also 
greater other visual details [F(1, 99) = 28.006, p < .001, η2p = .221] than Mandarin-speakers 
at both time points. 
In terms of main effect of representation type, imagination accounts contained more 
descriptive components about sound [F(1, 99) = 19.065, p < .001, η2p = .161], spatial context 
related [F(1, 99) = 14.435, p < .001, η2p = .127], and other visual details [F(1, 99) = 7.510, p 
= .007, η2p = .071] compared to memory accounts.  
In addition, there was a culture X representation type interaction on sound-related 
components [F(1, 99) = 10.576, p = .002, η2p = .097]; smells/tastes sensory details [F(1, 99) = 
4.482, p = .037, η2p = .043]; spatial details [F(1, 99) = 8.790, p = .004, η
2
p = .082]; and other 
visual details [F(1, 99) = 13.287, p < .001, η2p = .118]. Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni adjustment 
α = .025) indicated that English-speakers’ imagination accounts (vs. memory) contained 
greater sound-related components [F(1, 99) = 33.308, p < .001, η2p = .252]; smells/tastes 
related [F(1, 99) = 7.326, p = .008, η2p = .069]; spatial details [F(1, 99) = 26.256, p < .001, η
2
p 
= .210]; and other visual details [F(1, 99) = 23.400, p < .001, η2p = .191]. However, there was 
no difference between Mandarin-speakers’ imagination and memory ratings - sound related 
[F(1, 99) = 0.550, p = .460, η2p = .006]; smells/tastes related [F(1, 99) = 0.194, p = .661, η
2
p 
= .002]; spatial related [F(1, 99) = 0.309, p = .580, η2p = .003]; and other visual details [F(1, 99) 
= 0.363, p = .548, η2p = .004].  
Regarding the ratio of other to self, Mandarin-speakers made comparatively greater 
mention of others at both time points compared to themselves than English-speakers [F(1, 
69) = 8.657, p = .004, η2p = .111]. In addition, imagination accounts contained greater 
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other/self ratio than memory accounts [F(1, 69) = 4.835, p = .031, η2p = .065]. The frequency 
of the self being mentioned in the accounts was broken down into two categories with the 
self being mentioned as an agent/actor or as a referent. English-speakers’ accounts 
contained greater number of the self being used both as an agent [F(1, 99) = 58.34, p < .001, 
η2p = .371] and as a referent [F(1, 99) = 48.123, p < .001, η
2
p = .327] than Mandarin-speakers. 
Memory accounts contained greater frequency of the self being mentioned as an agent than 
imagination’s [F(1, 99) = 4.091, p = .046, η2p = .040].  
 
3.4.4 Discussion of Study 2 
The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenological characteristics of 
mental representation associated with projecting oneself into the past and the future in 
relation to an identical event.  
Based on CLT and on previous research suggesting that Westerners feel 
psychologically closer to the future whilst East Asians feel psychologically closer to the past, 
it was predicted that members of the two cultures would differ in their representations of 
future and past events in a number of ways. Firstly, English-speakers were expected to feel 
psychologically closer to a future event whereas Mandarin-speakers were expected to feel 
psychologically closer to a past event.  
The results showed that English-speakers rated the event to be psychologically 
closer during imagination (vs. memory). This is consistent with their future orientation 
established in the literature (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 2013) and 
English-speakers’ psychological distance rating pattern observed in this thesis (Chapter 2 - 
Study 1). However, Mandarin-speakers rated the target event as equidistant (imagination vs. 
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memory) which is contrary to previous findings of a stronger past orientation among East 
Asians (Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009). 
Secondly, it was predicted that English-speakers should report more intense 
emotional responses during imagination (vs. memory) whereas Mandarin-speakers would 
not exhibit such a tendency. The results are as predicted showing that English-speakers 
reported more intense emotions when they imagined the future target event (relative to 
the past) whereas Mandarin-speakers reported equivalent levels of emotional intensity for 
their imagination and memory. English-speakers’ findings are consistent with their reduced 
psychological distance during imagination (vs. memory) and also the suggestion that greater 
emotional experience is typically associated with reduced psychological distance (Van Boven 
et al., 2010). On the other hand, Mandarin-speakers’ non-differentiated emotional 
responses (imagination vs. memory) is also in-line with their absence of a difference 
between prospective and retrospective psychological distance ratings. 
The self-report and account coding outcomes on mental representation 
phenomenological characteristics are broadly consistent with participants’ psychological 
distance felt toward the event. For instance, English-speakers’ imagination accounts were 
found contained more contextual details including sensory details of sound, spatial, and also 
other visual details compared to their memory accounts. They rated their imagination as 
more emotionally intensified than their memory, and they also rated the event as 
personally more important during imagination (vs. memory). These are consistent with their 
reduced psychological distance to the event during imagination (vs. memory) hence 
demonstrating a stronger future orientation.  
On the other hand, Mandarin-speakers rated the event as equidistant prospectively 
and retrospectively. There was no difference in their emotional intensity rating while 
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imagining or remembering. Furthermore, there is an absence in difference between 
imagination and memory in many phenomenological characteristics including both self-
report measure (e.g., visual details, sensory details of sound and smells/tastes, spatial 
information) and account coding outcome (e.g., spatial details, sensory details of sound and 
smells/tastes, other visual details). These findings are compatible with their lack of a 
difference in psychological distance rating towards the event prospectively and 
retrospectively.  
For the third hypothesis in which it was predicted that the use of visual perspective 
will vary as a function of culture, the expected difference emerged. Mandarin-speakers 
were more likely to use third-person perspective for both imagination and memory 
representation compared to English-speakers. The target event of this study, a family festive 
gathering, should promote more use of a third-person perspective among Mandarin-
speakers because it is largely social in nature which typically involved the presence of 
significant others. This outcome is consonant with previous observations that the use of 
third-person perspective is common among East Asians especially in a social context (Cohen 
& Gunz, 2002; Cohen, et al., 2007) as a result of their greater sense of interdependent self 
as opposed to Western individual’s greater sense of independent self (Markus & Kitayama, 
1999). 
Concurrently, a tendency to see oneself as part of a wider social network among East 
Asians is also evident in Mandarin-speakers’ proportionately greater mention of other 
people as opposed to themselves compared to English-speakers, a finding that is consistent 
with previous studies (Wang & Conway, 2004). The function of self being mentioned in the 
account as either an agent or a referent was differentiated. It revealed that both English and 
Mandarin-speakers were more likely to mention themselves as an agent in their accounts.  
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There are some aspects of the account coding outcomes appear to be incompatible 
with the self-report measure outcomes. It is possible that there might be other mechanisms 
at play when participants were asked to describe their mental representation. For example, 
when asked to provide an account of mental representation, participants might choose to 
focus on specific aspects due to the influence of personal goals and intentions. Thus, they 
might prefer to elaborate on certain features of their mental representation in accordance 
with the focus of their attention. 
Take spatial details for example: whilst there was no difference in the self-report 
rating measure, imagination accounts were found to contain more spatial details compared 
to memory accounts. Spatial context is one of the defining features of mental 
representation. It is possible that when participants were asked to describe their 
imagination, they felt it more necessary to construct the spatial scenery before they 
elaborate on other details in order to create a coherent representation in order to convey 
their imagination to the readers effectively. On the other hand, when describing memory 
representations, participants might focus less on the spatial scenery but instead more on 
other specific details as they were likely to be very familiar with the location of the event 
hence the spatial details. This is because Christmas dinner and Chinese reunion dinner are 
repeated events that take place annually and likely to be at a familiar setting. Therefore, 
spatial context should play a less important role when participants describe their memory. 
Therefore, it makes sense that some of the outcomes of self-report measure and account 
coding outcomes appear to be incongruous with each other.   
Some intriguing observations were noticed in relation to the way participants 
describe their mental representation accounts. Judging by the event accounts provided by 
Mandarin-speakers, it would seem that their accounts contained greater details regarding 
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the progress of the target event (i.e., take place over a longer period of time – from 
atmosphere to getting ready for dinner then carry on to the actual dinner) compared to the 
more ‘dinner’ focused accounts provided by English-speakers. It is possible that there might 
be a difference in the cultural nature of the event. Whilst the two events share some 
similarities (e.g., typically involved family gathering, preparation and eating a large meal, 
decoration of homes, watching festive-related tv programmes), Christmas dinner involved 
exchange of presents whereas Chinese reunion dinner involves married couples giving out 
red packets (a monetary gift) to single people or children. Nevertheless, the observed 
difference in narrative styles between English and Mandarin-speakers resonates with the 
relatively more specific versus generic memory narrative observed among Western 
individuals and Chinese individuals respectively (Wang & Conway, 2004). This is also 
consistent with the dominant information processing style found among Western and East 
Asian individuals (i.e. analytical vs. holistic) which is likely to exert influence on their 
narrative style due to the relatively greater attention they pay to the focal objects and the 
peripheral details respectively (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).  
As a caution, as the target event in this study was only approximately two weeks 
away when participants were asked to perform the imagination or memory tasks, it is 
possible that the seemingly close objective temporal distance and also the festive 
atmosphere surrounding might affect their perceived psychological distance of the event 
and hence their mental representation. One possible way to rule out this explanation would 
be to examine how objective temporal distance affects people’s perceived psychological 
distance. The next study intended to address this issue by extending the investigation to 
events located at different temporal regions (i.e. close vs. distant). Another group of English-
speakers and Mandarin-speakers were asked to imagine and recall some life events that 
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differed in their temporal distance from the present (close vs. distant). They were then 
asked to complete the same mental imagery scale as the one used in Study 2. The 
psychological distance felt toward the event and visual perspective used in their mental 
representation were also assessed.   
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3.5 Study 3: Temporal Orientation, Culture, and Mental Representation II 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 It has been observed in the present chapter that temporal orientation and mental 
representation of future and past events are related. This suggests that the 
phenomenological characteristics of mental representation reflect the psychological 
distance people feel toward an event in concern, which varies as a function of cultural 
background.  
Study 3 intended to continue this line of investigation by extending the event in 
question to life events located in different temporal distance from the present (close vs. 
distant). If psychological distance is an important factor in mental representation, events 
that are temporally closer (hence psychological closer) should contain greater 
phenomenological characteristics compared to those that are temporally more distant 
(hence psychologically more distant). Therefore, the goal of Study 3 is to replicate and 
extend the basic findings of study 2, by contrasting the phenomenological characteristics of 
events that are temporally close (i.e., within one month from present) and relatively more 
distant (i.e., more than one year from present). 
Based on the prediction of CLT, events that are temporally closer are expected to be 
rated as psychologically closer. Mental representation of more recent events tends to 
contain greater phenomenological characteristics such as more sensory and contextual 
information compared to those that are more distant (D’Argembeau & Van der Linde, 2004; 
Johnson et al., 1988). In order to examine the relationship between perceived psychological 
distance and the phenomenological characteristics of mental representations associated 
with different objective temporal distance, participants were asked to imagine (or recall) 
events that will potentially happen to them (or have happened to them) within one month 
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from the present and more than one year in the future (or in the past). It was hypothesized 
that for both English and Mandarin-speakers, events that are relatively closer in objective 
temporal distance from the present should contain more phenomenological characteristics 
(i.e., sensory, spatial, temporal) than events that are more distant from the present. In 
addition, Mandarin-speakers are expected to be more likely to take third-person 
perspective while imaging and recalling compared to English-speakers.  
 
3.5.2 Method 
Participants 
Participants’ sample size was determined by referring to the article by Fritz and 
MacKinnon (2007). With a medium effect size expected, power of .80, estimated sample 
size was 100 in each cultural group. One hundred and six English individuals (56 females) 
and 111 Chinese individuals (59 females, 1 missing data) participated in this study online. 
Both English-speakers and Mandarin-speakers were recruited using online survey platform, 
namely https://prolific.ac and www.sojump.com respectively. English-speakers participated 
in this study in exchange for monetary incentive whereas Mandarin-speakers participated in 
this study in exchange for a chance to take part in a lucky draw contest.  
Participants were asked to imagine and recall events located at specific temporal 
regions (i.e., within the one month/one year in the past/future), therefore only native 
English or Mandarin-speakers’ responses associated with the correct event dates (fall within 
the specified temporal regions) were included in the analysis. Screening exercise revealed 
that 43 English-speakers and 53 Mandarin-speakers provided events associated with dates 
fall outside of the specified temporal region; 2 English-speakers and 2 Mandarin-speakers 
gave the same answers to all the self-report questions also did not provide titles for events 
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they imagined or recalled. These responses were therefore excluded from analysis. As a 
result, only 61 English-speakers (38 females, Mage = 23.88, SDage = 4.48) and 46 Mandarin-
speakers (22 females, Mage = 23.93, SDage = 3.53) were included in the analysis. The majority 
of the English-speakers were from the U.K. (82%) with the rest from USA (13%), and Canada 
(5%). All the Mandarin-speakers were from China.  
 
Materials 
Participants completed the mental imagery questionnaire identical to that in Study 2 
which was adapted and modified from D’Argembeau & Van der Linden (2006). The 
questionnaire contained 17 questions that were presented in random order. In addition, 
participants were also asked to provide a brief title and dates of each of the event they 
imagined/recalled.  
 
 Design 
This study utilised a 2 Culture (English, Mandarin) x 2 Representation type 
(Imagination, Memory) x 2 Distance (Close, Distant) mixed-ANOVA design, with culture as a 
between-participants variable whereas representation type and distance as within-
participant variables. Each participant was asked to imagine two events that might 
reasonably happen to them in the future and to recall two events that happened to them 
personally in the past. These events differed in their temporal distance from the present: 
within the next 30 days, within the last 30 days; more than a year ago, more than a year 
from now. Each participant was randomly allocated to one of the four questionnaire 
versions which counterbalanced between temporal distance (close and distant) and mental 
representation type (imagination and memory). 
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Procedure 
Both English and Mandarin-speakers completed this study in their native language 
respectively. The study procedure was similar to that of Study 2 apart from the events 
concerned and no mental representation account was provided. All the participants 
completed the study online. After giving informed consent for their participation, 
participants provided basic demographic information (e.g. sex, age, first language, country 
of birth, and country of residence at time of participation) prior to the start of the 
questionnaire.  
Participants were asked to make sure that they pay full attention while completing 
the study. The use of sound clip was removed because previously some participants 
commented the sound was too loud. After that they were presented with instructions that 
were adapted and modified from D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) which explained 
that the events they imagine or recall should be precise and specific (i.e., they should take 
place or had taken place in a specific place at a specific time; they should last or have lasted 
a few minutes or hours but not more than a day). It was also specified that the future events 
should be things that might reasonably happen to them in the future, given their plans and 
what they think their future would be. Beneath the instructions, some examples were given 
to illustrate what would or would not be considered as a specific event:  
 
Example of event that would be considered as specific:   
“I’m going to Barcelona for New Year’s Eve. I imagine arriving at the hotel and 
having dinner with my friends in downtown Barcelona”      
 Example of event that would not be considered as specific:    
"I imagine going on vacation in Spain"  
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They were also informed that the life event should be something they will be 
personally involved in (or have been personally involved with in the past) and is personally 
meaningful to them. It was also explained that the event can be positive or negative and 
about any kind of experience that they think will happen to them (or has happened to them) 
in the specified time frame. After reading the instructions, the first task was displayed on 
the computer screen and participants were instructed to close their eyes to spend one 
minute imagining (or recalling) a possible future life event (or a past life event) in as much 
detail as possible. After that, they were asked to provide a brief title of the event they have 
just imagined (or recalled) and a date they think this event might happen in the future (or a 
date when this event happened). They were asked to provide an exact date if they can if not 
a date as close to it as possible. They then completed the imagery scale in order to rate the 
phenomenological characteristics of their imagination (or memory) using the questionnaire 
identical as the one used in Study 2. 
 
3.5.3 Results 
Type of events 
For English-speakers, the life events they imagined or recalled fell into a number of 
categories: festive related (15.98%), leisure activities (10.66%), job or work related (10.25%), 
the birth of a child/episodes with a child (9.02%), college or university (8.61%), travel 
(7.79%), illness or death related (7.79%), wedding related (4.92%), romantic episodes 
(4.92%), party (2.87%), episodes with family (2.87%), shopping (1.23%), and other life events 
that could not be categorised into these categories (9.43%). For Mandarin-speakers, the life 
events they imagined or recalled involved leisure activities (16.30%), travel (14.13%), job 
related (14.13%), college or university related (10.87%), shopping (8.70%), romantic 
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episodes (5.98%), episodes with family (4.89%), wedding related (4.35%), the birth of a 
child/episodes with a child (2.17%), illness or death related (1.63%), party (1.63%), festive 
related (1.09%), and other events that could not be categorised into these categories 
(9.24%).  
 
Ratings for phenomenological characteristics 
Prior to conducting the analysis, for both imagination and memory versions, the 
ratings for “autonoetic consciousness” were produced by averaging the responses to 
“feeling of pre-experiencing (or re-experiencing)” and “feeling of traveling forward (or 
backward) to the event happening time” (Cronbach’s αimag/close = 0.52; Cronbach’s αimag/distant 
= 0.65; Cronbach’s αmem/close = 0.61; Cronbach’s αmem/distant = 0.73); similarly, the ratings of 
spatial context were produced by averaging responses regarding the “clarity of location”, 
“clarity of object layout” and “clarity of people layout” (Cronbach’s αimag/close = 0.55; 
Cronbach’s αimag/distant = 0.74; Cronbach’s αmem/close = 0.72; Cronbach’s αmem/distant = 0.71).  
 
Self-report phenomenological characteristics 
In order to see if phenomenological ratings differed according to culture, 
representation type, type of phenomenological characteristic, and temporal distance, a 
repeated-measure multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with all the 
phenomenological ratings (56 measures) as dependent variables, whereas culture as 
between-participants variable whilst representation type, phenomenological characteristic, 
and temporal distance as within-participant variables. As illustrated in Table 3.5, using 
Pillai’s Trace, most of the main effects (all F’s > 9.698, p’s < .002) and the interaction effects 
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(all F’s > 2.637, p’s < .004) reached statistical significance. There was no main effect of 
culture, F(101) = 3.283, p = .073, η2p = 0.031, nor was there a culture X distance interaction 
effect, F(101) = 1.631, p = .204, η2p = 0.016. 
 
Table 3.5 Results of MANOVA performed for the phenomenological ratings by culture, 
representation type, type of phenomenological characteristic, and temporal distance for 
Study 3 
 
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001. 
 
  Next, a series of univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each of 
the phenomenological characteristic with culture as a between-participants variable, 
representation type and distance as within-participant variables. The means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 3.6 whereas the main effects and interaction effects as a 
function of culture, mental representation type, and temporal distance are presented in 
Table 3.7. The result analysis will be broken down and presented in three sections, namely 
V F
Hypothesis 
df
Error 
df
η 2 p 
Culture 3.28 1 101 .03
Representation 0.09 9.70 ** 1 101 .09
Phenomenal 0.69 15.01 *** 13 89 .69
Distance 0.31 44.81 *** 1 101 .31
Culture*Representation 0.05 4.90 * 1 101 .05
Culture*Phenomenal 0.32 3.28 *** 1 89 .32
Culture*Distance 0.02 1.63 1 101 .02
Representation*Phenomenal 0.57 9.04 *** 13 89 .57
Representation*Distance 0.48 93.08 *** 1 101 .48
Phenomenal*Distance 0.61 10.76 *** 13 89 .61
Culture*Representation*Phenomenal 0.35 3.60 *** 13 89 .35
Culture*Representation*Distance 0.10 11.44 *** 1 101 .10
Culture*Phenomenal*Distance 0.28 2.64 ** 13 89 .28
Representation*Phenomenal*Distance 0.63 11.65 *** 13 89 .63
Culture*Representation*Distance*Phenomenal 0.33 3.36 *** 13 89 .33
Multivariate Test
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psychological distance, visual perspective, and all the other phenomenological 
characteristics. 
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Table 3.6 Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for self-report mental representation phenomenological characteristics by culture, 
representation type, and temporal distance for Study 3. 
 
Note: Values for autonoetic consciousness and spatial context refer to mean average. Rating scales: psychological distance: 1 = very close; 7 = very far away; 
visual perspective: 1 = entirely looking through my eyes; 7 = I can see myself in the imagination/memory; autonoetic consciousness: 1 = not at all; 7 = 
completely; visual/sounds/smells/tastes sensory details: 1 = none; 7 = a lot; spatial context: 1 =not at all clear; 7 = very clear; feeling emotions: 1 = not at all; 
7 = completely; emotion intensity: 1= not intense; 7 = very intense; emotion valence: 1= very negative; 7 = very positive; personal importance: 1= not at all 
important; 7 = very important; in words: 1 = not at all; 7 = a lot; coherent story: 1 = not at all; 7 = completely.  
Means not sharing a common subscript (a, b, c, d) are not statistically different at p < .05.           
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001.  
Close Distant Close Distant Close Distant Close Distant
Psychological distance 3.18 (1.97)a 5.10 (1.82)b 2.61 (1.81)a 4.43 (1.94)c 3.46 (1.83)a 4.09 (1.55)b 3.30 (1.67)a 3.87 (1.71)a
Visual perspective 3.97 (2.56) 4.48 (2.34) 3.59 (2.59) 3.57 (2.54) 5.09 (1.52) 5.13 (1.50) 5.02 (1.42) 5.15 (1.35)
Autonoetic consciousness 5.08 (1.54) 4.73 (1.49) 5.25 (1.53) 4.90 (1.58) 5.01 (0.95) 5.05 (1.09) 5.39 (0.92) 5.27 (1.00)
Visual details 5.56 (1.42) 5.33 (1.60) 6.18 (0.89) 6.21 (1.20) 4.67 (1.17) 4.83 (1.69) 5.39 (1.16) 5.33 (1.10)
Sounds 4.25 (2.29)a 3.73 (2.10)a 4.83 (2.17)b 4.73 (2.18)b 4.93 (1.32) 4.72 (1.56) 4.89 (1.59) 4.85 (1.59)
Smells/tastes 3.13 (2.17) 2.51 (2.09) 3.15 (2.23) 2.92 (2.00) 4.26 (1.99) 3.87 (1.81) 4.02 (1.94) 3.83 (1.68)
Spatial context 5.08 (1.21)a 4.49 (1.53)c 6.19 (1.00)b 5.82 (1.17)d 4.84 (0.99)a 4.63 (1.21)a 5.30 (0.93)b 5.11 (0.87)b
Temporal information 5.51 (1.74)a 4.43 (1.94)b 6.05 (1.43)c 6.05 (1.41)c 5.11 (1.45)a 4.57 (1.50)a 5.72 (1.17)b 5.41 (1.34)b
Feeling emotions 5.23 (1.66) 4.93 (1.64) 5.15 (1.67) 5.56 (1.53) 5.35 (1.14) 5.26 (1.14) 5.30 (1.21) 5.13 (1.29)
Emotions intensity 4.90 (1.51)a 5.72 (1.45)b 4.89 (1.83)a 5.89 (1.46)b 5.22 (1.28) 5.24 (1.34) 5.17 (1.32) 5.43 (1.34)
Emotions valence 5.45 (1.82) 5.77 (1.64) 4.64 (2.26) 5.03 (2.33) 5.43 (1.36) 5.54 (1.35) 4.98 (1.54) 5.15 (1.63)
Personal importance 5.13 (1.62)a 6.02 (1.44)b 4.75 (1.79)a 6.13 (1.40)b 5.13 (1.09) 5.59 (1.17) 5.15 (1.46) 5.46 (1.09)
In words 3.69 (2.08) 3.28 (1.97) 3.78 (2.26) 3.59 (2.16) 4.37 (1.37) 4.54 (1.35) 4.50 (1.35) 4.54 (1.60)
Coherent story 4.07 (1.94)a 3.77 (2.12)a 5.00 (1.91)b 5.30 (1.87)b 4.70 (1.59) 4.80 (1.42) 5.20 (1.26) 5.22 (1.38)
English (n  = 61) Mandarin (n  = 46)
Imagination Memory Imagination Memory
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Table 3.7 Main and interaction effects for self-report of mental representation phenomenological characteristics by culture, representation type, 
and temporal distance for Study 3. 
 
 
Note: * p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001. 
F η 2 p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p 
Psychological distance 0.41 .00 5.64 * .05 55.07 *** .34 1.55 .02 14.62 *** .12 0.12 .00 0.01 .00
Visual Perspective 15.14 *** .13 3.35 .03 1.30 .01 2.93 .03 0.30 .00 0.51 .01 1.00 .01
Autonoetic consciousness 1.16 .01 4.88 * .04 2.71 .03 0.38 .00 1.75 .02 0.14 .00 0.17 .00
Visual details 22.13 *** .17 32.31 *** .24 0.06 .00 0.37 .00 0.37 .00 0.01 .00 1.37 .01
Sounds 3.45 .03 6.51 * .06 1.68 .02 5.23 * .05 0.28 .00 0.85 .01 0.14 .00
Smells/tastes 13.82 *** .12 0.06 .00 4.89 * .04 1.45 .01 0.17 .00 0.89 .01 0.10 .00
Spatial context 7.79 ** .07 61.73 *** .37 13.73 *** .12 12.32 ** .11 2.36 .02 0.49 .01 0.34 .00
Temporal information 2.53 .02 37.45 *** .26 13.45 *** .11 1.43 .01 0.20 .00 8.27 ** .07 3.37 .03
Feeling emotions 0.09 .00 0.68 .01 0.16 .00 2.52 .02 0.34 .00 1.53 .02 2.50 .02
Emotions intensity 0.21 .00 0.32 .00 15.09 *** .13 0.00 .00 8.07 ** .07 0.77 .01 0.02 .00
Emotions valence 0.10 .00 14.90 *** .13 1.87 .02 1.28 .01 0.35 .00 0.08 .00 0.01 .00
Personal importance 1.35 .01 0.49 .01 22.63 *** .18 0.08 .00 5.58 * .05 0.62 .01 2.23 .02
In words 9.91 ** .09 0.99 .01 0.39 .00 0.29 .00 2.20 .02 0.02 .00 0.46 .00
Coherent story 4.22 * .04 22.38 *** .18 0.05 .00 4.71 * .04 0.05 .00 1.05 .01 1.90 .02
Main effects
Eng vs Man Ima vs Mem Clo vs Dist
Interaction effects
Imag/Mem* 
Culture
Clo/Dist* 
Culture 
Imag/Mem* 
Clo/Dist 
Imag/Mem* 
Clo/Dist*Culture
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Psychological distance  
Memory was rated as psychologically closer than imagination for all event types, 
F(105) = 5.640, p = .019, η2p = 0.051. In addition, temporally closer events were rated as 
psychologically closer than temporally distant events, F(105) = 55.065, p < .001, η2p = 0.344, 
This effect was moderated by culture, F(105) = 14.620, p < .001, η2p = 0.122. Post hoc tests 
(Bonferroni correction α = .025) revealed that this effect was stronger for English-speakers, 
F(105) = 73.523, p < .001, η2p = 0.412 than Mandarin-speakers, F(105) = 5.674, p = .019, η
2
p = 
0.051.  
 
Visual perspective13 
For visual perspective adopted while imagining and recalling the events, Mandarin-
speakers reported being more likely to adopt third-person perspective compared to English-
speakers, F(1, 105) = 15.141, p < .001, η2p = .126.  
 
Other phenomenological characteristics 
 English-speakers reported greater visual details [F(1, 105) = 22.130, p < .001, η2p 
= .174] and greater spatial context clarity [F(1, 105) = 7.785, p = .006, η2p = .069] than 
Mandarin-speakers. In contrast, Mandarin-speakers reported greater smells/tastes details 
[F(1, 105) = 13.823, p < .001, η2p = .116] than English-speakers. In addition, Mandarin-
speakers’ also rated their mental representations as more likely to be formulated in words 
[F(1, 104) = 9.914, p = .002, η2p = .087] and more coherent [F(1, 105) = 4.218, p = .042, η
2
p 
= .039] compared to English-speakers. 
                                                     
13 A repeated-measure ANOVA with culture and gender as between-participants variables whereas distance 
and representation type as within-participant variables revealed no significant main effect or interaction effect 
of gender on the use of visual perspective (all F’s < 1.424, p’s > .235).  
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For both temporal distances, memory was being rated as containing greater amount 
of autonoetic consciousness [F(1, 105) = 4.880, p = .029, η2p = .044], visual details [F(1, 105) 
= 32.312, p < .001, η2p = .235], sound related details [F(1, 104) = 6.511, p = .012, η
2
p = .059], 
higher spatial context clarity [F(1, 105) = 61.725, p < .001, η2p = .370], temporal information 
[F(1, 105) = 37.449, p < .001, η2p = .263], and more coherent [F(1, 105) = 22.384, p < .001, η
2
p 
= .176] than imagination. Conversely, imagination was being rated as emotionally more 
positive than memory for both temporal distances [F(104) = 14.902, p < .001, η2p = 0.125]. 
For both representation types, closer events were being rated as containing greater 
smells/tastes sensory details [F(1, 105) = 4.889, p = .029, η2p = .044], greater spatial context 
clarity, F(1, 105) = 13.732, p < .001, η2p = .116, and more temporal information [F(1, 105) = 
13.448, p < .001, η2p = .114] than more distant events. Conversely, more distant events were 
being rated as more emotionally intensified [F(105) = 15.092, p < .001, η2p = 0.126] and as 
more personally important [F(1, 105) = 22.628, p < .001, η2p = .177] than closer events. 
There was a culture X representation type interaction for sound sensory details [F(1, 
104) = 5.226, p = .024, η2p = .048] and spatial context [F(1, 105) = 12.320, p = .001, η
2
p 
= .105].  Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction (α = .025) revealed that English-
speakers rated their memory as containing more sound sensory details [F(1, 104) = 13.483, 
p < .001, η2p = .115] and greater spatial clarity [F(1, 105) = 75.131, p < .001, η
2
p = .417] than 
imagination. However, Mandarin-speakers rated their memory as containing greater spatial 
clarity [F(1, 105) = 8.285, p = .005, η2p = .073] than imagination whereas there was no 
difference in their ratings of sound sensory details [F(1, 104) = 0.031, p = .860, η2p < .001]. 
There was also a culture x distance interaction effect for emotional intensity [F(105) 
= 8.068, p = .005, η2p = 0.071] and personal importance [F(1, 105) = 5.581, p = .020, η
2
p 
= .050] ratings. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction (α = .025) revealed that 
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English-speakers rated distant events as more emotionally intensified [F(105) = 26.302, p 
< .001, η2p = .200] and as more personally important [F(1, 105) = 29.474, p < .001, η
2
p = .219] 
than closer events. However, this difference was absent for Mandarin-speakers [emotional 
intensity: F(105) = 0.478, p = .491, η2p = 0.005; personal importance: F(1, 105) = 2.514, p 
= .116, η2p = .023]. 
There was a representation type X temporal distance interaction for temporal 
information [F(1, 105) = 8.272, p = .005, η2p = .073] with post-hoc tests (Bonferroni 
correction α = .025) revealing that the temporal distance effect was stronger for memory 
[F(1, 105) = 45.895, p < .001, η2p = .304] than imagination [F(1, 105) = 8.962, p = .003, η
2
p 
= .079].  
 
3.5.4 Discussion of Study 3 
It was expected that if psychological distance influences mental representation, 
comparing mental representation of events located at different temporal regions will inform 
us on how psychological distance, temporal distance, and mental representations are 
related. 
The results showed that temporally closer events were also rated as psychologically 
closer compared to temporally more distant events. This applies to both future life events 
and past personal occurrences for both English and Mandarin-speakers. In other words, 
both cultural groups rated events that will happen/have happened within one month from 
the present as psychologically closer than events that will happen/have happened more 
than one year from now.  
Consistent with predictions, the MANOVA showed that the effect of temporal 
distance on ratings of phenomenological characteristics were not moderated by culture. 
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Both English and Mandarin-speakers rated temporally closer event as psychologically closer 
(vs. temporally more distant event) and as containing greater phenomenological 
characteristics including greater sensory details (e.g., smell/tastes), spatial details, and 
temporal information.   
Memory was rated as psychologically closer than imagination, for both closer and 
more distant events. Consistent with the psychological distance ratings, memory 
representations were reported to be more vivid, namely they contained greater autonoetic 
consciousness, visual details, sensory details of sound, spatial details, temporal information, 
and appeared to be more coherent than imagination. This observation is consistent with 
previous findings that memory typically consists of more contextual and sensory details 
compared to imagination (D’Argembeau & Van der Linde, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988) and 
even fabricated memories (Justice, et al. 2013). This is presumably due to memory being 
associated with the past which is more confined to reality whereas imagination of possible 
future events tends to be less reality-restricted and more goal-directed. A related 
observation is the emotional valence ratings which shows that participants rated their 
imagination as emotionally more positive than their memory. This indicates that 
participants anticipated their future to be largely positive which resonates with the 
optimistic tendency people generally have toward future life events (Weinstein, 1980).  
The observation of distant events (past and future) being rated as emotionally more 
intense and more personally important compared to close events suggests that when asked 
to bring to mind a life event, people tend to imagine or recall more salient events that are 
likely to have a major impact on their life. A possible explanation for this is that emotionally 
more intense and personally more important events are likely to be more memorable (e.g., 
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being rehearsed as a past event more often) and subjected to simulation as a potential 
future event more often.  
Overall, Mandarin-speakers reported greater use of third-person perspective (vs. 
English-speakers) when they imagine or recall life events. This applies to both imagination 
and memory and for both close and distant events. This finding is consistent with the results 
in Study 2 in this thesis and also previous research (Cohen & Gunz, 2002). 
The overall ratings of phenomenological characteristics in respect to close events in 
this study share some similarities as well as differences with the findings in Study 2. In terms 
of similarities, events were rated as emotionally more positive during imagination (vs. 
memory) in both studies. In addition, English-speakers tended to rate their mental 
representations as containing greater visual and greater spatial context clarity whereas 
Mandarin-speakers were more likely to rate their mental representations as being 
formulated in words.  
There are also some differences between the findings of Study 2 and Study 3. For 
instance, whilst Mandarin-speakers rated their mental representations to contain greater 
sensory details related to sound and smells/tastes than English-speakers in Study 2, this 
difference was absent in this study. Conversely, although Mandarin-speakers rated 
themselves to experience more emotional feelings and more intense emotional responses 
than English-speakers in Study 2, this was not the case in this study. In relation to close 
events psychological distance ratings in Study 3, there was no difference in Mandarin-
speakers’ prospective and retrospective ratings. The same was observed for English-
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speakers14. Although the observation of English-speakers’ psychological distance ratings in 
Study 3 appeared to be inconsistent with the outcome of Study 2, however, due to use of 
different research paradigms between the two studies, it is difficult to conclude whether 
these differences were due to the difference of the nature of events being 
imagined/recalled or due to participants’ own predispositions.  
The reliability of the questions of the autonoetic consciousness phenomenological 
characteristic was assessed with the Cronbach’s alpha level for “feeling of pre-experiencing 
(or re-experiencing)” and “feeling of traveling forward (or backward) to the event 
happening time”. The Cronbach’s alpha for close imagination (0.52), distant imagination 
(0.65), and close memory (0.61) appeared to be lower than that of distant memory (0.73). A 
low Cronbach’s alpha might be an indication of low internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951). 
However, other factors could also result in a low alpha value including a small number of 
items and items with poor inter-relatedness (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Further analyses 
revealed that the items have good inter-correlations15. Moreover, separate analyses 
conducted for each of the item showed that the results did not change the current 
conclusion16.  
  In conclusion, the results in this study confirmed that phenomenological 
characteristics of mental representations vary as a function of objective temporal distance 
and subjective psychological distance towards the event in question. The results in this 
study also converged with that of Study 2, showing that psychological distance is an 
                                                     
14 A separate paired sample t-test for English and Mandarin-speakers revealed no significant difference 
between their prospective and retrospective psychological distance ratings [English-speakers: t(60) = 1.994, p 
= .051; Mandarin-speakers: t(45) = 0.607, p = 547]. 
15 all r’s > .352, p’s < .001 
16 Participants’ scores on the ‘feeling of pre-experience (or re-experience)’ and ‘feeling of traveling forward (or 
backward)’ were entered into a separate repeated-measure ANOVA with culture as a between-participants 
factor. The sole significant effect was a main effect of representation type on feeling of traveling, F(1, 105) = 
5.490, p = .021, η
2
p = .050. No other significant effect emerged (all F’s < 3.121, p’s > .008). 
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important variable that influences mental representations as both English- and Mandarin-
speakers’ mental representations have been found differ in accordance to the psychological 
distance (and also objective distance) of the event in concern.  
The next study intended to examine the relationship between culture and temporal 
orientation by using a different temporal orientation measure – specifically, by using 
nostalgia as an indication of past orientation. An individual’s nostalgic tendency is the extent 
to which he/she thinks about the past which is essentially a characteristic of past orientation 
as it refers to people’s tendency to be cognitively involved in the past (i.e., a particular 
temporal region) (Park et al., 2007). Study 4 also aims to explore whether mental 
representation will influence other cognitive processing, namely, our valuation judgment of 
nostalgic items.   
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3.6 Study 4: Temporal Orientation, Culture, and Value Judgment 
3.6.1 Introduction 
It has been found that the phenomenological characteristics of mental 
representation vary as a function of objective distance (hence psychological distance), 
culture, and temporal region. Following the observation that temporal orientation could 
exert influence on one’s judgment of value (Caruso et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2012), the 
present study intends to examine whether an individual’s tendency to be temporally 
oriented towards the past will affect their mental representation of nostalgic items, which in 
turn influences their valuation of these items. In this study, the implications of past-
orientation for general feelings of attachment to the past (i.e., nostalgia) as well as value 
judgment of items associated with the past were examined. 
A tendency to temporally orient towards the past implies that an individual might 
think more or focus more on the past, which is one of the central features of nostalgia (i.e. 
thinking, remembering, longing, experience feeling about the past; Hepper et al., 2014). 
Therefore, it is possible that the more chronically accessible the past is, the more likely it 
will influence past-related judgments - in this case, valuations of nostalgic items.   
There is ample observation in the literature demonstrating that mental 
representations formed in regard to an object, person, or event can influence people’s 
subsequent judgment. For instance, the more recently a memory is formed or the more 
frequently we access a memory, the more likely it is to be used to make a related judgment 
(see reviews Wyer, 2007). For events or objects that are not presently available, 
psychological distance was found to affect people’s evaluation of objects, perhaps through 
the mental construal people form (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). For example, when 
evaluating a consumer product, the psychological distance people feel toward the product 
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could direct their attention to focus on certain aspects (e.g., the primary/central vs. 
secondary/peripheral features) which in turn affects their product evaluation (Kim, Zhang, & 
Li, 2008).  
If mental representation and emotions could exert influence on people’s evaluation 
or judgement, it is possible that greater feeling of nostalgia might trigger stronger emotion 
hence resulting in greater valuation judgments being placed on sentimental items. This 
study is designed based on this assumption, in order to investigate the relationship between 
temporal orientation and value judgement by using the endowment effect paradigm.  
The feeling of nostalgia is primarily related to the past, as hope is related to the 
future. It is defined as a sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past (New Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 1998, p. 1266). Nostalgia is a universal phenomenon and people 
around the world share similar understanding of it (Hepper et al., 2014). Albeit debates exist 
on the nature and valence of its affective dimension (e.g., whether it is positive, negative, or 
ambivalent in nature), feelings of nostalgia consist of and give rise to more positive than 
negative emotions (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). It is an emotion 
associated with various past oriented feelings such as remembering, reminiscence, longing, 
dwelling, missing, or even want to return to those personally meaningful and important past 
experiences (Hepper et al., 2012).  
Whilst previous research has established that diverse cultures share a common 
conceptual understanding of nostalgia (Hepper et al., 2014), it has not yet determined 
whether members of different cultures differ in the magnitude of their nostalgic 
experiences. Thus, in the present study, the aims are to examine whether: 1) members of 
East Asian cultures (which are claimed to be more past-oriented) would exhibit greater 
levels of nostalgia than Westerners (who are more future-oriented), and 2) whether this 
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tendency to focus more on the past would be evident in their valuation judgment about 
nostalgic items. As suggested by earlier work (Guo et al., 2012), perception of the past as 
psychologically closer may also have repercussions for the value placed on events and items 
associated with the past. Valuing the past and the objects associated may be manifested in 
various ways. For example, individuals who place greater value on the past may be more 
likely to experience nostalgia. This might have implication on their attachment to nostalgic 
items which in turn results in varied valuation judgment.  
As previously discussed, East Asians attend to and value the past to a greater extent 
than Westerners (Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009). Although nostalgia is a universal 
phenomenon (Hepper et al., 2014), these cultural differences suggest that the experience of 
nostalgia may vary cross-culturally as well. It is thus predicted that East Asians who have 
been found to be more past oriented (e.g., Guo et al., 2012) might exhibit greater nostalgia 
tendency hence value nostalgic items more compared to Western individuals. 
One of the widely studied and robust phenomenon where an object’s value 
increases by virtue of ownership is termed endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). It is commonly 
exhibited using either the exchange paradigm (i.e. research participants are endowed with 
an object and later given a chance to exchange it; Knetscch, 1989) or the valuation paradigm 
(i.e. research participants are assigned to be a buyer or seller, and are asked to provide a 
price at which they would be willing to buy/sell an object; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1990). In the exchange paradigm, the endowment effect is evidenced by participants’ 
reluctance to exchange the endowed object for a new object. Likewise, in the valuation 
paradigm, the endowment effect is measured by the (positive) difference between seller’s 
willingness-to-accept price (WTA) and buyer’s willingness-to-pay price (WTP) for the same 
object.  
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The endowment effect is often explained in terms of loss aversion (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) – that is, the pain associated with losing an object is greater than the 
pleasure associated with acquiring one. However, other factors also affect the strength of 
the endowment effect, such as duration of ownership (Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998); 
attentional focus (Ashby, Dickert, & Glöckner, 2012); social context in which the endowed 
object is used (Gobel, Ong, & Harris, 2014); subjective feelings of ownership (Reb & Connolly, 
2007); and cultural backgrounds (Maddux et al., 2010). 
For example, Maddux and his colleagues (2010; cf Gobel et al, 2014) investigated the 
endowment effect using a valuation paradigm, and found that European Canadians 
exhibited a stronger endowment effect for recently-acquired objects compared to East 
Asian participants. They attributed their findings to differences in self-construals. Specifically, 
European Canadians (who display primarily independent self-construals) show greater self-
enhancement compared to Japanese participants (who have primarily interdependent self-
contruals). Maddux et al suggested that individuals who are prone to self-enhancement (i.e., 
Westerners) are likely to assign greater value on objects associated with the self, thus 
demonstrating a greater endowment effect. 
Although the present study was designed with the association of nostalgia and 
valuation in mind, other research findings offer insight on the understanding of why and 
how people assign greater value to personal possessions suggest that an item’s intrinsic 
value can be influenced by its own characteristics or the value people attach or associate 
the item with. For example, not only that an item’s intrinsic value is influenced by the 
prospect of actual functional usage, it is also influenced by the perceived financial value and 
the psychological meanings it has (e.g., its association with significant others - Wallendorf & 
Arnould, 1988; as a connection to the personal past - Belk, 1988). These factors affect the 
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monetary valuation people place on possessions or previous possessions and also their 
motivation of keeping them.  
In terms of cross-cultural comparisons, the personal meanings people assign and 
attach to personal items have been found to vary across cultures (Wallendorf & Arnould, 
1988). For example, Americans’ attachment to their favourite possessions was found to be 
largely based on the possession’s connection to the owner’s personal past (e.g., as a 
reminder of an important person or a personally important past event). Personal items were 
thought to be a reflection of our personal identity and value. For instance, the items we own 
can be used to convey and express ourselves (Belk, 1988). Thus, the connection between 
personal possession and owner should be a more important aspect for Western individuals, 
as Western societies cherish and celebrate personal value and uniqueness to a greater 
extent than East Asian societies. Following this line of reasoning, it is possible that Western 
individuals should attribute greater values to nostalgic items - a suggestion that is consistent 
with the greater endowment effect observed among Western individuals (Maddux et al., 
2010). This will serve as a competing hypothesis of the present study. 
 In summary, this study extended the investigation on the relationship between 
culture and temporal orientation to include its potential downstream effects, namely, 
nostalgic item valuations. Nostalgia tendency was used as an alternative measure of 
temporal orientation. Participants were asked to complete the Southampton Nostalgia Scale 
(SNS; Barrett, et al., 2010) which consists of seven items that assess people’s past-oriented 
tendency. The scale is a multifaceted measure of nostalgic tendency which assesses the 
frequency of experiencing nostalgic tendency, personal relevance of nostalgia, and the 
proclivity of experiencing nostalgia episodes.  
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 It is worth clarifying that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact definition of being more 
“past oriented” because previous studies conducted in relation to stronger past orientation 
among East Asians included a wide variety of observations (e.g., feel closer to a past 
event/time point – Ji et al., 2009; value past event or object more – Guo et al., 2012; attend 
to a wider range of past information – Ji et al., 2009). Therefore, in this thesis, greater past 
orientation is expected to be associated with general greater nostalgic tendency. Nostalgic 
tendency includes thinking more about the past, perceiving nostalgia to be more personally 
relevant and the self to be more prone to nostalgia experience as measured by the SNS 
measure (Barrett, et al., 2010). 
The nostalgic object valuation judgement will be investigated by adapting and 
modifying the valuation paradigm used to investigate the endowment effect. In the 
conventional research paradigm to investigate endowment effect, individuals who are 
endowed with an object (i.e., sellers) typically demand more money to part with the object 
than those who are willing to pay to acquire it (i.e., buyers). In this study, Mandarin and 
English-speakers were asked to assume the role of buyer or seller of a sentimental object 
and then give a monetary value they were willing to pay (or accept) to acquire (or part with) 
the object. The feelings of nostalgia were triggered by asking participants to imagine being 
presented with a series of previously owned objects. Participants were subsequently asked 
to assign a value to each of the objects. Buyers imagined themselves having owned these 
nostalgic objects previously but no longer currently owning them whereas sellers imagined 
themselves currently owning these objects but no longer needing them. 
The above considerations lead to a number of predictions regarding the relationship 
between culture, nostalgic tendency, and valuation judgment. In terms of nostalgia 
tendency, it is suspected that East Asian individuals who are claimed to be more past 
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oriented (Ji et al., 2009) should exhibit greater nostalgia tendency by scoring higher on the 
SNS compared to Western individuals who are more future oriented (Caruso et al., 2008). 
There are two competing hypotheses in relation to the outcome of nostalgic object 
valuation. Firstly, to the extent that greater attachment to the past (and its associated 
objects) derives from greater past-orientation, it is expected that not only Mandarin-
speakers should display stronger nostalgia tendency, they should also assign higher values 
to nostalgic objects (vs. English-speakers) following their imagination of owning them 
previously. This is because Mandarin-speakers who are claimed to be past-oriented should 
display greater nostalgia tendency and experience stronger emotions while imagining 
owning nostalgic objects which in turn resulted in higher monetary valuation being assigned 
to these objects compared to English-speakers. 
On the other hand, in light of a stronger association between the self and personal 
possession among Western individuals (Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988), it might be predicted 
that imagining previous ownership of those sentimental objects should result in stronger 
emotions felt which in turn would lead Western individuals to assign greater values to 
previously owned sentimental personal objects compared to Mandarin-speakers.  
It is worth clarifying that although this study adapted and modified the conventional 
experimental procedure to investigate the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990), the 
difference between buying and selling valuations is not the primary interest of this study. In 
the conventional endowment effect paradigm, participants who are allocated the buyer 
roles have never taken ownership of the object but are asked to value whilst sellers typically 
assume a brief ownership of the object in concern. However, in this study, buyers were 
asked to assume that they had owned the objects in the past, but that they no longer 
owned them. In contrast, sellers were asked to assume that they currently owned the 
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objects, but no longer needed them. As past work observed that previous ownership 
experience and the duration of ownership can affect valuation judgments (Strahilevitz & 
Loewenstein, 1998), it is unclear how the shifting in buyer and seller’s reference point will 
affect their valuation. Moreover, the main interest of the present study is the relationship 
between nostalgia tendency and valuation. Therefore, no specific hypothesis will be made 
regarding the endowment effect in the present study.  
 
3.6.2 Method 
 Participants 
Two hundred and sixty-six participants participated in this study by completing an 
online questionnaire. Participants were recruited by posting study links on various 
psychological and non-psychological research websites and social-networking platforms (see 
Appendix A – Part I for online recruitment sources). These included 184 English-speakers 
and 82 Mandarin-speakers. Participants were recruited by offering a chance to win a prize 
lucky draw (£20 cash voucher each for English-speakers and Mandarin-speakers respectively) 
for completing the questionnaire online.  
 Of the two hundred and sixty-six responses, 225 were valid following the screening 
process following the inclusion criteria (exclusion rate = 15.41%) (32 responses were 
incomplete, 9 were non-native English-speakers). There were 148 English-speakers and 77 
Mandarin-speakers (154 females, 1 did not report gender, ages 18-74, median age group 25-
34). For the English-speakers, majority of them were born in the U.K. (50.0%) and the U.S.A 
(38.5%). The rest of them were born in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For the 
Mandarin-speakers, majority of them were born in Malaysia (75.3%) and China (14.3%). The 
rest of them were born in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  
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Design and Procedure 
Participants completed the Southampton Nostalgia Scale (SNS; Barrett, et al., 2010), 
consisting of seven items that assess three aspects of nostalgia including the frequency of 
experience nostalgic episodes ('How often do you experience nostalgia?’, ‘Generally 
speaking, how often do you bring to mind nostalgic experiences?’, ‘Specifically, how often do 
you bring to mind nostalgic experiences?’), the personal relevance of nostalgia experience 
(‘How important is it for you to bring to mind nostalgic experiences?, ‘How valuable is 
nostalgia for you?’, ‘How significant is it for you to feel nostalgic?’), and the proclivity to 
nostalgia (‘How prone are you to feeling nostalgic?). Participants rated these questions on a 
7-point scale (1 = not at all/very rarely; 7 = very much/very frequently) which were 
presented in a randomised order. The SNS had a high level of internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .93). Previous cross-cultural studies conducted in relation to a stronger past 
orientation included a variety of observations (e.g., feel closer to a past event/time point – Ji 
et al., 2009; value past event or object more – Guo et al., 2012; and attend to a wider range 
of past information – Ji et al., 2009), therefore a greater past orientation among Mandarin-
speakers is expected to be associated with a general greater nostalgic tendency and 
therefore the SNS scale will not be broken down into its subscales. 
They were then assigned to one of two between-participants conditions, which 
determined which version of a valuation questionnaire they received. Participants in both 
conditions were asked to report the value they assigned to seven hypothetical items (in 
randomised order) that had sentimental value (for all the hypothetical item scenarios refer 
to Appendix C). Approximately half of the participants were asked to assume the role of a 
‘seller’ and the other half were asked to assume the role of a ‘buyer’ of those items. For 
example, participants assigned to the ‘buyer’ role responded to the item: 
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Imagine you are buying a t-shirt. You see a t-shirt for sale that is from a concert of 
your favourite band that you went to years ago. You have good memories from that night 
and wished you had bought a t-shirt at the time. Choose a price you would pay for the t-shirt 
now (from £0 to £10). Give the amount to the nearest 50 pence. 
On the other hand, participants who were assigned the role of ‘seller’ were asked to 
respond to the item: 
Imagine you are selling a t-shirt that you got when you saw your favourite band in 
concert. The t-shirt brings back good memories; however, it no longer fits you and you wish 
to sell it so that someone else may enjoy it. Choose a price you would sell the t-shirt for (from 
£0 to £10). Give the amount to the nearest 50 pence. 
 
3.6.3 Results 
Nostalgia 
 A nostalgia index (SNS index) was generated by averaging across all seven items. The 
SNS index was analysed using an independent sample t-test. Mandarin-speakers produced 
higher SNS index than English-speakers, t(223) = 2.26, p = .025, d = .32. See Table 3.8 for 
descriptive statistics and the t-test outcome.  
 
Table 3.8 Means, standard deviations, and the t-test outcome by SNS and culture for Study 4. 
 
 
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001. 
 
 
M SD M SD t d
SNS index 4.42 1.38 4.85 1.29 2.26 * .32
English (n  = 148) Mandarin (n  = 77) t-test
 121 
Valuation Judgment 
Participants’ valuations of the seven items were internally consistent17 (Cronbach’s α 
= .79 for participants in the ‘seller’ role and α = .78 for those in the ‘buyer’ role). They were 
therefore averaged before analysis. The means and standard deviations are presented in 
Table 3.9. A 2 Culture (English, Mandarin) x 2 Role (Seller, Buyer) ANOVA was conducted for 
the valuation of the nostalgic items. ANOVA yielded no significant effects on culture [F(1, 
173) = 1.059, p = .305, ηp
2 =.006], role [F(1, 173) = 0.803, p = .371, ηp
2 =.005], nor was there 
a culture x role interaction [F(1, 173) = 0.822, p = .366, ηp
2 =.005]. 
 
Table 3.9 Means and standard deviations for nostalgic item valuation by role type and 
culture for Study 4. 
 
 
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater valuations. The valuations were mean averages. 
 
Relationships among Measures 
There was a positive correlation between SNS scores and valuations, r(177) = .295, p 
< .001. In separate analyses, the correlation between SNS scores and valuations was reliable 
for English-speakers [r(116) = .431, p < .001], absent for Mandarin-speakers [r(61) = -.014, p 
= .917] and of similar magnitude for sellers [r(96) = .236, p = .021] and for buyers [r(81) 
= .374, p = .001]. English-speakers in the both seller and buyer roles had a higher SNS and 
                                                     
17 The valuations provided by participants were also internally consistent within their own cultural group 
(English-speakers: Cronbach’s αbuyer= .77, Cronbach’s αseller = .73; Mandarin-speakers: Cronbach’s αbuyer = .81, 
Cronbach’s αseller = .80). 
M SD M SD
Seller 5.55 1.98 6.18 2.19
Buyer 6.14 2.08 6.17 1.99
English (n  = 116) Mandarin (n  = 61)
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valuations correlation compared to those of Mandarin-speakers’. See Table 3.10 for 
correlations. 
 
Table 3.10 Correlation of SNS scores and valuations for English and Mandarin-speakers by 
role for Study 4. 
 
 
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001. 
 
3.6.4 Discussion of Study 4 
In Study 4, I tested the proposition that cultural effects would manifest in temporal 
orientation that individuals attend to - specifically, that Mandarin-speakers would display 
higher nostalgia tendency compared to English-speakers because they are relatively more 
past-oriented. Consistent with this hypothesis, the average mean SNS scores of Mandarin-
speakers were higher compared to English-speakers. 
 In addition, cross-cultural differences in monetary valuation on nostalgic items was 
examined. Two hypotheses related to this were identified. The first hypothesis was 
established based on the assumption that nostalgic tendency should be related to temporal 
disposition, which in turn, should affect one’s item valuation. Following this line of 
reasoning, Mandarin-speakers who are more past-oriented should score higher on the SNS 
and also assign greater monetary valuation to nostalgic items compared to English-speakers. 
In contrast, the second hypothesis was formulated due to the perceived stronger ties 
Overall (N  = 177) 0.30 ***
English (n  = 116) 0.43 ***
Seller (n = 66) 0.39 **
Buyer (n = 50) 0.52 ***
Mandarin (n  = 61) -0.01
Seller (n  = 30) -0.14
Buyer (n = 31) 0.12
Pearson's Correlation
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between personal possession and the self among Western individuals. Based on this, 
English-speakers should place higher values on nostalgic items because of their higher 
perceived intrinsic values of these items compared to Mandarin-speakers.   
The results showed that there was no difference in valuation judgments between 
English and Mandarin-speakers. For Mandarin-speakers, the value placed on these nostalgic 
items was not related to their level of nostalgia. In contrast, there was a strong positive 
correlation between value and nostalgia among English-speakers. This suggest that there is 
a stronger correspondence between nostalgia and valuation among English-speakers, 
whereas this correspondence was virtually non-existent among Mandarin-speakers. 
The stronger correspondence between valuation and nostalgia tendency among 
English-speakers appears to be consistent with the second hypothesis. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, one of the culturally-related factors identified to influence valuation of 
personal possession is the perceived attachment between the item and the owner, for 
instance, a perceived connection of an item with one’s personal past (Wallendorf & Arnould, 
1988). This would explain the stronger association found between nostalgia tendency and 
nostalgic item valuations among English-speakers in this study as the nostalgic items were 
described to be connected to one’s personal past. 
On the other hand, the weaker correspondence between valuation and nostalgia 
tendency among Mandarin-speakers indicates that their valuation of nostalgic items is likely 
based on other consideration rather than the items’ perceived intrinsic values for being 
associated with the past.  
The observation of a different association between nostalgic tendency and nostalgic 
item valuation between English and Mandarin-speakers suggest that more investigation is 
needed to clarify this, namely what kind of attachment is likely to exert more influence on 
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their valuation judgment. For example, whether it is based on attached personal values, 
reminder of a past event, the functional or utility value of the item, or the perceived 
financial value of the item. Taken together the existing literature and the findings of Study 4, 
it appears that there is a variation between cultures in terms of the nature of attachment 
form between individual and item and the extent to which this would affect their valuation 
judgment.  
This study is designed to examine the influence of mental representation on 
judgment/decision. It is possible that the value one places on a nostalgic item may be 
related to the strength of nostalgic feeling evoked by thinking about the past, which should 
be associated with the imagination vividness and clarity of owning these items. However, 
participants’ imagination or emotions felt in the nostalgic scenarios were not measured in 
this study therefore it is unclear whether the intensity of nostalgic feeling associated with 
their imagination was sufficient to exert influence on their nostalgic items’ valuation. 
Nevertheless, previous studies found that simply asking participants to imagine owning an 
object was sufficient to evoke a sense of ownership and resulted in greater valuation being 
assigned to an object (Kahneman et al., 1990; Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998). It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that by asking participants to imagine owning those 
nostalgic items previously, it was adequate in evoking a sense of nostalgic towards the items.  
Moreover, the nostalgic items in this study were framed mainly to evoke sentimental 
feelings towards the items. Therefore, it was reasonable to assume that sentimental 
feelings associated with the items should be the most salient in participants’ mind while 
they were answering the questions. This, should be among the most influential factors in 
their valuation judgement.  
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Taken together, the outcome of this study suggests that the extent to which 
individuals with nostalgic tendencies assign greater value to nostalgic items are culturally 
dependent.  
 
3.7 Discussion 
The studies in this chapter investigated the possible downstream effects of time-
related tendencies, namely the influence of temporal orientation on phenomenological 
characteristics of mental representation (Study 2 & 3) and also the potential downstream 
effect of temporal orientation on valuation judgements (Study 4). Overall, there are 
observable cultural variations in mental representation as a function of temporal 
orientation, and this is especially prominent among English-speakers. 
Study 2 extended previous findings of a stronger future orientation among English-
speakers (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso et al., 2013), showing that English-speakers’ future 
oriented frame of mind can be observed in their phenomenological characteristics of mental 
representations (e.g., more intense emotional response and greater contextual details). 
Such findings are in line with their psychological distance ratings observed in Study 2 and 
also their feelings of being psychologically closer to the future in general as observed in 
Study 1.  
On the other hand, Mandarin-speakers’ non-differentiated mental representation 
phenomenological characteristics of past and future event observed in Study 2 is in line with 
their equidistant psychological distance ratings. However, this finding is contrary to previous 
findings of a stronger past orientation among East Asians (e.g., Guo et al., 2012). 
By comparing mental representation of events located at different temporal regions. 
The results of Study 3 provided converging evidence that psychological distance is an 
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important driving variable that influences mental representations, showing that temporally 
closer event was also rated as psychologically closer and consisting of greater contextual 
details compared to temporally more distant event. This finding is consistent with previous 
research (D’Argembeau & Van der Linde, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988) and is also in line with 
the predictions of CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
The reason for the lack of a difference between representations of future and past 
events among Mandarin-speakers is unclear. One might suspect that perhaps the preferred 
way to mentally represent object or event might vary cross-culturally. In other words, 
individuals with different cultural backgrounds might have tendency to imagine or recall in 
certain ways. For instance, people might have natural tendency to imagine or recall either 
by generating more images or using abstract messages such as words. However, the results 
of Study 3 argue against this explanation. Study 3 showed that phenomenological 
characteristics of participants’ mental representation varied as a function of objective 
temporal distance and psychological distance towards the event in question, and that this 
applied equally to both English and Mandarin-speakers. 
Following the findings of a cultural effect on mental representation, Study 4 was 
conducted to explore the possibility of an effect of culture on judgement through mental 
representation. It also used a different and novel measure, nostalgic tendency scale (i.e., 
SNS) as an indication of past orientation. Interestingly, although English-speakers reported 
themselves to be less nostalgic than Mandarin-speakers, nostalgic tendency was found to be 
associated with their nostalgic item valuations to a greater extent compared to Mandarin-
speakers. This provides a possible explanation for the greater endowment effect observed 
among Western individuals previously (Maddux et al., 2010; but see Gobel et al, 2014). 
Their greater valuation placed on endowed items is possibly related to their greater 
 127 
perceived connection between the item and the past. This suggestion is consistent with 
previous work showing that duration of ownership enhances endowment effects 
(Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998). Importantly, this shows that culture, cognition, and 
judgment have a complex relationship.  
Apart from observation regarding cultural variation, the studies in the present 
chapter have shown that some basic human tendencies are universal. For example, both 
cultural groups consistently rated their imaginations to be emotionally more positive than 
their memories (Study 2 & 3) which is in-line with a greater optimism bias towards future 
event commonly exhibited among individuals. In addition, objectively closer event was also 
rated as psychologically closer and contained greater phenomenological characteristics 
compared to objectively or psychologically more distant event. 
Having now considered the temporal orientation line of enquiry, the next chapter 
will turn to another time-related cognition, namely the use of time metaphor between 
English and Mandarin-speakers. In addition, it also explores the relationship between the 
use of time metaphor and downstream judgement and decision, including optimism bias 
and risk-taking tendency. 
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Chapter 4: Time Perception: Implications for Judgment and 
Decision-making 
 
The results of Study 1 showed supportive findings of cultural differences in the use of 
time metaphor. Specifically, English-speakers were more likely to use ego-moving 
metaphors whereas Mandarin-speakers were more likely to use time-moving metaphors. 
Next, I sought to continue this line of investigation by exploring the possible downstream 
effects of the use of time metaphor.   
 As described previously, a central distinction between ego-moving and time-moving 
metaphorical representations is the extent to which the self is perceived as active and in 
motion. As implied in the linguistic framework (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009) and some 
previous studies (Boltz & Yum, 2010; Lee & Ji, 2014; Ruscher, 2011) which examined the 
relationship between the use of time metaphor and judgement, a possible implication of 
this distinction is that individuals who endorse an ego-moving metaphor (vs. time-moving 
metaphor) may perceive themselves to possess a greater degree of personal control over 
event outcomes. Consistent with this conjecture, psychological studies on locus of control 
(e.g., Sastry & Ross, 1998) and fundamental attribution bias (e.g., Choi, et al., 1999) 
reported that Westerners – who are more likely to endorse ego-moving metaphors – have a 
greater internal locus of control and higher sense of agency respectively, compared to East 
Asians, where less emphasis is placed on the value of being in control.  
However, although the observations of cultural variations in locus of control (Sastry 
& Ross, 1998) and attribution of event causality (Choi et al., 1999) are consistent with the 
more frequent use of ego-moving metaphor and time-moving metaphor among English-
 129 
speakers and Mandarin-speakers respectively, the hypothesis that the use of time metaphor 
is related to perceived personal control has never been directly tested. 
 Perceiving greater personal control may be linked to a number of decision-making 
outcomes. For instance, studies found that perceived personal control is related to the 
optimism one has (Harris, 1996; Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001) and also one’s risk taking 
tendency (Klein & Kunda, 1994). The literature on optimism bias has shown that one’s 
perceived control over an event’s outcome is related to optimistic belief bias (Harris, 1996; 
Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). Specifically, people who perceived themselves to have 
greater control over an event’s outcome tend to have greater optimism belief bias. This is 
presumably due to their biased belief that the more controllable an event is, the more likely 
they are able to prevent the undesirable outcome. For example, if a driver believes he has a 
lot of control over getting involved in an accident, he is more likely to view his risk of getting 
involved in an accident as relatively low. Similarly, a study by Klein and Kunda (1994) 
showed that people’s biased beliefs of being able to control their outcomes was related to 
the extent to which they displayed the ‘better-than-average’ effect (a self-serving bias 
reflecting the belief that one is ‘above average’ on positive attributes).  
When it comes to self-related aspects, people show the tendency of seeing 
themselves in a self-serving manner and hold biased beliefs about themselves. This biased 
perception of the self is thought to serve a self-serving motive, to maintain and sustain our 
positive self-esteem (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). This self-
enhancement tendency is pervasive covering many aspects of daily life including our 
communication ability (Keysar & Henly, 2002); driving ability (McKenna & Myers, 1997), not 
getting injured or killed in an automobile accident (Rutter, Quine, & Albery, 1998); work 
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performance (Stajkovic & Luchins, 1998); and physical appearance (Eply & Whitchurch, 2008) 
among others.  
Research on unrealistic optimism bias typically asks participants to compare 
themselves to an average other (e.g., Weinstein, 1980). People often tend to be 
unrealistically positive about their future life events, think that good things are more likely 
to happen to themselves whereas bad things are more likely to happen to others, a 
phenomenon known as unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980). Unrealistic optimism is a 
self-positivity bias and is found to be a robust observation. Although various personal (e.g., 
mood, personality) and situational (e.g., prior experience) factors have been proposed to 
affect the extent to which people display this bias (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001), the 
perception of control over an event or its outcome was found to be a particularly influential 
factor, with greater perceptions of control being associated with greater unrealistic 
optimism bias (see meta-analysis by Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002). Apparently, the 
perception of being able to exert control over an event’s outcome may lead people to think 
that they have better chances of achieving desirable outcomes or avoiding undesirable ones.  
In a pioneering study conducted by Weinstein (1980), college students were asked to 
rate their chances of experiencing some positive and negative life events by comparing their 
chances with those of the average student. Those students who were unrealistically 
optimistic about their future rated themselves to be more likely to experience positive 
events but less likely to experience negative events compared to the average student. For 
example, compared to their average peers, college students believe they are more likely to 
get a good job, live longer, own their own home; and less likely than the average peer to 
divorce, have heart attack or lung cancer, drop out of college, or have drinking problem. 
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Similar findings have been reported in a number of subsequent studies (Weinstein, 1982, 
1983, 1984, 1987).  
Thus, unrealistic optimism appears to be a robust phenomenon. However, cross-
cultural studies examining various positive and negative life events and using different 
comparison methods have painted a mixed picture on this. Some researchers have argued 
that unrealistic optimism is a self-enhancing bias that is culturally variant, as the benefit of 
maintaining positive illusions is culturally specified (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995; Heine, 
Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). The argument put forward is that positive illusions 
serve to maintain the view that the self is a worthy person (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This 
motive is more salient among individuals with independent self-construals (i.e., Westerners). 
In contrast, individuals with an interdependent self-construal (e.g., Asians) prioritize the 
ability to ‘fit in’ and not ‘stand out’ in order to maintain harmonious interpersonal 
relationships. As a result, self-enhancement tendencies such as unrealistic optimism are less 
strong among East Asians compared to Western individuals (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, 
& Norasakkunkit, 1997).  
Nevertheless, people’s tendency to be optimistic also appears to be directly related 
to the type of event and the specific controllability they perceive themselves to have over 
the event (Chang, et al., 2001; Joshi & Carter, 2013). Optimism bias is likely to be related to 
different underlying motivation or cognitive processes (Hoorens, 1996). For instance, higher 
optimism bias tends to be expressed for events that are perceived to be more controllable. 
For example, participants who rated divorce as relatively more controllable also rated their 
chances of experiencing this event as relatively lower than their peers (Joshi & Carter, 2013).   
Accordingly, greater perception of control has been found to have wide implications 
(e.g., risk perception and risk-related behaviours) (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). For 
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instance, people’s perception of risk and their perceived tolerance of different types of risk 
are contingent upon their perceived ability to control an event or its outcome (Klein & 
Kunda, 1994; Slovic, 1987; Vlek & Stallen, 1980). The attractiveness of a risky option can be 
enhanced by the perceived controllability over the event’s outcome. People who perceive 
an event to be more controllable will be more likely to rate their own risk of receiving an 
undesirable outcome as lower than the average (e.g., Klein & Kunda, 1994). The perception 
of risk has serious implications for the course of action and the decisions we make in daily 
lives. For example, when people who were led to believe their risk of getting involved in an 
accident was greater than the average others, they showed greater intention to take 
precautionary actions (e.g., Mckenna, Stainer, & Lewis, 1991). 
Most of the decisions we make in our daily lives involve different levels of risk and 
these risks vary greatly in different life domains including financial, health, ethical, social, or 
recreational. When deliberating decisions, we often have to weigh our tolerance for risk 
against the possibility of achieving greater gains, as desirable options often involve 
undesirable aspects. For instance, financial decisions such as whether to put our savings in 
the bank during the current low interest rate environment or to invest in the volatile stock 
market require weighing the risk of losing our saving against the potential for a better 
return. Health decisions such as whether to endure inoculations before travelling to a high-
risk destination, pit one’s perception of long-term risk against one’s shorter-term comfort. 
Similarly, ethical, social, and recreational decisions require us to weigh the likelihoods of 
various outcomes that differ in their certainty, desirability, pleasantness, and temporal or 
spatial proximity. Thus, individuals’ risk-taking is multifaceted and complicated as the 
options often require one to assume different levels of risk to achieve more or less desirable 
outcomes.  
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Studies 5 and 6 in this chapter sought to explore the role of the use of time 
metaphor in optimism and in risk-taking tendencies. Study 5 investigated cultural 
differences in unrealistic optimism and tested the hypothesis that the use of time metaphor 
will act as a mediator. Study 6 examined cultural differences in risk taking and explored the 
role of time metaphors in individuals’ risk-taking tendencies. It was hypothesized that 
perceptions of control would be predicted by the use of different time metaphors, which 
were expected to vary by culture. Furthermore, individuals’ level of unrealistic optimism 
bias (Study 5) and risk-taking tendency (Study 6) were expected to be related to their 
perception of control. Specifically, a time-moving metaphor (characterized by a passive 
sense of self) was hypothesized to be related to lower sense of control and hence lower 
levels of optimism (Study 5) and lower risk-taking tendency (Study 6). On the other hand, an 
ego-moving metaphor (which fosters a more active sense of self) was expected to be related 
to higher perceived controllability and consequently higher levels of optimism (Study 5) and 
higher risk-taking tendency (Study 6).  
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4.1 Study 5: Time Metaphors, Perceived Control, and Unrealistic Optimism 
 4.1.1 Introduction 
This study will be the first to explore the complex relationship between the use of 
time metaphor, sense of personal control, and unrealistic optimism in different cultures. To 
test these associations, the relationship between individuals’ perceptions of control and 
their use of metaphorical representation of time was explored, followed by the role of the 
use of time metaphor in individual’s unrealistic optimism towards positive and negative life 
events. It was expected that the use of ego-moving metaphors would be related to higher 
perceived control whereas the use of time-moving metaphors would predict higher external 
locus of control. In addition, time metaphors should act as a mediator, such that culture 
influences an individual’s unrealistic optimism via the use of diverse metaphors. Specifically, 
time-moving metaphors are hypothesized to predict lower optimism towards life events. On 
the other hand, ego-moving metaphors should produce greater agency which should in turn 
lead to higher levels of optimism. 
Study 5 also sought to replicate the observation of cultural differences of time 
perception in Study 1 – the use of time metaphor and temporal orientation. In study 1, 
participants’ temporal orientation was assessed by using a simple psychological distance 
question - participants were asked to rate their perceived subjective distance (close vs. 
further away) of the same day one month in the past (vs. future). Although it was found that 
English-speakers felt closer a day one month in the future (vs. the same day one month in 
the past), Mandarin-speakers did not feel closer to a day one month in the past. Subsequent 
study (Study 2) found that English-speakers felt psychologically closer to a past event (vs. a 
future event) whereas Mandarin-speakers felt equidistant to the event (future vs. past). 
Study 5 attempts to replicate the finding of cultural differences in temporal orientation by 
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adapting and modifying the measure used in Study 1 – by using a continuous rating scale 
(i.e., a line which anchored by ‘Now’ and ‘Past’ or ’Future’ on the two extreme ends). 
Participants’ use of time metaphors was investigated using the same measure used in Study 
1 but excluding one of the spatial ambiguous questions (i.e., the alphabet question). In 
addition, the relationship between the use of ego-moving metaphor and psychological 
distance to the future will also be examined in this study. It was suspected that the use of 
time metaphor would be related to temporal orientation such that the use of ego-moving 
metaphor would be associated with a reduced psychological distance towards the future 
and an increased psychological distance towards the past. 
Participants’ unrealistic optimism will be assessed using the list of future life events 
from Joshi and Carter (2013) which was modified and adapted from Weinstein (1980) to 
examine the optimism bias between Western (i.e., English) and Asian (i.e., Indian 
participants). As highlighted in their research report, some of the future event list which was 
developed for used in the U.S by Weinstein (1980) were not suitable for Asian individuals 
(e.g., being injured while skiing, car turns out to be a lemon).  
In the present study, Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale which was used to 
investigate participants’ perception of control was replaced by Levenson’s (1981) IPC scale - 
The Internality, Powerful others, and Chance scale. IPC scale was designed to assess 
individual’s interpretation of the primary causation of event across different domains. It is a 
three-dimensional locus of control model which makes distinction between chance and 
powerful others as external influence, designed to assess individual’s interpretation of the 
primary causation of event across different domains. This scale has been translated and 
validated in multiple countries (e.g., U.S.A - Krampen & Wieberg, 2010; China - Lao, 1978; 
Japan - Krampen & Wieberg, 2010; Netherlands - Brosschot, Gebhardt, & Godaert, 1994).  It 
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has been established in the literature that people’s perception of control is complex and 
multidimensional (e.g., Skinner, 1996), therefore Study 5 intends to further examine the 
possible correlation between the use of time metaphor and locus of control in detailed by 
looking at the three dimensions proposed, namely internal, powerful others, and chance 
orientations.  
 
4.1.2 Method 
Participants 
The sample size was determined by referencing a related study (Joshi & Carter, 2013) 
in order to detect a difference in event optimism. With an effect size of d = 0.41, G*Power 
analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) showed that a sample size of at least 95 in each cultural group 
was required to reliably detect a difference in life event optimism with 0.80 power. One 
hundred eighty-nine participants completed the study. These included 99 English-speakers 
recruited from University of Plymouth and 90 Mandarin-speakers from universities in China. 
English participants were undergraduate students who were reimbursed £4 for completing 
the questionnaire online in a laboratory setting which formed part of a larger unrelated 
study. Mandarin-speakers were undergraduate students from universities in China which 
were recruited via an online survey platform (www.sojump.com). Mandarin-speakers were 
offered a chance to enter a prize lucky draw for completing the questionnaire online.  
Out of the 189 participants who participated in this study, 6 participants failed to 
complete all of the items and their data were therefore excluded, leaving 183 participants. 
There were 93 English-speakers (63 females, Mage = 20.63, SDage = 1.52) and 90 Mandarin-
speakers (48 females, Mage = 20.33, SDage = 2.65). The majority of the English-speakers were 
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born in the U.K. (99%). One of them was born in Australia (1%). All Mandarin-speakers were 
born in China.  
 
Materials 
Participants completed a series of measures in fixed order: 
Unrealistic Optimism: All respondents completed the unrealistic optimism 
questionnaire that included 10 potential positive and 10 potential negative future life events. 
The list of future life events was adopted from Joshi and Carter’s study (2013). See Appendix 
D – Part I for a full list of life events.  
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two versions of questionnaire which 
varied in the instructions given (see Appendix D – Part II for instructions)18. There were 
asked to rate the probability of these events happening to themselves (“the following 
statements each describe a specific event. In each case, rate how likely do you think are the 
chances that the following events will happen to you?”) and to people like themselves (“the 
following statements each describe a specific event. In each case, rate how likely do you 
think are the chances that the following events will happen to you?”) using a scale range 
from 0% (extremely unlikely) to 100% (extremely likely). Mixing positive and negative events, 
the 20 events were presented in random order. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.78 for positive 
event optimism and 0.81 for negative event optimism. 
In addition, participants were also asked to assess the controllability of each of the 
life event. All the 20 life events were presented in random order, the participants were 
asked “in each case, rate how controllable do you think the following events are?” on a 7-
                                                     
18 There was no significant difference in responses on the optimism score, controllability rating, and 
perception of control measure between the two versions of questionnaire [largest F(1, 179) = 2.096, p = 0.149]  
 138 
point scale (1 = not at all controllable, 7 = very controllable). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.77 for 
positive event controllability and 0.81 for negative event controllability. Participants were 
also asked to rank the 10 positive events from the very best event to the least good event 
(1= the very best event, 10 = the least good event) and the 10 negative events from the very 
worst event to the least bad event (1 = the very worst event, 10 = the least bad event).  
Time Perception: Participants completed the same measures of time orientation and 
of their metaphorical representations of time as were described in Study 1, with two 
modifications. First, a five-item version of the time metaphor measure was used (excluding 
one of the spatial items from the original version19). Second, the rating scale used for the 
temporal orientation questions was replaced with a continuous line (due to the use of paper 
version for English-speakers and on-line rating scale for Mandarin-speakers, the length of 
the line is 155mm for English-speakers; 100mm for Mandarin version) anchored by ‘Now’ 
and ‘Past’ or ’Future’ on both extremes of the line. Participants marked their responses 
which was measured in terms of mm from the anchor ‘Now’. Participants’ responses were 
computed as a ratio of the perceived psychological distance over the total length of the line. 
English-speakers completed the paper version whereas Mandarin-speakers completed the 
on-line version of the temporal orientation questionnaire. 
 Perceived Control: Participants completed the Internality, Powerful others, and 
Chance (IPC) scale (Levenson, 1981). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.62 for Internality, 0.64 for 
Chance, and 0.76 for Powerful others.  
Participants first rated the chances that each of the event will happen to themselves, 
rated the controllability of each of the event, ranked the order of negative event’s 
desirability, the chances that those events will happen to other people, and lastly, they 
                                                     
19
 The alphabet question 
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ranked the order of positive events in terms of the event’s desirability. The time perception 
and perceived control measures were dispersed among the unrealistic optimism 
questionnaire. 
 
Procedure 
Mandarin-speakers answered all the questions online by clicking on links to the 
study whereas English-speakers completed the questionnaire online in a laboratory setting. 
After participants consented to participate in the study, they were asked to provide some 
basic demographic information (e.g. sex, age, first language, country of birth, and country of 
residing at time of participation) prior to the start of the questionnaire. Upon completion of 
the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
4.1.3 Results 
Post-hoc power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) revealed that with a sample size of 183, 
effect size of d = 0.41, the power achieved to detect the difference in life event optimism 
was .79. 
 
Cultural Differences in the Use of Time Metaphors  
Participants’ metaphorical representations of time were analysed as the proportion 
of ego-moving responses selected. In order to examine differences in ego-moving response 
between English and Mandarin-speakers, an independent-samples t-test was conducted. 
Given a violation of Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, F(1, 181) = 523.84, p < .001, 
a t-test not assuming homogeneous variances was calculated. The results of this test 
revealed a significant difference in ego-moving response between the two groups, t(94.06) = 
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23.26, p < .001, d = 3.35. English-speakers selected significantly more ego-moving responses 
(M = .70, SD = .29) than Mandarin-speakers (M = .004, SD = .03). 
 
Cultural Differences in Psychological Distance 
Due to the use of different rating scales among English and Mandarin-speakers, 
participants’ ratings of psychological distance were converted into z-scores. The z-scores of 
psychological distance rating to one month in the past vs. future were entered as repeated 
measures in a mixed-model ANOVA with culture (English vs. Mandarin) as a between-
participants factor. Whilst estimates of distance from the past vs. future did not significantly 
differ [F(1, 179) = .87, p = .35, η2p = .005], there was a marginally significant effect of culture 
[F(1, 179) = 3.69, p = .056, η2p = .020] such that English-speakers reported greater 
psychological distance from both time points than did Mandarin speakers. However, the 
main effect was moderated by time point, F(1, 179) = 9.01, p = .003, η2p = .048. Post-hoc 
analysis (Bonferroni corrected α = .025) indicted that English-speakers felt psychologically 
closer to a day one month in the future [t(90) = 3.19, p = .002, d = -.34] whereas there was 
no difference between Mandarin-speakers’ past and future ratings [t(89) = -1.312, p = .19, d 
= .11]. See Table 4.1 for means and standard deviations of psychological distance ratings. 
 
Table 4.1. Mean ratings of psychological distance as a function of temporal direction and 
culture in Study 5. 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Psychological distance rating was 
converted into z-scores. Higher scores indicate greater distance. 
 
Past Future 
M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 91) .34 (.29) .27 (.27)
Mandarin (n  = 90) .36 (.22) .39 (.25)
Culture
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Relationship between the use of ego-moving metaphor and temporal orientation 
As mentioned earlier, it was suspected that the use of time metaphor would be 
related to temporal orientation such that the use of ego-moving metaphor would be 
associated with reduced psychological distance towards the future and increased 
psychological distance towards the past. This relationship did not emerge for the overall 
sample, nor did it emerge when English and Mandarin-speakers were considered separately. 
See Table 4.2 for the correlations between the use of ego-moving metaphor and 
psychological distance ratings. 
 
Table 4.2 Pearson’s correlation between ego-moving metaphor score and psychological 
distance ratings by temporal direction and culture in Study 5. 
 
 
 
Event desirability 
As described in the method section, participants were also asked to rank each 
positive and negative event for desirability. The desirability ranking of the 10 positive events 
was very similar between English and Mandarin-speakers, rho(10) = .915, p < .001. The same 
was observed for the 10 negative events, rho(10) = .915, p < .001. 
 
Perceived Control & Unrealistic Optimism 
Participants’ scores on the Internality, Powerful others, and Chance subscales of the 
IPC measure were entered into a multivariate ANOVA with culture as a between-
Culture Past Future 
Overall sample (N  = 181) .02 -.13
English (n  = 91) .11 .18
Mandarin (n  = 90) -.03 .01
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participants factor. There was no significant multivariate effect of culture, F(1, 179) = 0.85, p 
= .47, η2p = .014. No significant effect emerged on any subscale (Internality: F(1, 181) = 0.113, 
p = .74, η2p = .001; Power others: F(1, 181) = 1.97, p = .16, η
2
p = .011; Chance: F(1, 181) = 
1.08, p = .30, η2p = .006). See Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3 Mean ratings of IPC sub-scales as a function of culture in Study 5 
 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Higher scores indicate greater control. 
 
Unrealistic optimism scores were computed separately for positive and negative 
events. Because optimism is defined here as making relatively positive judgments for the 
self than for others, I computed positive scores by subtracting the perceived likelihood that 
a positive event would happen to others from the perceived likelihood that the same event 
would happen to oneself. Likewise, negative scores were computed by subtracting the 
perceived likelihood of a negative event would happen to oneself from the perceived 
likelihood that the same event would happen to others. These scores were then entered as 
repeated measures in a mixed-model ANOVA with culture as a between-participants factor. 
This analysis produced a significant main effect of event valence [F(1, 181) = 32.35, p < .001, 
η2p = .152] such that participants were more optimistic about negative events not happening 
to them (M = .08, SD = .16) than they were about positive events happening to them (M 
= .01, SD = .14). This effect was not qualified by culture [F(1, 181) = 2.21, p = .139, η2p = .012], 
Internality Powerful Others Chance
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 93) 30.76 (5.68) 20.44 (6.35) 20.68 (6.37)
Mandarin (n  = 90) 31.06 (6.05) 21.99 (8.46) 21.66 (6.35)
Culture
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nor was there a significant main effect of culture [F(1, 181) = 0.11. p = .745, η2p = .001]. See 
Table 4.4 for means and standard deviations of optimism ratings.  
 
Table 4.4 Mean ratings of optimism as a function of event valence and culture in Study 5 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Higher scores indicate greater 
optimism. 
 
Perceived controllability judgments of the same positive and negative events were 
analysed in a parallel mixed-model ANOVA. This analysis also produced a significant main 
effect of valence [F(1, 181) = 70.87, p < .001, η2p = .281] such that both English and 
Mandarin-speakers rated positive events (M = 4.46, SD = 0.85) to be more controllable than 
negative events (M = 3.72, SD = 1.06). However, this effect was qualified by culture, F(1, 181) 
= 14.37, p < .001, η2p = .074. Post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni corrected α = .025) indicate that 
Mandarin-speakers perceived positive events to be more controllable than English-speakers 
[F(1, 181) = 17.20, p = .001, η2p = .087] whereas there was no difference between their 
controllability ratings for negative events [F(1, 181) = 1.17, p = .281, η2p = .006]. Nonetheless, 
the main effect of culture did not reach significance, F(1, 181) = 2.30, p = .131, η2p = .013. 
See Table 4.5 for means and standard deviations of event controllability ratings. 
 
 
 
 
Positive Negative
M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 93) 0.01 (0.12) 0.07 (0.14)
Mandarin (n  = 90) 0.01 (0.16) 0.10 (0.17)
Culture
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Table 4.5 Mean ratings of controllability as a function of event valence and culture in Study 5 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Controllability was rated using a scale 
ranging from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate greater control. 
 
Relationships among measures 
It was hypothesized that optimism about positive and negative events would be 
predicted by general perceptions of control (i.e., the Internality subscale of the IPC relative 
to the Powerful others and Chance subscales) and specific measures of personal control (i.e., 
judgments of how controllable the positive and negative events were). Perceptions of 
control were, in turn, hypothesized to be predicted by the use of ego-moving metaphors of 
time, which we expected to vary by culture. 
In examining the evidence for these hypotheses, regression analysis was first carried 
out to see whether the use of ego-moving metaphors predicted general perceptions of 
control. The use of ego-moving metaphor did not significantly predict general perceptions of 
control, R2 = .02, F(1, 182) = 0.06, p = .815. 
Next, parallel regression analyses were carried out to test whether specific and 
general perceptions of control predicted optimism about positive and negative events. In 
the analysis of optimism relating to positive events, both specific and general perceptions of 
personal controllability were weak and non-significant predictors, R2 = .027, F(2, 180) = 2.47, 
p = .088. Neither general perceptions of control (defined as the average of Powerful other 
and Chance subscale scores subtracted from Internality subscale scores) nor judgements of 
controllability over the specific events were individually predictive, β = .09, p = .27 and β 
Positive Negative
M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 93) 4.22 (0.65) 3.81 (0.80)
Mandarin (n  = 90) 4.71 (0.96) 3.64 (1.28)
Culture
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= .12, p = .13 respectively. In the analysis of optimism relating to negative events, the 
pattern was somewhat different. Specific and general perceptions of personal controllability 
combined to account for significant variance, R2 = .048, F(2, 180) = 4.54, p = .012. Whilst 
general perceptions of control did not predict optimism regarding negative events (β = .04, 
p = .57), perceptions of personal control over the specific events were a reliable predictor (β 
= .22, p = .003). Thus, overall there was somewhat inconsistent evidence regarding the 
influence of perceived personal control on optimistic judgments – to the extent that such an 
influence exists, it appears to be stronger for negative than for positive outcomes.  
In the analysis of specific event optimism relating to the event in both cultural 
groups separately, specific perception of control was a reliable predictor for both positive 
[R2 = .037, F(1, 91) = 4.53, p = .036] and negative event optimism [R2 = .041, F(1, 91) = 4.97, 
p = .028 among the English-speakers. On the other hand, specific perception of control was 
only a reliable predictor for negative event optimism [R2 = .039, F(1, 88) = 4.65, p = .034 but 
not for positive event optimism [R2 = .007, F(1, 88) = 1.62, p = .206] among Mandarin-
speakers. Fig. 4.1 shows the mean ratings of event optimism as a function of culture and 
specific event controllability for both positive and negative life events. The regression line 
fitted implied that controllability has a positive relationship with optimism ratings for both 
types of events in both cultural groups. 
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Figure 4.1 Average mean ratings of event optimism as a function of culture and specific 
event controllability for positive (left panel) and negative (right panel) life events. 
 
 
Turning to the hypothesis that culture and metaphorical representations of time 
would predict perceptions of control (and consequently optimistic judgments), little 
evidence was found to support this. As noted above, there were no cultural differences 
either in (specific or general) perceived personal control or in optimistic judgments. 
Moreover, participants’ tendencies to use ego-moving metaphors of time bore little 
relationship to their reports of perceived control or optimism levels. The sole significant 
correlation to emerge relating to time metaphors was a negative correlation between the 
use of ego-moving metaphors and perceived control over positive events, r(183) = -.286, p 
< .001 (all other r’s < .11, p’s > .14).  See Appendix E for a complete correlation matrix. 
 
4.1.4  Discussion of Study 5 
In terms of time perception, the results of Study 5 were somewhat consistent with 
the results of Study 1. On the use of time metaphors, English-speakers again showed strong 
tendency to use ego-moving metaphors whereas the use of time-moving metaphors was 
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more common among Mandarin-speakers. The results of the psychological distance 
measure were similar to what was discovered in Study 1 and Study 2 as English-speakers 
rated the future to be subjectively closer whereas Mandarin-speakers did not feel closer to 
the past. In addition, there was little evidence of an association between the use of ego-
moving metaphor and psychological distance to the past and future - a finding consistent 
with the observation in Study 1. 
Judging by the low time-moving score on the time metaphor ambiguous questions, 
Mandarin-speakers appeared to have a strong tendency to adopt a time-moving metaphor. 
One might question that to what extent the result obtained was due to the conceptual 
structures of the questions used instead of people’s time perception in general. The fact 
that the present study is a cross-cultural study therefore the use of testing materials in 
different languages are unavoidable. As a result, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that 
the result is simply driven by linguistic framework differences in the time metaphor 
ambiguous questions between the two languages. However, a similar cross-cultural study 
(Lai & Borodistky, 2013) comparing the performance of native English-speakers, Mandarin-
English (ME) bilinguals, and Mandarin monolinguals’ on the meeting and clock questions 
demonstrated that when ME bilinguals were tested in English they were still more likely to 
use time-moving metaphors albeit to a less extent in comparison to Mandarin monolinguals. 
The performance of ME bilinguals in English was situated between those of English 
monolinguals and Mandarin monolinguals. Participant’s English proficiency was positively 
correlated with ego-moving responses. Although the testing materials in this study were 
formatted in participant’s native language and therefore we could not rule out the influence 
of language on performance, previous findings showed that even when tested in foreign 
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language Mandarin-speakers were still less likely to take ego-moving metaphors than 
English-speakers supporting the results of this study.   
Results in Study 5 confirmed the presence of unrealistic optimism bias among 
English-speakers and Mandarin-speakers. Participants from both cultural groups 
overestimated the chances of positive events happening to oneself and underestimated the 
chances of negative events happening to themselves (vs. average others). In order to ensure 
that the events presented shared similar meaning cross-culturally, participants were also 
asked to rank the events in terms of its desirability in order to present a cross-cultural 
comparison of event desirability. The ranking order by English and Mandarin-speakers 
showed that the desirability of events in these two cultures was very similar, therefore it is 
unlikely that event desirability can be held responsible for the cultural differences observed.  
As described earlier, one of the most common explanations of the observation of 
cultural differences in unrealistic optimism is the self-enhancing bias. Specifically, 
Westerners have greater motivation to self-enhance in order to better present themselves 
as a worthy and high self-esteem person (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) which is consistent 
with the characteristics of individualistic societies which emphasize agency, a sense of 
independent self, and the individual as a unique entity. In contrast, self-enhancement is 
deemed less desirable among East Asian individuals due to the collectivistic nature of East 
Asian societies which places greater priority on harmonious interpersonal relationship and 
also an interdependent sense of self. However, the observation of Mandarin-speakers to be 
self-enhancing in both positive and negative events showed that unrealistic optimism can be 
observed among East Asian individuals who live in a collectivistic society. One possible 
explanation to this observation is perhaps the Mandarin-speakers recruited in this study 
were less collectivistic than the literature suggested. The Mandarin-speaking participants 
 149 
were Chinese university students aged 18 to 25. The dramatic social and economic change 
in Chinese society since the early 1990s might have shifted the priority Chinese individuals 
place in collectivism and make their society increasingly individualistic (Steele & Lynch, 
2013).  
The reliability of the questions of the IPC sub-scales was assessed with the 
Cronbach’s alpha level for internality (0.62) and Chance (0.64) appeared to be lower than 
that of powerful-others (0.76). A low Cronbach’s alpha might be an indication of low 
internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951). Further factor analysis of these two sub-scales 
revealed that all the seven questions from both scales were strongly loaded on a single 
dimension respectively with one of the question from each scale respectively loaded on a 
second factor on its own (internality: “How many friends I have depends on how nice a 
person I am”; chance: “I have often found that what is going to happen will happen”). 
Further analysis showed that removing each of the question from the scale will slightly 
improve the reliability level (internality: improved to 0.664; chance: improved to 0.672).  
However, further analysis conducted for each of the related analysis by removing the 
responses for those two questions from internality and chance sub-scale respectively 
showed that the results did not change the current conclusion120.  
In general, participants were comparatively more optimistic about negative events 
not happening to themselves than they were about positive events happening to them. 
Specific controllability towards negative event was found to be a reliable predictor of 
negative event optimism in both cultures. In the analysis of specific event optimism relating 
to the event controllability in the two cultures separately, for English-speakers, specific 
                                                     
20 Participants’ scores on the Internality, and Chance subscales of the IPC measure were entered into a 
multivariate ANOVA with culture as a between-participants factor. No significant effects emerged on both 
subscale (internality: F(1, 181) = 0.18, p = .672, η
2
p = .001; chance: F(1, 181) = 0.943, p = .333, η
2
p = .005). 
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event controllability was positively related to both positive and negative event’s optimism 
level although the relationship appears to be stronger for negative events. However, for 
Mandarin-speakers, specific event controllability only significantly related to negative event 
optimism ratings. The results thus substantiated the claim that positive event and negative 
event optimisms are two independent psychological mechanisms which are possibly 
sustained by different underlying motivation or cognitive processes (Hoorens, 1996). 
For both cultures, individual’s optimism bias towards negative events was found to 
be related to their perceived ability to control the negative event or the outcome of the 
events. This observation has important implications because the potential negative 
consequences associated with underestimating the occurrence of negative events might be 
greater than that of overestimating the positive ones (e.g., “I am a relatively skilful driver 
therefore I can drive at greater speed and not get involved in an accident). Underestimating 
the chances of negative events happening to oneself could be associated with more risky 
and unsafe behaviours which are more potentially hazardous (e.g., health-care behaviour: 
Menon, Block, & Ramanathan, 2002). 
Turning back to the main hypothesis of the study, it was hypothesized that optimism 
about positive and negative events would be predicted by general and specific measures of 
personal control which, in turn, also hypothesized to be predicted by the use of ego-moving 
metaphors of time that was expected to vary by culture. As noted above, participants’ 
tendencies to use ego-moving metaphors of time bore little relationship to their reports of 
perceived control or optimism levels. Moreover, there were no cultural differences either in 
(specific or general) perceived personal control or in optimistic judgments.  
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The next study intended to explore the relationship between the use of time 
metaphors and individuals’ risk-taking tendency including their risk preferences (Study 6A) 
and risk-taking behaviours (Study 6B).  
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4.2 Study 6A & 6B: Relationship between Time Metaphors, Perceived 
Control, and Risk-taking Tendency 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This study intended to examine the mediator role time metaphor plays between 
culture and risk-taking by focusing on individual’s risk-preferences (Study 6A) and risk-taking 
behaviour (Study 6B).  
As discussed earlier, the use of ego-moving metaphors was found associated with an 
agentic or approach frame of mind whereas the use of time-moving metaphors was 
associated with a passive or avoidance outlook (Lee & Ji, 2014). Furthermore, the linguistic 
frameworks of ego and time-moving metaphors were also consistent with this finding, 
attribute the source of change to different entities (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009). It is thus 
suspected metaphorical representations of time may be related to one’s degree of 
perceived control or personal agency which in turn may lead to higher (i.e., ego-moving 
metaphor) or lower (i.e. time-moving metaphor) risk-taking tendencies. 
The perception of control is related to risk-taking (Chau & Phillips, 1995; Horswill & 
McKenna, 1999; McKenna, 1993). For example, people believe they are more able to avoid 
an automobile accident if they are the driver but not when they are a passenger (McKenna, 
1993) – an exhibition of perceived control capacity. In an experiment which investigated 
people’s risk-taking and perceived control when driving by using video simulation tests, 
participants were found willing to drive at faster speeds (i.e., at a faster speed than the 
vehicle in the video) when they imagined they were driving (vs. when they imagined they 
were passengers) (Horswill & McKenna, 1999) – suggest that perception of control is closely 
related to risk-taking tendency. Specifically, drivers who perceived themselves to have 
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greater control were more comfortable with higher driving speed (i.e., higher level of risk) 
compared to when they were not in control (i.e., passengers).  
An explanation for the association between perception of control and risk taking is 
that, greater perception of control possibly leads to other associated positive beliefs or 
attributions which are likely to be self-serving in nature. For instance, Chau and Phillips 
(1995) investigated the phenomenon of gambling fallacy and found that, by taking previous 
outcomes into account, previous successful outcomes led participants to a greater belief 
that the outcomes were due to not just luck but also their own abilities (e.g., skill).   
With the association between perception of control and risk taking in mind, it is thus 
expected that the use of ego-moving metaphor which is associated with a higher sense of 
agency would produce a sense of higher perceived personal control toward event outcome 
or environment. This sense of higher perceived personal control should in turn lead to a 
greater risk-taking tendency. In contrast, the use of a time-moving metaphor which is 
associated with a passive or avoidance mental states should be related to lower perceived 
control toward an event outcome which in turn should lead one to have lower risk-taking 
tendency.  
Although this study is designed with the association of perceived personal control 
and risk-taking in mind, cross-cultural comparison studies in relation to risk-taking suggest 
that other factors might be at play, for instance, cultural context. Hsee and Weber (1999; cf 
Li & Fang, 2004) found that Chinese individuals were more risk taking in financial decisions 
compared to Americans but not in other decision domains (e.g., medical or academic). They 
proposed the ‘cushion hypothesis’ to explain such findings. According to them, the wider 
social network in relatively more collectivistic cultures act as a support and help ‘cushion’, in 
event that those individuals fail after taking substantial risks. Members of those cultures 
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expected to receive help from their social network such as friends and family should their 
decision fail. In contrast, individuals in relatively individualistic cultures are expected to take 
personal responsibility for possible losses. Presumably with the readily available social 
support to mitigate risk against failure, Chinese individuals are willing to take greater 
financial risk. Based on this, it is possible that people with a Chinese cultural background 
should exhibit greater risk taking in financial domain. This will serve as a competing 
hypothesis of this study. 
The findings of Chinese individuals showing greater risk-taking tendency in financial 
domain but not in other decision domains (e.g., medical or academic) (Hsee & Weber, 1999) 
supported the suggestion that risk-taking tendencies are domain-specific, as people are not 
consistently risk-seeking or risk-avoidant across all decision domains (Rolison, Hanoch, 
Wood, & Liu, 2014; Weber et al., 2002). As decisions in different domains involve different 
types of risk and uncertainty, people might be willing to take risk in some situations but not 
in others.  
In addition, risk-taking tendencies also change across an individual’s life span (see 
meta-analysis by Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011). For instance, men’s risk-
taking tendencies in financial domains and women’s risk-taking tendencies in social domain 
were both found to decrease sharply in older age (Rolison, et al., 2014). Previous studies 
have shown that individual’s risk-taking tendency can be influenced by many factors, 
including time pressure (Finucane et al., 2000), the decision-maker’s ability to engage in 
probabilistic thinking (Lau & Ranyard, 2005); representation of risk information (White, 
Gummerum, & Hanoch, 2015), affect (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001); mood 
(Yuen & Lee, 2003), social factors (Hsee & Weber, 1999), or whether the decision is made 
alone or with others (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). 
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Risk-taking has important implications for both an individual’s course of action and 
his or her decision-making. It is a subjective and complex construct and therefore can be 
conceptualized and modeled in many different ways (see reviews, Yates & Stone, 1992). This 
study focuses on risk preference and risk-taking behavior. Risk preference is an individual’s 
tendency to prefer a certain outcome over an option with a probabilistic outcome (Hsee & 
Weber, 1999) whereas risk-taking behaviour is self-reported risk-taking behavior in various 
decision domains. 
This study focused on individuals’ choices between a sure outcome and an outcome 
with specified probabilities (i.e. risk preferences) in Study 6A, and their willingness to 
engage in risky activities (i.e. risk-taking behaviour) in Study 6B. Choosing the sure option is 
characterized as risk averse and choosing the uncertain option is defined as risk taking. 
Specifically, the use of ego-moving metaphor is hypothesized to be related to higher control 
one perceives oneself to have, and in turn leads to higher risk-taking tendency. In contrast, 
individuals who take time-moving metaphor will feel less in control, which in turn leads to 
lower risk tolerance or lower risk-taking tendencies or lower risk preferences.  
 
4.2.2 Study 6A – Participants, Materials, and Procedure 
Participants 
The sample size was determined by referencing a related cross-cultural study (Hsee 
& Weber, 1999). With an effect size of d = 0.52, G*Power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) showed 
that a sample size of at least 68 in each cultural group was required to reliably detect a 
difference in investment risk-taking with 0.85 power.  Two hundred and five university 
students completed the study.  They included 100 English-speakers who were 
undergraduate students from University of Plymouth. They completed the questionnaire 
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online in a laboratory setting which formed part of a larger unrelated study and they were 
reimbursed £4 for their participation. 105 Mandarin-speakers who completed the study 
online were undergraduate students from universities in China which were recruited via an 
online survey platform (www.sojump.com). They were offered a chance to enter a prize 
draw for completing the questionnaire online.  
All the responses were included in the analysis. They were 100 English-speakers (63 
females, 1 missing data, Mage= 20.35, SD = 1.50) and 105 Mandarin-speakers (61 females, 
Mage = 21.52, SD = 1.83). The majority of the English-speakers were born in the U.K. (98%). 
The rest of them were born in the U.S.A. All Mandarin-speakers were born in China.  
 
Materials 
Time Metaphors:  Participants completed the five-item version of the time metaphor 
measure described in Study 5.  
 Perceived Control: Participants completed the Internality, Powerful others, and 
Chance (IPC) scale (Levenson, 1981). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.66 for Internality, 0.78 for 
Chance, and 0.75 for Powerful others. 
Risk Preferences: Participants were randomly allocated to one of two versions of 
questionnaire21 which consists of a series of risk preferences measures on financial, 
monetary gamble, medical, and academic domains adopted from Hsee and Weber (1999). 
These two questionnaire versions differ in the question’s arrangement order and the 
framing of monetary gambles (gain vs. loss). Each monetary gamble condition consists of 
                                                     
21 A multivariate MANOVA was conducted with questionnaire version and first language as between-
participants factors and all other measures as dependent variables (e.g., ego-moving response, perceived 
control, and risk-preferences on academic, medical, and investment). The sole significant difference was a 
main effect of questionnaire version on academic risk-preference [F(1, 203) = 9.29, p= .003, η
2
p = .07]. No 
significant interaction effect emerged (all F’s <  2.729, p’s > .101). 
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two sets of questions (i.e. the large and the small outcome size). The large outcome size 
question set always preceded the small outcome size question set. In addition, participants 
also completed and the Asian disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) which was 
presented in either a positive (i.e., 200 people will be saved) or a negative frame (i.e., 400 
people will die). The cover story in the original problem was adapted by substituting ‘UK’ 
and ‘China’ for U.S. in the English version (i.e., Imagine that the U.K. is preparing for the 
outbreak…) and the Mandarin version (i.e., Imagine that the China is preparing for the 
outbreak…) respectively (see Appendix F for questionnaire). 
All participants completed the time metaphors, perceived control measures, 
academic, medical, and investment risk-preferences measures. In addition, they completed 
one of the monetary gamble measures (gain or loss) and also one of the Asian disease 
problems (gain or loss). The Mandarin translation was identical to the English version except 
that the outcome values were in Yuan (¥). 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Study 5 – Mandarin-speakers completed 
the questionnaire online by clicking on links to the study whereas English-speakers 
completed the questionnaire online in a laboratory setting. 
 
4.2.3 Results 
Post-hoc power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) revealed that with a sample size of 205, 
effect size of d = 0.52, the power achieved to detect the difference in investment risk-taking 
was .96. 
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Cultural Differences in the Use of Time Metaphor 
Participants’ metaphorical representations of time were analysed as the proportion 
of ego-moving responses selected. In order to examine differences in ego-moving response 
between English and Mandarin-speakers, an independent-samples t-test was conducted. 
Given a violation of Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, F(1, 203) = 581.59, p < .001, 
a t-test not assuming homogeneous variances was calculated. English speakers selected 
significantly more ego-moving responses (M = .68, SD = .28) than did Mandarin-speakers (M 
= .004, SD = .03), t(100.76) = 23.54, p < .001, d = 3.44. 
 
Perceived Control  
Participants’ scores on the Internality, Powerful others, and Chance subscales of the 
IPC measure were entered into a multivariate ANOVA with culture as a between-
participants factor. There was a significant multivariate effect of culture, F(3, 201) = 9.24, p = 
< .001, η2p = .12. Moreover, univariate tests for each subscale indicated that Mandarin-
speakers made stronger attributions to Chance [F(1, 203) = 10.07, p= .002, η2p = .05) and to 
Powerful others [F(1, 203) = 16.19, p < .001, η2p = .07) but less so to Internal factors, F(1, 203) 
= 8.11, p = .005, η2p  = .04 compared to English-speakers. See Table 4.6 for means and 
standard deviations of IPC ratings. 
 
Table 4.6. Mean ratings of IPC sub-scales as a function of culture in Study 6A 
 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Higher scores indicate greater control. 
Internality Powerful Others Chance
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 100) 32.47 (5.51) 19.36 (7.56) 20.29 (7.79)
Mandarin (n  = 105) 30.28 (5.52) 23.19 (6.01) 23.47 (6.51)
Culture
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Calculation of the Risk Preference Index 
A Risk Preference (RP) Index was assigned to each respondent based on his or her 
choices in each set of questions (Hsee & Weber, 1999). In the monetary gambles domain, 
the RP Index can range from 1 (most risk-averse) to 8 (most risk-seeking). If a participant 
chose the sure option in all the seven questions, his/her RP Index was defined as 1 (most 
risk-averse). If he/her chose the risky option in all of the seven questions, the RP Index was 
defined as 8 (most risk-seeking). If a participant chose the risk option in Question 1 through 
Question i-1, and chose the sure option in Question i through Question 7, her RP index was 
defined as i. The reverse rule was applied to the loss condition. If participants’ choice 
pattern across the questions was inconsistent (e.g. choosing a small sure gain over a risky 
gain but choosing the risky gain over a larger sure gain), their RP Index was categorized as 
missing value. The calculation method of RP Index for investment, academic and medicine 
domains was the same as in monetary gambles domain except in these three domains each 
set of question only has three questions, therefore the RP Index ranged only from 1 (most 
risk-averse) to 4 (most risk-seeking).  
 
Perceived Control & Risk-preferences 
Participants’ scores on the risk preferences measure were entered into a 
multivariate ANOVA with culture as a between-participants factor. There was no significant 
multivariate effect of culture, F(5, 58) = 1.108, p = .37, η2p = .087. No significant effect 
emerged on any subscale [largest F(1, 132) = 2.804, p = .10, η2p = .021]. The means, standard 
deviations, and main effects are presented in Table 4.7 as a function of culture. 
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Table 4.7 Means, standard deviations, and main effects of risk preferences index by culture 
and risk-taking context in Study 6A 
 
Note: Higher risk preferences index indicates more risk-taking. 
 
For the Asian disease framing question, the pattern of outcome obtained was 
consistent with the previous findings (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) whereby people tend to 
be more risk averse when the choices involving gain but more risk taking when the choices 
involve losses. A chi-square test indicated that Mandarin-speakers were significantly more 
risk-taking when the choices were framed in losses [χ2 (1) = 8.76, p = .003] by selecting more 
risky option compared to the English-speakers. However, there was no significant difference 
in the choice pattern between the two cultural groups when the choices were framed in a 
gain frame [χ2 (1) = 3.08, p = .079]. See Table 4.8 for distribution of responses.  
 
Table 4.8. The distribution of responses as a function of culture and problem framing for The 
Asian disease problem in Study 6A 
 
 
 
M SD M SD F η
2
p 
Monetary gamble
Gain - Large 2.35 1.27 2.29 1.50 0.36 .00
Gain - Small 3.39 1.42 3.20 1.70 0.35 .00
Loss - Large 3.08 1.52 3.36 1.81 0.62 .01
Loss - small 3.37 1.39 3.61 1.42 0.70 .01
Investment 2.14 0.66 2.02 0.83 1.36 .01
Academic 1.63 0.66 1.76 0.69 1.91 .01
Medical 1.98 0.80 2.26 0.99 2.80 .02
Main effectsEnglish Mandarin 
English Mandarin English Mandarin
Sure option 44 (75.9%) 32 (60.4%) 18 (42.9%) 8 (15.4%)
Risky option 14 (24.1%) 21 (39.6%) 24 (57.1%) 44 (84.6%)
Positive frame Negative frame
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Relationships among Measures 
It was hypothesized that risk preferences would be predicted by perceptions of 
control (i.e., the Internality subscale of the IPC relative to the Powerful others and Chance 
subscales). Perceptions of control were, in turn, hypothesized to be predicted by the use of 
ego-moving metaphors of time, which was expected to vary by culture. 
In examining the evidence for these hypotheses, regression analysis was first carried 
out to see whether the use of ego-moving metaphors predicted general perceptions of 
control. The use of ego-moving metaphor was a significant predictor of general perceptions 
of control, R2 = .10, F(1, 203) = 23.40, p < .001. Further regression analyses were carried out 
to test whether perceptions of control predicted risk preferences in any of the decision 
domains. The general perceptions of control was not a significant predictor in any decision 
domain [largest F(1, 132) = 1.46, p = .230].  See Table 4.9 for regression analyses output. 
 
Table 4.9 Results of regression analysis with general perception of control as a 
predictor of risk-preferences for Study 6A 
 
 
Note. B = Unstandardized coefficient, SE B = standard error for the unstandardized 
beta, β = Standardized coefficient.  * p < .05 ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Although general perceptions of control was not a significant predictor on the 
positive framing Asian disease problem, R2 = .002, F(1, 109) = .224, p = .637 it was a 
B SE B β R
2 F
Monetary gamble
Gain - Large 0.01 0.02 0.04 .00 0.16
Gain - Small 0.00 0.02 0.02 .00 0.02
Loss - Large -0.02 0.02 -0.11 .01 1.13
Loss - Small -0.01 0.02 -0.05 .00 0.20
Investment 0.00 0.01 0.02 .00 0.05
Academic -0.01 0.01 -0.07 .01 0.96
Medical -0.01 0.01 -0.10 .01 1.46
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significant predictor when the question was framed in a negative frame, R2 = .102, F(1, 92) = 
10.483, p = .002. 
Turning to the hypothesis that culture and metaphorical representations of time 
would predict perceptions of control (and consequently risk preferences), there was little 
evidence to support this. As noted above, there were no cultural differences on any decision 
domains and participants’ general perceptions of control were a weak predictor across all 
decision domains. See Appendix G for a complete correlation matrix.  
 
4.2.4 Study 6B – Participants, Materials, and Procedure 
Participants 
The sample size was determined by referencing a related cross-cultural study (Hsee 
& Weber, 1999). With an effect size of d = 0.52, G*Power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) showed 
that a sample size of at least 68 in each cultural group was required to reliably detect a 
difference in investment risk-taking with 0.85 power. Two hundred and thirteen participants 
participated in this study online. Participants were recruited by posting study links on 
various psychological and non-psychological research websites and social-networking 
platforms (see Appendix A – Part I for online recruitment sources). Participants were offered 
a chance to enter a prize lucky draw (£50 cash voucher for English-speakers; RM50 for 
Mandarin-speakers) for completing the questionnaire online.  
Of the two hundred and thirteen responses, 162 were valid following the inclusion 
criteria (exclusion rate = 23.94%) (32 responses were incomplete, 18 were non-native 
English or Mandarin speakers, and 1 below 18 years-old) (109 females, Mage = 22.42, SD = 
5.67) including 88 English-speakers and 74 Mandarin-speakers. The English-speaking sample 
were students from University of Plymouth whilst the Mandarin-speakers were Mandarin 
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speaking individuals with Chinese cultural backgrounds residing in Malaysia. Most of the 
native English-speakers were born in the U.K (97.73%) apart from one born in New Zealand 
and one in Canada. All the native Mandarin-speakers were born in Malaysia.  
 
Procedure 
Time Metaphors: Participants completed the five-item version of the time metaphor 
measure as describe in Study 5. Temporal orientation was not measured in this study. 
Perceived Control: Participants completed the Internality, Powerful others, and 
Chance (IPC) scale (Levenson, 1981). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.56 for Internality, 0.75 for 
Chance, and 0.72 for Powerful others. 
Risk-Taking: Participants completed the 30-item risk taking component of the 
revised Domain Specific Risk Taking Attitude (DOSPERT) scale (Blais & Weber, 2006) 
intended to measure their risk-taking tendencies across a variety of domains: Social (e.g., 
admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend), Financial-gambling (e.g., 
betting a day’s income at the horse races), Financial-investment (e.g. Investing 5% of your 
annual income in a very speculative stock), Health/safety (e.g., drinking heavily at a social 
function), Recreational (e.g., going down a ski run that is beyond your ability), and Ethical 
(e.g., taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return). Participants rated 
their likelihood of engaging in the activity on a 7-point scale ranged from 1 (extremely 
unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely). Participants’ risk-taking behaviour for each risk domain was 
produced by adding up the six responses on the corresponding domain. A higher value 
indicates greater risk-taking behaviour. Mandarin participants completed the Chinese 
version of DOSPERT. The 30-item scale displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α 
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= .80). Subscales corresponding to individual domains had mixed consistency (social α = .64; 
ethical α = .65; financial α = .73; health/safety α = .57; recreational α = .73). 
 
4.2.5 Study 6B: Results 
Post-hoc power analysis (Faul, et al., 2009) revealed that with a sample size of 162, 
effect size of d = 0.52, the power achieved to detect the difference in investment risk-taking 
was .91. 
 
Cultural Differences in the Use of Time Metaphor 
Participants’ metaphorical representations of time were analysed as the proportion 
of ego-moving responses selected. Given a violation of Levene’s test for homogeneity of 
variances, F(1, 160) = 123.87, p < .001, a t-test not assuming homogeneous variances was 
calculated. An independent-samples t-test revealed that English-speakers selected 
significantly more ego-moving responses (M = .60, SD = .30) than Mandarin-speakers (M 
= .14, SD = .22), t(157.26) = 11.42, p < .001, d = 1.73. 
 
Perceived Control & Risk-Taking 
Participants’ scores on the Internality, Powerful others, and Chance subscales of the 
IPC measure were entered into a multivariate ANOVA with culture as a between-
participants factor. There was a significant multivariate effect of culture, F(3,157) = 3.62, p 
= .015, η2p = .065. Univariate tests for each of the three subscales indicated that English-
speakers made stronger attributions to Internal factors (F(1, 160) = 11.64, p < .001, η2p = .07), 
but not to Chance (F(1, 159) = .17, p = .681, η2p = .001) or to Powerful others (F(1, 160) = .37, 
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p = .545, η2p = .002) compared to Mandarin-speakers. See Table 4.10 for means and 
standard deviations of IPC ratings.  
 
Table 4.10. Mean ratings of IPC sub-scales as a function of culture in Study 6B 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Higher scores indicate greater control. 
 
Participants’ self-reported risk-taking behaviour for each risk domain was computed 
separately. These scores were then entered into a multivariate ANOVA with culture as a 
between-participant factor. There was a significant multivariate effect of culture, F(5,156) = 
11.60, p < .001, η2p = .27. Univariate tests for each of the risk-taking domains indicated that 
Mandarin-speakers were more risk taking only on financial items [F(1, 160) = 40.36, p < .001, 
η2p = .20] compared to English-speakers. There was no difference between English and 
Mandarin-speakers’ behaviour on social, health, recreational, and ethical items (all F’s < 
3.31, p’s > .07) (see Table 4.11 for means, standard deviations, and main effects). Further 
analysis showed that Mandarin-speakers’ greater risk-taking on the financial domain (vs. 
English-speakers) was due to their higher risk taking behaviour on the investment subscale, 
F(1, 160) = 108.35, p < .001, η2p = .40, but not on the gambling subscale, F(1, 160) = .007, p 
= .931, η2p < .001. 
 
 
 
Internality Powerful Others Chance
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
English (n  = 87) 29.32 (5.21) 22.01 (7.21) 22.80 (6.38)
Mandarin (n  = 74) 32.19 (5.43) 21.32 (7.31) 22.32 (8.01)
Culture
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Table 4.11 Means, standard deviations, and main effects of self-reported risk-taking 
behaviours as a function of culture and DOSPERT subscale in Study 6B  
 
Note: Risk-taking behaviour was rated using a scale ranging from 1 to 7. Higher scores 
indicate greater risk-taking behaviour. 
 
Relationships among Measures 
It was hypothesized that risk-taking behaviour would be predicted by general 
perceptions of control (i.e., the Internality subscale of the IPC relative to the Powerful other 
and Chance subscales). Perceptions of control were, in turn, hypothesized to be predicted 
by the use of ego-moving metaphors of time, which we expected to vary by culture.  
In examining the evidence for these hypotheses, regression analyses were first 
carried out to see whether general perception of control predicted risk-taking behaviour in 
any of the decision domains. The general perceptions of control was a significant predictor 
on the social domain [R2 = .030, F(1, 160) = 5.00, p = .027] and ethical domain [R2 = .093, F(1, 
160) = 16.45, p < .001]; but not a significant predictor on financial decision, health, and 
recreational decision. See Table 4.12 for regression analyses output. 
 
 
 
 
M SD M SD F η 2 p 
Financial 13.76 6.26 19.70 5.52 40.36 *** .20
Investment 5.36 4.13 5.31 3.57 108.35 *** .40
Gambling 8.40 3.65 14.39 3.66 0.01 .00
Social 31.66 5.40 30.68 5.01 1.43 .01
Health 21.36 6.45 19.45 6.95 3.31 .02
Recreational 23.36 9.16 25.15 6.64 0.17 .01
Ethical 14.19 5.57 15.12 5.95 0.31 .01
Main effectsEnglish (n  = 88) Mandarin (n = 74)
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Table 4.12 Results of regression analysis with general perception of control as a 
predictor of risk-taking behaviours for Study 6B 
 
 
Note. B = Unstandardized coefficient, SE B = standard error for the unstandardized 
beta, β = Standardized coefficient.  * p < .05 ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
 Secondly, a series of regression analyses were carried out to test whether the use of 
ego-moving metaphor was a significant predictor of risk-taking in any of the decision 
domains. The use of ego-moving metaphor was only significantly predicted financial risk-
taking, R2 = .044, F(1, 160) = 7.37, p = .007 but not any other risk-taking decisions [largest F(1, 
160) = 2.27, p = .134]. See Table 4.13 for regression analyses output. 
 
Table 4.13 Results of regression analysis with the ego-moving response as a predictor 
of risk-taking behaviours for Study 6B 
 
Note. B = Unstandardized coefficient, SE B = standard error for the unstandardized 
beta, β = Standardized coefficient.  * p < .05 ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Further regression analysis showed that the use of ego-moving metaphor was not a 
significant predictor of general perceptions of control, R2 = .009, F(1, 160) = 1.492, p = .224. 
Moreover, computed correlations among measures of metaphorical representations, 
perceived control, and risk-taking showed that there was little evidence of the effects of 
B SE B β R 2 F
Financial -0.04 0.05 -0.07 .00 0.74
Social 0.09 0.04 0.17 .03 5.00 *
Health -0.03 0.05 -0.04 .00 0.29
Recreational 0.05 0.06 0.06 .00 0.59
Ethical -0.17 0.04 -0.31 .09 16.45 ***
B SE B β R 2 F
Financial -3.96 1.46 -0.21 .04 7.37 **
Social 1.23 1.18 0.08 .01 1.09
Health 2.27 1.51 0.12 .01 2.27
Recreational -1.79 1.83 -0.08 .96 0.96
Ethical -0.26 1.30 -0.02 .00 0.04
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culture on each of these measures being dependent on each other, as the individual 
measures did not correlate with each other (See Appendix H for a complete correlation 
matrix). 
 
4.2.6 Discussion of Study 6A & 6B 
Studies 6A and 6B were intended to explore the relationship between the use of 
time metaphor, perceived control, and risk-taking tendency (i.e., risk preferences and risk-
taking behaviour). Mandarin-speakers once again showed a tendency to adopt time-moving 
metaphor whereas English-speakers tended to take an ego-moving metaphor. 
In terms of risk preferences, there were no cultural differences detected between 
English and Mandarin-speakers across all decision domains. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies which found no cross-cultural risk preferences between Chinese and 
American students (Weber & Hsee, 1998). However, previous finding of cultural differences 
in risk-taking behaviour (Hsee & Weber, 1999) was also observed in Study 6B, with 
Mandarin-speakers reporting higher risk-taking tendency compared to English-speakers. 
This finding supported the competing hypothesis. Mandarin-speakers reporting greater 
willingness to take risks in making financial decisions compared to English-speakers. It is 
worth noting that the difference was due to higher investment risk-taking but not on 
monetary gambles.  
The findings of Mandarin-speakers’ greater risk-taking in the investment domain is 
consistent with the cross-cultural risk-taking studies (Botempo, Bottom, & Weber, 1997; 
Weber & Hsee, 1998). Various possibilities have been proposed to account for this 
observation such as the availability of social network (i.e., cushion hypothesis: Weber & 
Hsee, 1998; framing effect: Wang & Fischbeck, 2004; probability thinking: Wright & Phillips, 
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1980; cultural wisdom: Weber, Hsee, & Sokolowska, 1998). As described earlier, the cushion 
hypothesis proposed by Weber and Hsee (1998) suggested the support from wider social 
network in Asian countries act as a cushion to mitigate the risk of adverse decisions. 
Although one could argue wouldn’t the social cushion to be associated with greater risk-
taking in gambling domain as well. Despite speculative in nature, it is possible that gambling 
carries a greater social taboo as it is generally not socially acceptable to seek help from 
family and friends after gambling losses whereas losses due to investment might be a more 
probable reason for seeking help.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that Mandarin-speakers are more risk-taking in 
investment due to framing effect. Previous study showed that people make different 
decisions contingent upon whether the outcome was framed as either investment or 
gambling (Deck et al., 2013), an indication that people’s decisions are affected by how a 
financial problem is framed. Another supportive finding of East Asians being more 
susceptible to framing effects comes from the observation that Mandarin-speakers were 
more risk-taking when the Asian disease problem was framed in a negative frame. It 
appears Mandarin-speakers were more risk-taking in the prospect of losses. Taken together, 
one could postulate that Mandarin-speakers more affected by choice outcome is likely to be 
related to their largely holistic nature of attentional strategy (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001) 
which drive them into taking more account of the contextual information and consequently 
more restricted by it. However, the investment and gambling decision problems used to 
investigate risk-taking in this study were different choice problems and therefore it is 
difficult to draw a firm conclusion based on that.  
It was hypothesized that the time metaphor adopted would play a mediator role 
between culture and risk-taking tendency. However, the results showed little supportive 
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evidence of a relationship between the use of time metaphor and risk-taking tendency. 
Firstly, the use of ego-moving metaphor was found to relate only to one of the decision 
domains (i.e., financial risk-taking). Secondly, general perceptions of control were not a 
significant predictor of the use of ego-moving metaphor. Correlational analysis revealed 
there was only very weak or near non-existent relationship between the use of time 
metaphor and perception of control and therefore there was little evidence of the use of 
time metaphor, perception of control, and risk-taking dependent on each other.  
 
4.3 Cross-Study Analyses 
Cultural differences in different aspects of time perception were observed in the 
three studies reported in this chapter. To obtain a more precise estimate of the size of these 
effects, analyses were carried out on the combined datasets.  
 
Cultural Differences in the Use of Time Metaphor 
Participants’ ego-moving scores from Study 5, 6A, and 6B were combined and 
entered into a Univariate ANOVA test with culture (English vs. Mandarin) and the study the 
data was recruited from (Study 5 vs. 6A vs. 6B) as between-participant factors. Analysis 
showed that English-speakers (M = 0.66, SD = 0.29) had a higher ego-moving score 
compared to Mandarin-speakers (M = 0.04, SD = 0.13), F(1, 544) = 1023.15, p < .001, η2p 
= .653. This difference was qualified by a significant culture by study interaction [F(2, 544) = 
13.788, p < .001, η2p = .048], such that English-speakers had lower ego-moving scores in 
Study 6B compared to those in Study 5 and 6A whereas Mandarin-speakers had a higher 
ego-moving scores in Study 6B compared to those in Study 5 and 6A. Nonetheless there was 
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no significant main effect of study, F(2, 544) = 0.86, p = .424, η2p = .003. See Figure 4.2 for 
participants’ ego-moving responses by study and culture. 
 
Figure 4.2 Participants’ ego-moving responses by study and culture. 
 
Cultural Differences in Perception of Control 
Because the IPC scale was included in multiple studies, it makes sense to report the 
results of analyses that combine the datasets to produce more precise estimates of effect 
sizes. A series of two-way ANOVA tests were conducted to examine the effect of study and 
culture on internality, powerful others, and chance sub-scales with study and culture as 
between-participants factors. There was a significant main effect of culture on the 
internality score, F (1, 544) = 11.023, p = 0.001, η2p = .02 such that English-speakers (M = 
31.82, SD = 5.57) scored higher compared to Mandarin-speakers (M = 30.28, SD = 5.64). This 
difference was moderated by study, F(2, 544) = 3.953, p = 0.02, η2p = .014 with English-
speakers scoring significantly higher compared to Mandarin-speakers in Study 6A and 6B but 
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not in Study 5. Nonetheless there was no significant main effect of study, F(2, 544) = 0.619, 
p = .539,  η2p = .002.   
There was also a significant main effect of culture on scores on the Powerful-others 
subscale, F(1, 544) = 10.832, p = 0.001, η2p = .02 such that Mandarin-speakers (M = 22.46, SD 
= 7.23) scored higher compared to English-speakers (M = 20.33, SD = 7.12). This difference 
was not moderated by study, F(2, 544) = 2.396, p = 0.092, η2p = .009; nor was there a 
significant main effect of study, F(2, 544) = .198, p = 0.821, η2p = .001. 
Finally, there was a significant main effect of culture on the Chance sub-scale, F(1, 
544) = 7.330, p = 0.007, η2p = .013 such that Mandarin-speakers (M = 22.68, SD = 6.44) 
scored higher compared to English-speakers (M = 20.98, SD = 7.54). This difference was not 
moderated by study, F(2, 544) = 1.765,  p = .172, η2p = .006; nor was there a main effect of 
study, F(2, 544) = 1.416, p = 0.244, η2p = .005.  
 
4.3.1 Discussion of Cross-study Analyses 
The responses from Study 5, 6A, and 6B were combined to perform cross-study 
analyses. The results confirmed that English-speakers were more likely to use ego-moving 
metaphors whereas Mandarin-speakers were more likely to use time-moving metaphors. 
This appears to be a strong disposition with the distinctions being observed in all the studies 
conducted.  
 Apart from time metaphor responses, the responses on IPC scale from Study 5, 6A, 
and 6B were combined to produce a more precise picture of the cross-cultural differences in 
perception of control. English-speakers were found more likely to attribute events to 
internal forces whereas Mandarin-speakers were more likely to attribute events to chance 
and powerful-others. Taken together, the findings were consistent with suggestions in the 
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literature that East Asians have greater external locus of control whereas Western 
individuals have greater internal locus of control (Sastry & Ross, 1998).  
 
4.4 Discussion 
 The studies in this chapter aimed to investigate cultural differences in time 
metaphors and their potential role as a mediator between culture and downstream 
judgements and decisions. Study 5 explored the mediating role time metaphor plays 
between culture and unrealistic optimism; Study 6A and 6B examined the possibility of the 
use of time metaphors as a mediator between culture and risk preferences and risk-taking 
behaviour respectively. In addition, they also attempted to replicate cultural differences in 
time perception (i.e., temporal orientation in Study 5 and the use of time metaphor in Study 
5, 6A, & 6B). 
Combining the results from the three studies, there is strong evidence of cultural 
differences in the use of time metaphor with English-speakers more likely to take an ego-
moving metaphor whereas Mandarin-speakers were more likely to take a time-moving 
metaphor. The findings of this study converged and extended cross-cultural literature on 
the use of time metaphor, replicated the findings of a diverse use of time metaphor as a 
function of cultural background with native Mandarin-speakers from East Asian countries 
(e.g., China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan) and native English-speakers from the U.K. as 
participants.  
As discussed in Study 5, one might question whether the difference in the use of 
time metaphor truly reflects the conceptual difference in time perception or is rather a 
result of the linguistic framework (due to the involvement of two different languages in the 
time metaphor ambiguous questions). However, in all the studies reported here, 
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participant’s responses on the time metaphor ambiguous questions were classified as ego-
moving or time-moving, and the proportion of ego-moving responses was calculated for 
each participant. Some of the questions were spatial in nature as space and time have close 
correspondence in language (e.g., Gentner et al., 2002). As an abstract concept, time can be 
described and understood by referring to a more tangible domain such as space. The 
expressions of “time is like a river, you can never step into the same river twice” by the 
Greek philosopher Heraclitus, is an example of mapping time onto a more familiar domain, 
space. However, whether time-space mapping is habitual psychological concepts is still an 
open question as language construct of metaphorical system does not necessarily imply real 
psychological correspondence. 
The use of several time metaphor ambiguous questions also aimed to minimize the 
possibility of the difference in response being due to linguistic framework difference in the 
interpretation of the questions. Careful translation process including using the method of 
back translation (Brislin, 1970) with the involvement of two bilingual translators in order to 
ensure the intended meaning was retained and to minimize the possibility of bias. However, 
as demonstrated in Lai and Boroditsky’s (2013) study which compared the use of ego-
moving metaphor among monolinguals, English-Mandarin bilinguals, and Mandarin 
monolinguals by varying the languages used in the time metaphor questions (i.e., English 
versus Mandarin), English-Mandarin bilinguals still showed greater tendency to adopt ego-
moving metaphor when the time metaphor questions were presented in English.  
However, it is worth noting that, the interpretation of the finding should be whether 
an individual is “more ego-moving” or “more time-moving”. Although consistent cultural 
differences were found in the use of temporal metaphors, the metaphor adopted by any 
given individual is not a static disposition, but is instead dynamic and may shift in response 
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to situational or contextual factors (Gentner et al., 2002). The same applies to individual’s 
psychological distance to the past or future as psychological distance can be varied as a 
function of temporal direction and direction of spatial movement (e.g., Caruso et al., 2013). 
 The second aspect of time of interest is the primary temporal region individuals from 
East and West attend to (i.e., past versus future). The response on psychological distance 
measure in Study 5 indicated that English-speakers rated a day one month in the future as 
subjectively closer than a day one month in the past. This is consistent with the study 
hypothesis in which Western individuals were expected to have a strong future orientation 
by attending more to the future (versus past). However, Mandarin-speakers rated a day one 
month in the past and a day one month in the future as equidistant. This is contrary to the 
findings of previous studies showing a stronger past orientation by East Asians (e.g., Ji et al., 
2009) but is nevertheless consistent with the findings of Study 2 where they rated a target 
event (i.e., Chinese New Year Reunion dinner) to be equidistant (imagination vs. memory).  
An explanation for English-speakers’ greater future orientation is their societies’ 
greater emphasis on sense of agency. The future is where we are heading, plans and 
executions are needed in order to put dreams into action and live a fulfilling life. This line of 
thinking is consistent with their greater sense of independent self - emphasis on realizing 
one’s internal attributes, goal, and one’s internal abilities, thoughts and feelings (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Their tendency of placing more emphasis on forthcoming is functional as 
the past is gone and future is where desires and dreams can be put into action. This line of 
thinking also implied greater sense of personal control which is compatible with the greater 
internal attributions Western individuals tend to make. The use of IPC scale in the present 
research confirmed this by replicating the findings of greater internal sense of control 
among English-speakers. 
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Contrary to the study hypothesis in which Mandarin-speakers were expected to feel 
subjectively closer to the past, a day one month in the past and future was of equidistant to 
Mandarin-speakers. As defined earlier, temporal orientation refers to the primary temporal 
region to which an individual (Park et al, 2006) or the habitual temporal region an individual 
emphasizes, which could be reflected in the choices that we make (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). 
The used of psychological distance as a measure of temporal orientation is by adapting and 
modifying the measure used in a previous similar study (Ji et. al., 2009). However, the 
definitions of temporal orientation afforded broad interpretation which implied that other 
measures might be possible as well (e.g., habitual thinking or choices that people make in 
relation to a temporal region). 
Turning back to the main purpose of studies presented in this study, to explore the 
possible downstream effects on judgement and decisions by the diverse use of time 
metaphor among English and Mandarin-speakers. It was hypothesized that individual’s 
judgment or decisions (i.e., unrealistic optimism, risk preferences, and risk-taking behaviour) 
would be predicted by perception of control which, in turn, also hypothesized to be 
predicted by the use of metaphorical representation of time which was expected to vary by 
culture. However, despite linguistic framework interpretation suggestion (e.g., McGlone & 
Pfiester, 2009) and the implications of previous time-metaphor related findings (e.g., Lee & 
Ji, 2014; Ruscher, 2011), the results of the three studies suggest there is relatively little 
relationship between the use of time metaphor and perceived control. There was only very 
weak or near non-existent relationship between the use of time metaphor and perception 
of control. Perception of control was found not to be a significant predictor of optimism in 
Study 5, risk preferences in Study 6A and only on limited decision domains in risk-taking 
behaviour (Study 6B). Moreover, risk-taking tendency appeared to be domain specific, as 
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supported by the observation that Mandarin-speakers were more risk-taking behavior in 
financial domain but not in other decision domains. Further investigation into possible 
downstream effect of the use of time metaphor on individual’s unrealistic optimism and 
risk-taking tendency also revealed little evidence of the influence of time metaphor.  
The results of the studies suggest little evidence of the influence of time metaphor 
on individual’s downstream judgement and decision, specifically optimism bias and risk-
taking tendency. A possible explanation for this is, metaphor might be only a conceptual, 
theoretical, or linguistic mapping rather than a real psychological construct. Although 
previous research suggested otherwise (Gentner et al., 2002). Or perhaps it could be one’s 
change in habitual disposition (e.g., for example through involvement of physical movement) 
that could exert influence on one’s temporary judgement or decisions. These are 
speculative in nature nevertheless they are open questions awaiting answers. 
In summary, the studies reported here provide compelling evidence of cultural 
differences in perceptions both of time and of causality, but yielded little evidence that such 
differences produce meaningful differences in downstream judgments and decisions.
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Chapter 5 - General Discussion 
 
5.1 Culture and Time Perception 
Across a series of studies, this thesis investigated two aspects of time perception, 
temporal orientation and the use of time metaphors, and their potential downstream 
influences on mental representations and decisions. Study 1 investigated whether the 
cultural differences reported in the existing literature could be replicated among English- 
and Mandarin-speakers. Study 2 and Study 3 examined whether phenomenological 
characteristics of mental representation vary in accordance with psychological distance. 
Study 4 investigated the relationship between culture and a different measure of temporal 
orientation, namely nostalgic tendency. In addition, the relationship between nostalgia and 
nostalgic item valuation was also addressed in this study. Subsequent studies explored 
whether the use of different time metaphors is related to perceived personal control, and 
also addressed the possibility that the use of time metaphors influences optimism biases 
(Study 5) or risk-taking tendency (Study 6A & 6B) as a function of perceived personal control.  
To give a general overview of present thesis’ findings on the relationship between 
culture and time perception, the results of several studies have been combined and 
integrated in order to provide an overview of results on two key measures, namely temporal 
orientation and the use of time metaphors. It aims to answer the question of whether time 
perceptions differ between English and Mandarin-speakers by using participants’ responses 
to the time-perception measures, namely the temporal orientation questions (i.e., 
psychological distance) and the time metaphor question. All the effect sizes were calculated 
using means and standard deviations. The average effect size of each study (i.e., average d 
 179 
within study) was computed using the average of different measures within the study 
whereas the overall effect size (“average weighted effect size”) was computed by using 
study as a basis unit of measure. It is also important to note that the marking of effect size 
indicates the extent to which they fit the predictions of this thesis.  
 
5.1.1 Temporal Orientation 
With reference to the claims in the existing literature that Westerners and East 
Asians prioritise different temporal regions, with Westerners emphasizing the future 
(Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 2013; Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009; Van 
Boven & Ashworth, 2007; Van Boven et al., 2010) whereas East Asians prioritise the past 
(Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009), this thesis results show a small effect size in relation to 
investigation of such claims. The summary shows that across the three studies, the average 
weighted effect size is d = 0.15 for both between-cultures and within-culture comparisons. 
See Table I1 in Appendix I for effect sizes across studies based on between-cultures 
comparison and within-culture comparison of participants’ responses to the psychological 
distance questions. 
 Taken together, it would seem that English-speakers have a stronger future 
orientation and a weaker past orientation, whereas Mandarin-speakers are neither past- 
nor future-oriented. In terms of cross-cultural comparisons, Mandarin-speakers were more 
past-oriented (vs. English-speakers) whereas English-speakers were more future-oriented 
(vs. Mandarin-speakers). This indicates that English-speakers’ observed tendencies are in-
line with previous related works (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso et al., 2013; Guo et al., 2012; Ji 
et al., 2009) whereas Mandarin-speakers’ tendencies are only partially consistent with 
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previous related works (Guo et al., 2012; Ji et al., 2009). This put forward a few 
considerations and suggestions.  
The findings of cultural differences in temporal orientation between English and 
Mandarin-speakers in this thesis had an average smaller effect size compared to previous 
similar studies (Caruso et al., 2013; Ji et al., 2009) especially in relation to the Mandarin-
speakers. Previous findings on temporal orientation - including those from cross-cultural 
comparison paradigms (Ji et al., 2009 – Chinese vs. Euro-Canadians) and from non-cross 
cultural paradigms (Caruso et al., 2013 - Western participants) - both had a medium effect 
size (Cohen’s d range from .45 to .68) by using similar testing questions as used in the 
present thesis.  
A possible explanation for a smaller effect size obtained in this thesis is that, the 
above mentioned previous related studies adopted different target events in the 
psychological distance measure compared to this thesis. Previous research has shown that 
emotional valence (positive vs. negative) of an event affects the psychological distance 
people feel toward the event in question (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Therefore, it is possible that 
the use of different target events might account for the difference in outcome because 
participants’ psychological distance to an event is likely to be guided by the nature or type 
of the event. For instance, although emotional valence was not measured in Ji et al. (2009) 
which showed cultural differences in psychological distance, it is reasonable to assume that 
the emotional valence of the target event used (i.e., exam) was less positive than the target 
events used in this thesis (e.g., festive celebrations22). The use of different target events 
                                                     
22 The average emotional valence ratings (imagination and memory) in Study 2: English-speakers (M = 6.04; SD 
= 1.14); Mandarin-speakers (M = 5.87; SD = 1.08). Rating scale used: 1 = very negative; 7 = very positive. 
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should trigger different types of emotions during mental simulation and thus affects the 
psychological distance participants feel.  
Based on CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010) and temporal value asymmetry findings 
(Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso et al., 2013; Guo et al., 2012; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007; Van 
Boven et al., 2010), it was predicted that individuals’ propensity to be oriented toward a 
temporal region might be reflected in their mental representations of specific events. 
Specifically, English-speakers who are more future (vs. past) oriented should feel closer to 
an event during imagination and thus their mental representation of a future event (vs. an 
identical past event) should be filled with greater phenomenological characteristics (e.g., 
emotional intensity, sensorial details, spatial details). Likewise, the same should be observed 
for Mandarin-speakers’ representations of past events given their greater past (vs. future) 
orientation.  
Overall, there are observable cultural variations in mental representation as a 
function of temporal orientation, and this is especially prominent among English-speakers. 
Study 2 reaffirmed English-speakers’ stronger future orientation, showing that English-
speakers’ prospective mental simulations of an event were also filled with greater 
phenomenological characteristics compared to their retrospective mental simulations. Such 
findings are in line with their feelings of being psychologically closer to the event 
prospectively (vs. retrospectively) and also to the future in general as observed in Study 1.  
On the other hand, Mandarin-speakers reported mental representations that did not 
differ as a function of whether they were imagining or recalling. This applies to their 
emotional intensity, visual details, sensorial details of sound and smells/tastes, and spatial 
information. This finding is in line with their equidistant psychological distance ratings to the 
event prospectively and retrospectively.  
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Subsequently, by contrasting mental representations of events located temporally 
closer vs. more distant, Study 3 indicated that the phenomenological characteristics of our 
mental representations vary as a function of both objective temporal distance and 
psychological distance. Study 3 provided converging evidence that psychological distance is 
an important driving variable that influences mental representations. Both English and 
Mandarin-speakers’ mental representations were found differ in accordance to the 
psychological distance (and also objective distance) of the event in concern. This finding is 
also consistent with previous research that mental representation of objectively more 
recent events tended to contain greater phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensorial 
and contextual information) compared to those that are more distant (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linde, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988) and is also in line with the predictions of CLT (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). 
The sole evidence of Mandarin-speakers’ greater past-orientation in this thesis is 
their relatively higher levels of self-reported nostalgic tendencies. A possible reason for this 
is that East Asian societies are characterised by greater emphasis on tradition and heritage 
(e.g., worshipping of ancestors, strong family relations), created by a social environment or 
cultural norm that prompts or triggers past-related thinking. Thus, they experience more 
episodes of nostalgia and past-related emotions. Related support for this is that Chinese 
individuals tended to draw on past personal events for self-reflection purposes (Wang & 
Conway, 2004) and they considered past situations to be more relevant in understanding a 
current problem and remembered them in greater detail (vs. Euro-Canadians) (Ji et al., 
2009). Therefore, environmental and cultural factors might be related to their relatively 
higher nostalgic tendency compared to English-speakers.  
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The contrary patterns of results obtained by using psychological distance measure 
and nostalgic tendency suggest that these two are likely measuring different aspects. 
Psychological distance measures the extent to which people feel psychologically 
closer/distant to an event or a time point, which is largely “affective” in nature as opposed 
to nostalgic tendency which measures both “affective” and “cognitive” dimensions in 
relation to the past. This is because the SNS measures the frequency of experiencing 
nostalgic tendency, personal relevance of nostalgia (i.e., importance, value, and significance), 
and the proclivity of experiencing nostalgia episodes. Whilst “thinking about the past” is 
considered to be one of the main features of being past-oriented (e.g., Guo et al., 2012, Ji et 
al., 2009, Maddux & Yuki, 2006), the psychological distance question does not seem to 
capture such a tendency. Future research should aim to fill this gap, by clarifying and 
identifying temporal orientation tendency and measurement respectively.   
Importantly, the specific mechanism underlying individuals’ temporal orientation is 
unclear. Whilst a few studies (Caruso et al., 2008; Caruso, 2010; Van Boven & Ashworth, 
2007) attributed Western individuals’ greater emphasis on the future to their stronger 
emotional feelings or more extensive (e.g., vivid) mental simulation (Van Boven & Ashworth, 
2007) of a future event, Guo et al. (2012) proposed that it is associated with the extent to 
which people focus or think about a temporal region (i.e., temporal focus). However, 
emotional intensity did not predict the psychological distance ratings in Study 2 and Study 
323. This is not the focus of this thesis, but it is nevertheless an important question awaiting 
clarification. 
                                                     
23 Emotional intensity did not predict psychological distance felt toward event in question (based on linear 
regressions: Study 2: all β’s < -.20, p’s > .10; Study 3: all β’s < -.18, p’s > .07), nor did it mediated the effect of 
culture on psychological distance (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; based on 10,000 bootstrapping - Study 2: all β’s < -
.10; Study 3: all β’s < .08, all 95% BCaCI contain zero). 
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An important question arises from the consistent observation of cultural differences 
in the dominant use of visual perspective, specifically whether the use of first-person and 
third-person perspectives serves similar psychological functions for people from different 
cultural groups. As indicated earlier in Chapter 3, previous visual perspective studies 
recruiting Western participants suggest various factors that could influence the type of 
visual perspective one uses (e.g., personal change – Libby & Eibach, 2002; emotionality - 
Berntsen & Rubin, 200, authenticity of memory – Justice et al., 2013). It remains unknown 
how these factors would interact with the use of third-person perspective among East 
Asians. Nevertheless, the findings in this thesis is consistent with Cohen and Gunz’s (2002) 
suggestion that the use of third-person perspective among East Asians is more prevalent in 
social settings. 
Overall, there is observation of cultural differences on temporal orientation and 
mental representation between English-speakers and Mandarin-speakers. The changes in 
phenomenological characteristics of mental representation that individuals form appear to 
vary in accordance to the temporal region they primarily attend to, but this is only 
applicable to English-speakers. Mandarin-speakers seem to be neither future nor past 
oriented which is confirmed by their broadly similar past and future mental imagery.  
 
5.1.2 The Use of Time Metaphor 
The second aspect of time perception that was of interest in this thesis is the use of 
time metaphors. Overall, this thesis’ results on the use of time metaphors are consistent 
with a previous related work (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013), showing that the ego-moving 
metaphors are more frequently used among English-speakers whereas the time-moving 
metaphors are more common among Mandarin-speakers. The result of this thesis shows 
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that there is supportive evidence of cultural variations in the use of time metaphor, with a 
mean effect size of d = 2.67 when averaged across four between-cultures comparisons (see 
Table I2 in Appendix I for effect sizes across studies).  
 The linguistic frameworks of two common temporal metaphors, namely ego- and 
time-moving metaphors, were suggested to imply different sources of agency about the 
event in question by attributing the source of change to different entities (McGlone & 
Pfiester, 2009). However, despite predictions based on linguistic framework interpretation 
(McGlone & Pfiester, 2009), the use of time metaphor was found to have little relationship 
with perceived personal control (Study 5, 6A & 6B). It was predicted that the use of ego- 
versus time-moving metaphors would influence optimism bias and risk-taking through their 
effects on perceived personal control. However, there was little evidence of an association 
between the use of time metaphors and perceived personal control. Moreover, there was 
also little evidence of an impact of the use of time metaphors on one’s tendency to be 
optimistic toward the future (Study 5) or on one’s risk-taking tendency (Study 6A & 6B).  
It has been assumed that the use of time metaphors is related to different levels of 
perceived personal control (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009), with the use of ego-moving 
metaphor relatively more advantageous for control (vs. time-moving metaphor). This thesis 
tested such proposition by looking at the correlations between self-reported measures of 
the use of time metaphor and perceived personal control. However, previous research 
suggesting an association (e.g., Ruscher, 2011) has not determined the direction of causality 
and therefore future research might investigate it from a different angle. An alternative 
means of investigating this relationship is to see whether variations in agentic control will 
result in a tendency to engage in one metaphorical time representation over another. For 
example, it may be informative to manipulate the agentic control one feels to see whether 
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enhancement or deprivation of agentic control will prompt the use of one perspective over 
the other. If the feeling of being in control is a driving motivation behind the metaphorical 
representation of time, an individual who is primed with feeling greater control (vs. feeling 
relatively less in control) might be more likely to use ego-moving metaphor. Conversely, an 
individual who feels relatively less in control might be more likely to take time-moving 
metaphor.  
In the analysis of perceived personal control, the present study focuses on active 
personal control by using Rotter’s IE scale (Rotter, 1966) and Levenson’s IPC scale (Levenson, 
1981). However, there are other types of perceived personal control or agency constructs 
which might be related. Different conceptions of personal control or agency vary in regard 
to whether their central component ideas are more or less relevant to a particular cultural 
context. For instance, two-process models have highlighted primary control versus 
secondary control (Rothbaum, et al., 1982) which is relatively more applicable to Western 
and Eastern societies respectively. Primary control refers to the dominant type of control 
commonly observed among Western culture (e.g., Americans) in which one exerts control 
by influencing one’s situation through active measures. In contrast, secondary control which 
is prevalent among East Asians (e.g., Japanese) implies control is achieved by adapting 
oneself to one’s situation. These two control motives appear to be consistent with the 
independent and interdependent sense of self among individualistic and collectivistic 
societies respectively (Weisz et al., 1984).  
Moreover, the characteristics of primary control seem to be consistent with the use 
of ego-moving metaphor, with the self is perceived to be in active control, attempt to alter 
or shape environment by exerting influence over it. Concurrently, the use of time-moving 
metaphor is also consistent with the secondary control, with the self is perceived as 
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motionless entity dealing with approaching events. It is possible that primary and secondary 
control might act as pathways through which culture affect judgement or decisions. 
This thesis also attempted to bring together two lines of time perception 
investigations, namely the use of time metaphors and temporal orientation, by examining 
the relationship between these two-time perceptions. It was predicted that the use of ego-
moving metaphor should be related to a reduced in psychological distance to future. This is 
following the idea (Caruso et al., 2013) that as future approaches, there should be a 
reduction in temporal distance between the self and the future hence also a reduction in 
psychological distance. At the same time, as a past recedes from the self, there should be an 
increase in temporal distance between the self and the past which should result in an 
increase in psychological distance to the past. However, there was little association between 
these two-time perceptions as observed in Study 1 and Study 5.  
A plausible explanation for this is, the constructs of temporal orientation and time 
metaphor might simply be independent of each other. It is possible that the use of time 
metaphor might not be a real psychological construct but instead a conceptual, theoretical, 
or linguistic mapping that people use to understand and represent time - an abstract 
concept which cannot be comprehended through concrete dimension. Therefore, the use of 
time metaphor might only represent people’s mental representation of time in-the-moment. 
On the other hand, temporal orientation represents people’s attitude towards a particular 
event or time period located in a temporal region, which is a largely psychological construct 
that consists of cognition, affect, and behavioral aspects (Park et al., 2017; Lasane & 
O’Donnel, 2005). For instance, the measure of temporal orientation (i.e., psychological 
distance) is based on the assumption of a connection between cognition and affect (i.e., 
 188 
how close/distant people feel towards a time point/event). Therefore, it is possible that the 
two aspects are not directly related to each other.  
 
5.2 Limitations and Methodological Considerations 
As the present thesis employed a cross-cultural comparison approach, one of the 
potential confounding factors is the use of different languages in testing materials for 
different cultural groups. It is possible that the difference observed between the two 
cultural groups might be due to different linguistic frameworks in testing materials rather 
than a difference in actual predisposition itself. It is aware that linguistic interpretation is 
likely to be a confounding factor in this thesis especially in relation to the use of time 
metaphors which rely heavily on linguistic interpretation. However, this thesis adopted the 
back-translation method (Brislin, 1970) to ensure the English and Mandarin versions of 
testing materials are equivalence. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, previous research 
(Lai & Boroditsky, 2013) which assessed Mandarin-speakers’ use of time metaphors by using 
English testing materials still showed that they were more likely to adopt time-moving 
metaphor (vs. English-speakers). Future research may recruit samples that use other 
languages in order to rule out the effect of language as explanation. 
 Another important methodological aspect worth noting, not only in this thesis but 
also in other cross-cultural research, is that individuals from different cultures are likely to 
have their preferred communication or reporting styles (e.g., in regard to memory reporting) 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Wang & Conway, 2004) which might affect the interpretation of a 
research outcome. For instance, when asked to report what they have been presented with 
previously, Americans were more likely to start their reporting with the focal object whereas 
Japanese were more likely to start their reporting with contextual information (Masuda & 
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Nisbett, 2001). Also relevant is the more specific versus generic memory narrative reporting 
styles by Western individuals and Chinese individuals respectively (Wang & Conway, 2004). 
The imagination and memory accounts provided by English and Mandarin-speakers in Study 
2 appear to reflect such tendencies. Nevertheless, these observations are consistent with 
Western individuals’ more “focal point” focused tendency and East Asians’ more context-
bound attentional strategy respectively (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett et al., 1999; 
Norenzayan et al., 2002).  
It should also be noted that this thesis adopted Likert-type format questions which 
might be liable to extreme responding and acquiescence bias (Van Dijk, Datema, Piggen, 
Welten, & Van de Vijver, 2009). Although responses which showed characteristics of 
extreme responding style (i.e., the tendency to select an endpoint of a rating scale) have 
been excluded during the screening process, this thesis did not, however, account for 
possible acquiescence bias - people’s tendency to agree with questions. Previous related 
research showed that response styles are related to the characteristics of a participant’s 
culture (e.g., a positive association between acquiescence bias and collectivism – He, 
Espinosa, Poortinga, & Van de Vijer, 2014).  Possible cultural variations in communicating 
and responding styles should be borne in mind when designing cross-cultural study and 
interpreting of such findings. 
The majority of Mandarin-speaking participants recruited in the present thesis were 
Chinese university students aged 18 to 25 from mainland China who were born after the 
introduction of the one-child policy since its inception in 1979. Growing up in an only-child 
family and also in a social environment with increasing number of single-child families is 
likely to encourage a relatively more individualistic (or less collectivistic) self-view compared 
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to their older Chinese peers, who tended to grow up in a multiple-child environment prior 
this change in social policy. Previous research suggests that individuals who grow up in a 
single-child family share a more self-oriented self-concept (Cai, Kwan, & Sedikides, 2012; 
Wang, Leichtman, & White, 1998). For instance, one autobiographical memory study (Wang 
et al., 1998) has found that they tended to describe themselves using more elaborative 
private descriptions and fewer collective descriptions, and reported greater self-focused 
autobiographical memories compared to those who grow up in a multiple-child 
environment - an indication that a change in social environment is likely to have an impact 
on basic human dispositions (e.g, self-concept). The studies in the present thesis recruited 
mainly young adults (aged 18 to 25, university students) and, as such, it remains unknown 
whether these findings would be generalised to wider range of individuals in the same 
cultural groups. 
In addition, people from different parts of the world are integrating at an ever-
increasing pace in various aspects including trading, education, social, political, among 
others. These rapid changes or advancement in socioeconomic aspects in East Asian 
countries are likely to impact the priorities individuals place as greater socioeconomic 
advancement promotes individualist aspects (e.g., income, health, employment status). A 
more modernised society tends to be associated with characteristics that are more 
individualistic in nature (e.g., self-independence, personal efficacy, personal autonomy, 
gender equality, freedom of choice) (Steele & Lynch, 2013). There is also supportive 
evidence that some Eastern cultures are becoming more individualistic (Cai et al., 2012; 
Steele & Lynch, 2013). For instance, by using the World Values Survey data collected in 
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China in 1995, 2001, and 2007, Steele and Lynch (2013) found that Chinese individuals24 
showed increasing tendency of emphasizing individualist factors (e.g., income, health, 
employment status) in their assessment of life satisfaction and happiness.  
Lastly, it is important to note that there are variations in many aspects including 
history, culture, political and economic factors, and language, to name a few, both within 
and between countries from the same continent. I would like to acknowledge that there is 
within-group diversity in both English and Mandarin-speakers groups recruited in this thesis. 
For example, Mandarin-speakers from China reported themselves as less likely to adopt 
ego-moving metaphors compared to those from Malaysia25. However, separate analysis 
conducted with each of the participant group revealed similar results and did not change 
this thesis conclusion.  
 
5.3 Open Questions for Future Research 
Although this thesis observed a robust cultural variation in the use of time 
metaphors, there was little evidence of a relationship between the use of time metaphor 
and perceived personal control. Therefore, a question for future research is whether a 
temporary change in one’s use of a particular time metaphor will affect sense of personal 
control. As discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of time metaphors is very much related to 
embodied cognition - the idea that our understanding of abstract and complex concepts 
which cannot be comprehended directly can be experienced in the bodily dimension (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1999). If time metaphors are experienced by the physical bodily self (e.g., 
                                                     
24 Individuals age 18 to 65 living in urban China. 
25 Mandarin-speakers from China (M = 0.004, SD = 0.03) were less likely to take ego-moving metaphors 
compared to those from Malaysia (M = 0.15, SD = 0.24), F(1, 369) = 74.64, p < .001, η
2
p = .17. 
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traveling on train/plane), the question is raised of whether such embodiment in the physical 
dimension would affect one’s perception of control in-the-moment. Therefore, an 
alternative means of investigating this relationship is by manipulating participants’ physical 
movement (i.e., move forward in space) or with the help of virtual reality technology to 
create an illusory sense of movement that is compatible with their use of time metaphor. 
This can provide more insights on how bodily experience shape people’s metaphorical 
representation of time and also reduce the involvement of language which is a potential 
confounding factor. 
The existing literature (e.g., Ji et al., 2009) and the present research tested 
hypotheses using the conception of temporal orientation, with the assumptions that a 
future (or past) oriented frame of mind would be related to closer psychological distance to 
a timepoint (Study 1 & 5) or event (Study 2) in the future (or the past). However, it is 
possible that the use of a timepoint or an event is likely to direct people’s minds to different 
aspects. For instance, an event is a more concrete target compared to a timepoint which is 
relatively more abstract in nature. This is because generally a more concrete target (e.g., cat, 
apple, tree) is likely to lead to more mental images being generated compared to an 
abstract target (e.g., intelligent, honesty, active; Paivo, 1965). Presumably this is because 
people have more knowledge or information in relation to concrete concepts which can be 
retrieved from memory. Thus, a target such as a designated event should promote a more 
imagery mental representation compared to a target of time point which possibly invite a 
relatively wider interpretation. Future studies should clarify the use of more abstract vs. 
concrete measures as an indication of temporal orientation. By doing so, it will provide a 
better understanding on how culture, temporal orientation, and target are related.  
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Lastly, Gao (2016) suggested that East Asians might have a longer temporal focus 
compared to Western individuals. This is possibly due to their cyclical view of time, as they 
perceive events to be more likely to repeat or transform themselves within a cycle. This 
perception of event unfold within a cycle is a more ‘big picture’ view in nature, which 
appears to be in line with their dominant use of holistic thinking style (i.e., a predisposition 
to view elements as interconnected). In contrast, Western individuals’ linear view of time is 
comparatively more short-term focused. This might be related to their more analytical 
thinking style (i.e., a predisposition to focus on focus point) in general which enables them 
to focus on a shorter time span, hence encouraging a relatively more stable world view (e.g., 
less anticipation of a change, Ji, Zhang, Guo, 2008; Ji et al., 2009). Although this thesis has 
sampled multiple time points and found similar results for both time points (a month and a 
year), future studies may incorporate wider variations of temporal depth in their studies on 
temporal orientation, in order to better understand how a short vs. long-term focus of 
temporal orientation of individuals from different cultures affects the priorities they place.  
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
As the world is now changing with an ever-increasingly fast pace, people from 
different cultures are also interacting at a higher frequency than before. A key way to 
reduce the intercultural gap is through better understanding. This thesis set out to bring 
together culture and time perception by investigating whether and how culture and time 
perception are related, and how they relate to a range of other cognitive processes 
including mental representation and decisions.  
At a broad level, the findings across the seven studies reported in this thesis suggest 
that cultural effects can be observed in time perceptions and mental representations. 
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However, there was limited supportive evidence of such tendencies to influence further 
downstream judgment and decisions, which have led to the discussion of a range of 
methodological considerations and further research suggestions.  
Overall, it would seem that cultural effects are observable in many fundamental 
human cognitions including the use of visual perspective, perceived personal control, and 
the content of mental representation. The relationship between culture, cognition, and 
judgment or decisions appears to be inseparable and deeply entwined with each other. It is 
hoped the present thesis can provide useful information and potential directions for future 
research to build on and refine in the search for a more thorough understanding of how 
culture and time are related. 
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Appendix A – Part I 
 
Online Recruitment Sources 
 
http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html: A website listing online psychological 
related research studies. This website is maintained by John H. Krantz, PhD. and 
sponsored by the Hanover College Psychology Department  
http://www.in-mind.org/content/online-research: This is a website of the magazine, 
Inquisitive Mind which maintains a directory of online psychological research studies.  
http://www.legacy.socialpsychology.org//expts.htm: This is a website of Social Psychology 
Network, a website devoted to psychological research and teaching which contains 
links to online psychological related experiments, surveys and other social psychology 
studies. 
 
https://www.douban.com/: This is a Chinese social networking website allowing posting 
study to recruit participants from all social and educational backgrounds.  
www.facebook.com: A social media and social networking website allowing posting study to 
recruit participants from all social and educational backgrounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
Appendix A - Part II 
 
Time Metaphor Questions for Study 1 
 
(Adapted from Lai & Boroditsky, 2013 and Richmond, et al., 2012) 
 
 
The meeting question 
‘Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days. What day is the meeting 
now that it has been rescheduled?’ 
A response of ‘Friday’ will be categorized as an ego-moving response whereas a response of 
‘Monday’ will be categorized as a time-moving response. 
 
The clock question 
‘Suppose the clock says it is 1pm now. You need to move it one hour forward. What time will 
it be adjusted to?’ 
A response of ‘2pm’ will be categorized as an ego-moving response whereas a response of 
‘12pm’ will be categorized as a time-moving response. 
 
The book question 
‘A book will be re-edited so that ‘page 10’ will move forward 5 pages. What page will ‘page 
10’ now appear on?’  
A response of ‘page 15’ will be categorized as an ego-moving response whereas a response 
of ‘page 5’ will be categorized as a time-moving response. 
 
The block marked ‘X’ question 
 
The Block marked ‘X’ in block D in the diagram has been moved forward three places. Which 
column is the block in now that it has been moved? 
A response of ‘G’, ‘number 5’ will be categorized as an ego-moving response whereas a 
response of ‘A’ will be categorized as a time-moving response. 
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The 5 people question 
 
There are 5 people standing in the above diagram. Person number 3 moves forward two 
places. Is person number 3 now standing in box number 1 or box number 5? 
A response of ‘number 5’ will be categorized as an ego-moving response whereas a 
response of ‘number 1’ will be categorized as a time-moving response.  
 
The alphabet question 
 
The letter ‘M’ in the alphabet has been moved forward four places. What letter will the letter 
‘M’ now follow in its new position? 
A response of ‘P’, ‘Q’, or ‘R’ will be categorized as an ego-moving response whereas a 
response of ‘H’, ‘I’, or ‘J’ will be categorized as a time-moving response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H      I      J      K      L      M      N      O      P      Q      R      S  
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Appendix A - Part III 
 
Construal Questions for Study 1 
(Adapted from Fujita, et al., 2006 and Vallacher &Wegner, 1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actions Low-Level Construal Response High-Level Construal Response
Toobrushing Moving a brush around in one’s mouth Preventing tooth decay
Taking a test Answering questions Showing one’s knowledge
Greeting someone Saying hello Showing friendliness
Resisting temptation Saying “no” Showing moral courage
Eating Chewing and swallowing Getting nutrition
Growing a garden Planting seeds Getting fresh vegetables
Traveling by car Following a map Seeing countryside
Talking to a child Using simple words Teaching a child something
Pushing a doorbell Moving a finger Seeing if someone’s home
Staying home to study Reviewing one’s notes Exerting self-discipline
Recycling Bagging paper, glass, & cans Caring for the environment
Teaching Talking to students Having authority
Meeting new people Small talk and shaking hands Enhancing one’s social network
Filling out a personality test Answering questions Revealing what you’re like
Picking an apple Pulling an apple off a branch Getting something to eat
Sweeping the floor Moving a broom Being clean
Skydiving Jumping out of an aeroplane Demonstrating one’s daringness
Making an expensive purchase Swiping a credit card Doing something for one’s pleasure
Attending a class Sitting in a chair Looking at a teacher
Making a list Writing things down Getting organized
Reading Following lines of print Gaining knowledge
Joining the Army Signing up Helping the Nation’s defence
Chopping down a tree Wielding an axe Getting firewood
Measuring a room for carpeting Using a yard stick Getting ready to remodel
Cleaning the house Vacuuming the floor Showing one’s cleanliness
Painting a room Applying brush strokes Making the room look fresh
Paying the rent Writing a check Maintaining a place to live
Caring for houseplants Watering plants Making the room look nice
Locking a door Putting a key in the lock Securing the house
Voting Marking a ballot Influencing the election
Climbing a tree Holding on to branches Getting a good view
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Appendix A – Part IV 
 
Scatter Plots for Study 1 
 
The scatter plot of the ego-moving response and internal locus of control (overall sample) 
 
 
 
 
The scatter plot of the ego-moving response and internal locus of control by culture 
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Appendix B 
 
Imagination and Memory Account Examples for Study 2 
 
 
Imagination Account Examples by English-speakers. 
 
Subject # 8 Female 
I am sat in my kitchen in my new house with my mum, dad and great uncle. My sister isn’t 
here for the first time because she is working.  Dinner is smaller than usual because the 
ovens tiny, but it’s alright. Dinner is smaller than usual because the ovens tiny, but it’s 
alright. There are Christmas crackers and festive stuff everywhere. My dogs are sat under 
the table and the cats in the living room. Everyone is drinking and talking about different 
things. My plate is covered with a bit of everything and swamped in gravy. We’re discussing 
which game to play first, articulate or cluedo. It’s very cold so we bring a heater and 
blankets into the kitchen. It’s probably dark outside but can hear the ocean still.  
Our presents from earlier are just around the house. Everybody’s wearing nice clothes, 
probably a new piece of clothing which was given as a present. 
 
Subject #25 Female 
There would be lots of delicious food: roast turkey, vegetables, yorkshires, etc. My family 
would all be chatting and laughing around the table (mum, dad, sister and relatives). There 
would probably be a bit of harmless bickering as mum gets stressed but overall happy event. 
We would all be drinking wine and pulling crackers and party poppers. We would all be 
catching up on everything in the past year. All excited to open presents and celebrate 
together. 
 
Subject #49 Female 
I am sat around the table with my mum’s family. We do alternate years, one year mum, one 
year dad. My grandad is drunk making jokes in a Scottish accent, whilst the rest of us cringe!  
Sam my step grandma is sat petting the dogs, not speaking to anyone else and my brother is 
being the Christmas Grinch! My mum is in the kitchen cooking away at the food, stressing 
that no one will like it and my step father and I sit back and watch it all take place! My 
grandma arrives, with her dog which makes our dogs go mad! she fusses over everyone, and 
my mum stresses even more now. Finally, we sit down, the food smells amazing, as always! 
The tree is flashing so brightly we almost get an epileptic fit from it, but that’s the way mum 
likes it! sitting down we all compliment the food to which mum always responds, I hope you 
all like it, it wasn’t much! after dinner is done and we all feel stuffed. 
 
Subject #65 Male 
We would have travelled up to visit nans house with my parents and sister, as well as my 
two uncles and we would be around the big table after setting it all up in the main living 
room, the TV would probably have some christmas special show on but turned down while 
were at the table, nan would come out with dishes full of food for us to help ourselves, 
though the food and the plates would be too hot to start with. There might be snow outside 
which I could almost see through the patterned net curtains, and the heating would be on 
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and coming through the floor vent just beside the table. There would be potatoes in one 
bowl, with all the other vegetables in another massive dish, stuffing in one tray and all the 
different meats in another big ceramic tray. There would also be christmas crackers on the 
table for us all an 
 
Subject #75 Male 
Christmas tree and lights are on. On the television is the movie Home Alone. Fire is crackling 
in the fireplace. The dog is lying down chewing on a bone after Christmas dinner. The 
younger kids are playing with their brand new toys. Snow is falling outside. The family is all 
wearing Christmas jumpers. Were in Switzerland for snowboarding and skiing. But now its 
dark and were inside drinking hot chocolate for the kids and wine for the adults. Everyone is 
full from the roast turkey and vegetables. Mum is in the kitchen dealing with leftover food, 
putting it in the fridge for boxing day. Another log goes on the fire. The Anatolian Mastiff 
has finished his bone and is lying on its back next to the fire, allowing his belly to be warmed 
up. A funny scene in the film comes up and the family laugh. 
 
 
Memory Account Examples by English-speakers. 
 
Subject # 8 Female 
We ate at my great uncle’s house, which is just next door to us. Everything was cooked at 
his because our oven is too small at our house. It was a weird Christmas because my sister 
wasn’t there and it was our first time in our new house. This year the bread sauce and red 
cabbage was from a packet (and not as good as mum’s usual). The starter was melon and 
ham and it was very nice. Main was turkey with all the trimmings and then dessert was 
cheesecake and a cheese board. It was all very lovely. I felt very ill because that’s the day my 
cold started so half way through I had to leave and take some tablets. I didn’t drink any 
alcohol for the entire day, only water. The TV was on in the background, first was Frozen, 
then it went onto Only Fools, which was hilarious. Mum sat next to me, Geoff sat to my left 
and dad was at the head of the table. It was a very weird and very nice day.  
The crackers were very bad. 
 
Subject #25 Female 
There was lots of delicious food - turkey, vegetables, yorkshires etc. For dessert we had fruit 
salad. My family (mum, dad and sister) are all sat round the table chatting and laughing. 
First we pull crackers and put the hats on our heads. Then we open a bottle of wine to share 
before we begin eating and chat about the rest of the day, our presents, etc. 
 
Subject #49 Female 
I am sat around at the dinner table with all of my family. Grandad is asleep in the armchair 
and my grandma is in the kitchen telling my mum how to cook the roast potatoes correctly 
like she does every year! I can smell the food and it lingers in from the kitchen. Christmas is 
never a great time with divorced parents but the food and the presents seem to soften the 
blow a little each year! I’ve already had my Norwegian Christmas with my dad the day 
before so I’m not as hungry as everyone else but the pudding will be the best bit! 
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Subject #65 Male 
There was 9 of us sat around the slightly rounded table with a floral patterned tablecloth 
over it, with different plates and ceramic bowls full of food in the centre and large metal 
spoons for handing out the food. There was a bottle of regular champagne half finished on 
the table after it had been poured out beforehand, and there was also a large bottle of coke 
for those who weren’t drinking. In front of each person was a hot ceramic plate with 
different types of flowers on them. 
 
Subject #75 Male 
Thailand. A jungle valley with the sea a few hundred metres away. Looking down upon it 
from the Thai mountain house that my parents built and lived in. Classic music played from 
the lounge, overlooking the swimming pool. The turkey was put onto the table. My Mum, 
Dad, twin sister and older brother as well as my cousin and her daughter, all started to sit 
round the dinner table. We had just skyped family in Australia and the UK. I was asked to 
carve the turkey. The white meat was easy. But I struggled with the wings and the legs.  
So I just yanked them off in the end. I passed the meat around and it was placed on various 
plates. Metal spoons scraped the bottom of the serving dishes as people collected roast 
potatoes and carrots. The click and clank of tongs to grab broccoli and cauliflower. The smell 
of jasmine in the air from the bushes outside. 4 of our 15 dogs were sitting around the table 
in anticipation for a stray piece of turkey to fall off the table and onto the floor. Wind 
chimes sounded in the distant from the little hut next to the swimming pool. A light breeze 
swept across us.         
 
 
Imagination Account Examples by Mandarin-speakers. 
 
Subject # 6 Female 
There are steaming dishes on the table. Together with grandad and grandma, there are 15 
of us sat on the table talking and laughing. We are talking about things that we look forward 
to in 2018. There are our favourites home-cooked dishes on the table, we are savouring 
them. 
 
Subject #13 Female 
My family all gathered at grandad’s house. My cousin and her husband who came back from 
abroad are here too. Everyone is very happy, discussing where to go in the new year to have 
fun. My cousin talks about things that happened abroad, we are eating delicious dishes, 
having a happy New Year’s Eve! 
 
Subject #39 Male 
Our family is watching Spring Festival Gala, sitting around eating the reunion dinner happily. 
We are talking about things that happened in the last year, and discussing what we need to 
do in the coming year. It is full of festive atmosphere and the reunion feeling, the dishes 
that we eat are not important, what matters is us. After dinner, we talk about domestic 
matters, visit our friends.  
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Subject #47 Female 
Around 2 o’clock in the afternoon, the whole family gathered at the grandma’s house. Dad 
or uncle prepared braise chicken and fried fish. My aunties made dumplings, most of which 
were mutton and carrot stuffing, only around twenty of the dumplings were vegetarians 
which were especially made for grandma, because she is getting older, cannot eat meat, 
usually bean curd and egg stuffing. It is four in the afternoon after getting ready, our 
reunion dinner usually starts at 4 o’clock. We placed two tables in the living room, uncles sat 
at the table which served alcohol drinks. We women who don’t drink alcohol and children 
occupied another table. 
 
Subject #83 Male 
The family sat around the table, eating a steaming and delicious New Year’s Eve dinner, 
chattering about domestic trivia, discussing interesting things that happened this year, 
enjoyable. 
 
 
Memory Account Examples by Mandarin-speakers. 
 
Subject #6 Female 
This is a simple New Year’s Eve dinner. There were three of us who came back to the 
parents’ home for the new year. Although there were not many dishes, but they were all 
what we like to eat. Children greet the elderly politely, wish them a healthy and long life.  
 
Subject #13 Female 
Our family sat around the table. There were many relative and friends, many of whom I did 
not know. Everyone was talking and laughing, very happy! There were many kids, the 
delicious food was given to them by the adults! 
 
Subject #39 Male  
During the reunion dinner that took place fourteen days ago, our family gathered around for 
our New Year’s Eve dinner. Everyone talked and laughed, we then watched the Spring 
Festival Gala. 
 
Subject #47 Female 
It was as usual at the beginning. Everyone gathered at grandma’s house after two o’clock in 
the afternoon, to make dumplings, preparing cold dishes. It’s ready around three o’clock. 
Everyone takes a rest, and has a chat, dinner officially started at four. This year’s chicken 
legs were delicious, and they were quickly eaten up. The cold dishes, which have always 
been popular, nobody eats because of the cold weather, and the heating in the house is not 
functioning well. After dinner, the children are responsible for washing dishes and preparing 
for new year greetings. This year, there were some accidents that made everyone feel bad, 
it was considered a rather bad thing. I am still unhappy when I think of it, not sure what will 
happen next year. 
 
Subject #83 Male 
Mom has prepared a table full of tasty dishes, the family sat around together, the steaming 
dishes drove away the cold of the winter. We were talking and laughing, eating the dishes 
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that we missed for a long time, savouring them slowly, I really wish that time would stop at 
this moment.  
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Appendix C 
 
Hypothetical Nostalgic Item Scenarios (Study 4) 
 
 
Role: Seller 
Scenario 1 
Imagine you are selling a t-shirt you got when you saw your favourite band in concert. The t- 
shirt brings back good memories however, it no longer fits you and you wish to sell it so 
someone else may enjoy it. 
 
Scenario 2 
Imagine you are selling a sports shirt, the shirt represents your favourite team and you have 
some good memories of times that you wore this shirt and your team won. There is now a 
new team shirt that you wish to buy and you are hoping to get some money to pay for the 
new shirt by selling your old one. 
 
Scenario 3 
Imagine you are selling you childhood teddy bear that was given to you by a family member. 
You used to take this teddy bear with you everywhere and it was your favourite as a child. 
You no longer need a teddy bear and have decided to sell it so that someone else may get 
pleasure from it as you did. 
 
Scenario 4 
Imagine you are selling your favourite book from your childhood. You have read it you and 
have read it yourself multiple times. You know the story very well. You are selling the book 
for some extra money as you no longer read it, and you hope that it may become someone 
else’s favourite as well. 
 
Scenario 5 
Imagine you are selling a pair of shoes. These shoes are in very good condition and may 
have only been worn once or twice. These shoes remind you of a special occasion, such as, a 
wedding or graduation, however you know it is unlikely you will ever wear them again. You 
have decided to sell them to get some extra money and so that they will be worn and not 
locked away in a cupboard any more. 
 
Scenario 6 
Imagine you are selling your old university jumper. You no longer wear the jumper but it 
reminds you of the time you spent at university. You have decided to sell it after sorting out 
your wardrobe. 
 
Scenario 7 
Imagine you are selling a CD, it is the first CD you ever bought. You no longer play CDs as 
you have all your music on your computer and no longer have a device to play them on, so 
you decided to sell all of your old CDs. 
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Role: Buyer 
Scenario 1 
Imagine you are buying t-shirt. You see a t-shirt for sale that is from a concert of your 
favourite band that you went to years ago. You have good memories from that night and 
wished you had bought a t-shirt at the time. 
 
Scenario 2 
Imagine you a buying a sports shirt. It represents your favourite team and is the version that 
was worn during one of the best matches you ever saw. You want to buy the short to 
remind you of that day. 
 
Scenario 3 
Imagine you are buying a teddy bear for your child. You come across one that reminds you 
of the toy you had as a child, you want to buy this toy for your own child as you remember 
your own teddy bear fondly. 
 
Scenario 4 
Imagine you are buying a book, you see an old book that you loved in your childhood but 
have not seen for a long time. You remember enjoying the book as a child and wish to read 
it again, and share it with your own child. 
 
Scenario 5 
Imagine you are buying shoes for an upcoming event, for example a wedding or graduation. 
You find a pair of shoes that would be perfect for the event. Finding these shoes make you 
all the more excited for the upcoming event. 
 
Scenario 6 
Imagine you shopping online and come across a jumper from your old university. Seeing the 
jumper makes you smile and remember the good times you had at university. 
 
Scenario 7 
Imagine you are shopping online and you come across the first CD you ever bought. You 
may not even like the song anymore but you remember playing that CD repeatedly as soon 
as you had bought it, this brings back good memories and you wish to own the CD again.
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Appendix D – Part I 
 
Positive and Negative Life Events for Study 5 
 
(Adapted from Joshi & Carter, 2013) 
 
 
Positive life Events: 
Owning your own home 
Winning the lottery 
Good health in old age 
Son/daughter getting a very good job 
Success for self and spouse at work 
Living a long life 
Having exotic holiday 
Moving to a better home 
Getting a better job offer 
Unexpectedly inheriting some money  
 
Negative life events:  
Attempt suicide 
Getting cancer 
Hate your chosen career 
After growing old you will find out that you never realised your most important dreams 
Unable to own your own home 
Having a heart attack before the age of 60 
Being burgled 
Having very serious financial problems 
Son/daughter having a serious illness 
Divorce 
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Appendix D – Part II 
 
Questionnaire Instructions in Study 5 
 
(Adapted from Joshi & Carter, 2013) 
 
 
Optimistic example: 
“The chances of an event occurring in your life may be the same or different from 
the chances of event occurring in the lives of people like you. For example, you might think 
that the chance of you having heart attack is 30% and the chance of people like you is also 
30%; or you may think that because your health is very good the chance of you having a 
heart attack is only 10% and the chance of people like you having a heart attack is 30%”  
 
Pessimistic example: 
“The chances of an event occurring in your life may be the same or different from 
the chances of event occurring in the lives of people like you. For example, you might think 
that the chance of you having heart attack is 30% and the chance of people like you is also 
30%; or you may think that because your health is not good the chance of you having a 
heart attack is 70% and the chance of people like you having a heart attack is 30%”.  
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Appendix E 
 
Correlations of Measures in Study 5 
 
Table E1. Bivariate correlations among all measures in Study 5 (+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001) for (a) overall sample, (b) English-
speakers only, and (c) Mandarin-speakers only. 
 
(a) Overall sample (N = 183) 
 Ego-
Moving 
Distance 
1 month 
future 
Distance 
1 month 
past 
IPC-
Internal 
IPC-
Powerful 
others 
IPC-
Chance 
Control 
(Positive) 
Control 
(Negative) 
Optimism 
(Positive) 
Optimism 
(Negative) 
Ego-Moving 1 -.127+ .021 -.045 -.080 -.042 -.286*** .045 .026 -.107 
Distance 1 month future  1 .571*** .083 .056 .024 .019 -.054 .014 .007 
Distance 1 month past   1 .091 .155* .009 .086 .005 -.036 -.076 
IPC-Internality    1 -.236** -.306*** .343*** .081 .111 -.020 
IPC-Powerful Others     1 .637*** -.089 .160* -.063 -.008 
IPC-Chance      1 -.131+ .082 -.084 -.126+ 
Control-Positive       1 .178* .142+ .102 
Control-Negative        1 -.052 .215** 
Optimism-Positive         1 .277*** 
Optimism-Negative          1 
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b) English-speakers (N = 91) 
 Ego-
Moving 
Distance 
1 month 
future 
Distance 
1 month 
past 
IPC-
Internal 
IPC-
Powerful 
others 
IPC-
Chance 
Control 
(Positive) 
Control 
(Negative) 
Optimism 
(Positive) 
Optimism 
(Negative) 
Ego-Moving 1 .182+ .109 -.048 .017 .049 -.096 -.083 -.038 -.106 
Distance 1 month future  1 .727*** .130 .050 -.071 -.075 -.028 -.021 -.144 
Distance 1 month past   1 .126 .149 -.029 -.019 -.059 -.117 -.224* 
IPC-Internality    1 -.076 -.220* .246* .311** .109 -.046 
IPC-Powerful Others     1 .599*** -.129 -.207* -.108 -.152 
IPC-Chance      1 -.061 -.128 -.045 -.213* 
Control-Positive       1 .666*** .218* .142 
Control-Negative        1 .133 .228* 
Optimism-Positive         1 .372*** 
Optimism-Negative          1 
 
c) Mandarin-speakers (N = 90) 
 Ego-
Moving 
Distance 
1 month 
future 
Distance 
1 month 
past 
IPC-
Internal 
IPC-
Powerful 
others 
IPC-
Chance 
Control 
(Positive) 
Control 
(Negative) 
Optimism 
(Positive) 
Optimism 
(Negative) 
Ego-Moving 1 .008 -.031 -.189 .090 .199 -.129 -.046 -.108 -.055 
Distance 1 month future  1 .375*** .027 .020 .095 -.034 -.049 .065 .112 
Distance 1 month past   1 .047 .168 .054 .183+ .064 .047 .077 
IPC-Internality    1 -.361*** -.396*** .428*** -.053 .115 -.003 
IPC-Powerful Others     1 .673*** -.125 .354** -.030 .070 
IPC-Chance      1 -.237* .233* -.111 -.066 
Control-Positive       1 .012 .135 .048 
Control-Negative        1 -.149 .224* 
Optimism-Positive         1 .225* 
Optimism-Negative          1 
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Appendix F 
Risk-preferences Questionnaire in Study 5 
(Adapted and modified from Hsee & Weber, 1999) 
 
Investment 
Imagine you have some savings. Suppose that there are only two investment options: 
A: Buy a particular stock: Its return rate will vary 
B: Put the money in a savings account: Its return rate is fixed. 
 
(Return rate refers to annual return rate here. For example, a return rate of 4% means that 
for every $100 you invest, you will get $4 extra after a year.) 
 
From either option, you can withdraw your money at any time without penalties. Suppose 
that these are the only investment options available, and that you can choose only one of 
the two, not both. Assume also that if you want to buy the stock, you must buy it now. If 
you miss this chance, you can't buy it later. 
 
Each scenario below describes the return rates of the two options. Read each scenario 
carefully and select the option you would choose in that scenario. 
* 
o Stock: either 0% or 8% with equal probabilities  
o Savings: exactly 2% 
 
* 
o Stock: either 0% or 8% with equal probabilities  
o Savings: exactly 4% 
 
* 
o Stock: either 0% or 8% with equal probabilities  
o Savings: exactly 6% 
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Monetary Gambles (Gain Frame – Large Magnitude) 
Suppose that you bought a lottery ticket a week ago. You are now informed that you have 
won and have been given two options of how to receive the money. 
 
Select the option that you would choose in each of the following decisions. 
* 
o Receive $400 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
* 
o Receive $600 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
* 
o Receive $800 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
* 
o Receive $1000 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
* 
o Receive $1200 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
* 
o Receive $1400 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
* 
o Receive $1600 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
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Monetary Gambles (Gain Frame - Small magnitude) 
Suppose that you bought a lottery ticket a week ago. You are now informed that you have 
won and have been given two options of how to receive the money. 
 
Select the option that you would choose in each of the following decisions. 
* 
o Receive $20 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
 * 
o Receive $30 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $40 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $50 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $60 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $70 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $80 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $100 if H or $0 if T 
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Monetary Gambles (Loss Frame - Large magnitude) 
Suppose that you violated a traffic rule and hurt somebody a week ago. You are now 
informed that you will be fined and have been given two options of how to pay the fine. 
Select the option that you would choose in each of the following decisions. 
 
* 
o Receive $400 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
 * 
o Receive $600 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $800 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $1000 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $1200 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $1400 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Receive $1600 for sure 
o Flip a coin; receive $2000 if H or $0 if T 
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Monetary Gambles (Loss Frame – Small Magnitude) 
Suppose that you violated a traffic rule and hurt somebody a week ago. You are now 
informed that you will be fined and have been given two options of how to pay the fine. 
Select the option that you would choose in each of the following decisions. 
* 
o Pay $20 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Pay $30 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Pay $40 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Pay $50 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Pay $60 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
 
* 
o Pay $70 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
 
 
* 
o Pay $80 for sure 
o Flip a coin; pay $100 if H or $0 if T 
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Academic 
 
Imagine you are taking an important business course now. Your final grade for this course 
will depend heavily on an essay (paper) that will be due next week. Scores on the paper can 
range anywhere from 0 to 100. 
 
You are debating whether to write on a conservative (traditional) topic or on a provocative 
(tending to provoke or irritate) topic. If you choose the conservative topic, you know how 
much your professor will like it and what score you will receive. If you choose the 
provocative topic, you don't know how much your professor will like it and don't know what 
score you will get. 
 
Each scenario below describes your estimates of what score you will get on the paper if you 
write on the conservative topic or the provocative topic. Read each scenario carefully and 
select the topic you would choose in that scenario. 
* 
o Provocative topic: either 60 or 100 with equal probabilities  
o Conservative topic: exactly 70 
 
 
* 
 
o Provocative topic: either 60 or 100 with equal probabilities  
o Conservative topic: exactly 80 
 
 
* 
o Provocative topic: either 60 or 100 with equal probabilities  
o Conservative topic: exactly 90 
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Medical 
Imagine you are experiencing a severe headache. After a thorough examination, your doctor 
told you that it is not serious, will automatically go away and will not cause any permanent 
damages. However, it will take 10 days before it goes away if you don't take any medicine. 
 
There are two imported drugs on the market that can help reduce the duration of your 
headache: Drug A and Drug B. Both drugs are free with your doctor's prescription. 
Each scenario below describes the number of days by which each drug will reduce the 
duration of your headache.  
 
Read each scenario carefully and select the drug you would take in that scenario. 
* 
o Drug A: reduce headache by either 0 or 8 days with equal probabilities  
o Drug B: reduce headache by exactly 2 days 
 
 
* 
 
o Drug A: reduce headache by either 0 or 8 days with equal probabilities  
o Drug B: reduce headache by exactly 4 days 
 
 
* 
 
o Drug A: reduce headache by either 0 or 8 days with equal probabilities  
o Drug B: reduce headache by exactly 6 days 
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Asian Disease Problem (Gain Frame)  
(Adapted and modified from Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
 
Imagine that the U.K. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved.  
 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
o Program A  
o Program B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
Asian Disease Problem (Loss Frame)  
(Adapted and modified from Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
 
Imagine that the U.K. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
 
If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die. 
 
Which of the two programs would you favour? 
o Program A  
o Program 
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Appendix G 
Correlations of Measures in Study 6A 
Table G1. Bivariate correlations among all measures in Study 6A (+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001) for (a) overall sample, (b) English-
speakers only, and (c) Mandarin-speakers only 
 
(a) Overall sample (N = 205) 
 Ego-
Moving 
IPC-
Internal 
IPC-
Powerful 
Others 
IPC-
Chance 
RPI 
Large 
Gain 
RPI 
Small 
Gain 
RPI 
Large 
Loss 
RPI 
Small 
Loss 
RPI 
Invest 
RPI 
Medical 
RPI 
Essay 
Ego-Moving 1 .181** -.269*** -.196** .023 .026 -.126 -.085 .079 -.133 -.068 
IPC-Internality  1 .017 .053 .055 .018 -.134 -.128 -.024 -.108 -.109 
IPC-Powerful Others   1 .580*** .073 -.019 -.020 -.073 -.073 .092 -.070 
IPC-Chance    1 -.077 .009 .086 -.030 -.005 -.015 .062 
RP Index – Large Gain     1 .648*** - - .341*** .128 .329** 
RP Index – Small Gain      1 - - .519*** .345** .402*** 
RP Index – Large Loss       1 .719*** .122 .127 .138 
RP Index – Small Loss        1 .288** .006 .155 
RP Index – Investment         1 .376*** .332*** 
RP Index – Medicine          1 .226* 
RP Index – Essay           1 
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(b) English-speakers (N = 100) 
 Ego-
Moving 
IPC-
Internal 
IPC-
Powerful 
Others 
IPC-
Chance 
RPI 
Large 
Gain 
RPI  
Small 
Gain 
RPI 
Large 
Loss 
RPI  
Small 
Loss 
RPI 
Invest 
RPI 
Medical 
RPI 
Essay 
Ego-Moving 1 .027 -.097 -.026 .019 -.078 -.151 -.035 .025 -.014 .059 
IPC-Internality  1 .055 .069 -.124 -.180 -.296* -.222 -.054 .015 -.141 
IPC-Powerful Others   1 .492*** .239 .036 .046 -.124 -.035 .348* -.193 
IPC-Chance    1 .023 .113 .095 -.044 .035 .149 -.070 
RP Index – Large Gain     1 .649*** - - .263+ .142 .433** 
RP Index – Small Gain      1 - - .441** .295 .329* 
RP Index – Large Loss       1 .717*** .039 .148 .210 
RP Index – Small Loss        1 .317* .061 .437** 
RP Index – Investment         1 .302* .220* 
RP Index – Medicine          1 -.080 
RP Index – Essay           1 
 
(c) Mandarin-speakers (N = 105) 
 Ego-
Moving 
IPC-
Internal 
IPC-
Powerful 
Others 
IPC-
Chance 
RPI 
Large 
Gain 
RPI 
Small 
Gain 
RPI 
Large 
Loss 
RPI 
Small 
Loss 
RPI 
Invest 
RPI 
Medical 
RPI 
Essay 
Ego-Moving 1 .069 .042 .044 - - .019 .059 -.003 -.041 -.054 
IPC-Internality  1 .100 .136 .207 .131 .066 -.023 -.031 -.118 -.051 
IPC-Powerful Others   1 .645*** -.073 -.044 -.179 -.063 -.074 -.077 -.005 
IPC-Chance    1 -.198 -.084 .029 -.056 -.005 -.139 .147 
RP Index – Large Gain     1 .648*** - - .387** .119 .271+ 
RP Index – Small Gain      1 - - .557*** .372** .456*** 
RP Index – Large Loss       1 .727*** .209 .112 .028 
RP Index – Small Loss        1 .263+ -.010 -.224 
RP Index – Investment         1 .426*** .420*** 
RP Index – Medicine          1 .356*** 
RP Index – Essay           1 
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Appendix H 
 
Correlations of Measures in Study 6B 
 
Table H1. Bivariate correlations among all measures in Study 6B (+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001) for (a) overall sample, (b) English-
speakers only, and (c) Mandarin-speakers only. 
 
(a) Overall sample (N = 162) 
 Ego-
Moving 
IPC-
Internality 
IPC-
Powerful 
Others 
IPC- 
Chance 
Social  
Risk  
Taking 
Ethical  
Risk  
Taking 
Financial 
Risk  
Taking 
Health  
Risk  
Taking 
Recreation 
Risk  
Taking 
Ego-moving 1 .022 .024 .145+ .082 -.016 -.210** .118 -.077 
IPC-Internality  1 -.203** -.256** .073 -.159* -.095 -.038 .006 
IPC-Powerful others   1 .643*** -.313*** .280*** -.006 -.062 -.161* 
IPC-Chance    1 -.169** .312*** .028 .075 -.053 
Social Risk Taking     1 .057 .101 .216** .331*** 
Ethical Risk Taking      1 .236** .399*** .162* 
Financial Risk Taking       1 .176* .289*** 
Health Risk Taking        1 .340*** 
Recreational Risk Taking         1 
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(b) English-speakers (N = 88) 
 Ego- 
Moving 
IPC-
Internality 
IPC-
Powerful 
Others 
IPC- 
Chance 
Social  
Risk  
Taking 
Ethical  
Risk  
Taking 
Financial 
Risk 
 Taking 
Health  
Risk  
Taking 
Recreation 
Risk  
Taking 
Ego-moving 1 -.251* .103 .318** -.012 .059 .115 .012 -.026 
IPC-Internality  1 -.191+ -.312** .075 -.223* -.004 -.015 .062 
IPC-Powerful others   1 .580*** -.250** .220* .040 -.054 -.121 
IPC-Chance    1 -.084 .310** .046 .126 .012 
Social Risk Taking     1 .093 .211* .253* .415*** 
Ethical Risk Taking      1 .242* .424** .143 
Financial Risk Taking       1 .215* .220* 
Health Risk Taking        1 .366*** 
Recreational Risk Taking         1 
 
 
c) Mandarin-speakers (N = 74) 
 Ego- 
Moving 
IPC-
Internality 
IPC-
Powerful 
Others 
IPC- 
Chance 
Social  
Risk  
Taking 
Ethical  
Risk  
Taking 
Financial 
Risk  
Taking 
Health  
Risk  
Taking 
Recreation 
Risk  
Taking 
Ego-moving 1 -.137 .029 .035 .096 .038 .156 .065 .038 
IPC-Internality  1 -.206+ -.176 .018 -.051 .066 -.152 -.007 
IPC-Powerful others   1 .745*** -.390*** .344** -.128 -.059 -.251* 
IPC-Chance    1 -.298** .319** -.038 .021 -.200+ 
Social Risk Taking     1 .033 .089 .151 .228+ 
Ethical Risk Taking      1 .203+ .408*** .179 
Financial Risk Taking       1 .344** .367** 
Health Risk Taking        1 .373** 
Recreational Risk Taking         1 
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Appendix I 
 
Effect Sizes Across Studies 
 
Table I1. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) of psychological distance responses across studies based on 
(a) between-cultures comparisons and (b) within-culture comparisons. 
 
 
a) Between-cultures comparisons 
 
+ p < .10.    * p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001 
 
b) Within-culture comparisons 
 
* p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001 
 
Note: Effect sizes were computed based on the extent to which they fit this thesis predictions.  
 
In Table (a), for the “past” measure, a positive effect size sign indicates that Mandarin-speakers felt 
closer to the past than English-speakers whereas a negative sign indicates that English-speakers felt 
closer to the past than Mandarin-speakers. For the “future” measure, a positive sign indicates that 
English-speakers felt closer to the future than Mandarin-speakers whereas and a negative sign 
indicates that Mandarin-speakers felt closer to the future than English-speakers).  
 
In Table (b), for English-speakers, a positive sign indicates that they felt closer to the future than the 
past whereas a negative sign indicates that they felt closer to the past than the future. For the 
Mandarin-speakers, a positive sign indicates that they felt closer to the past than the future whereas 
a negative sign indicates that they felt closer to the future than the past. 
Study N Measure CI (95%) Average d  Within Study
Study 1 233 Past 0.25 + (-0.01, 0.51)
Future -0.13 (-0.39, 0.13)
Study 2 101 Past 0.55 ** (0.15, 0.95)
Future 0.07 (-0.32, 0.46)
Study 5 181 Past -0.08 (-0.37, 0.21)
Future 0.46 ** (0.16, 0.75)
0.15
0.06
0.31
0.19
Average Weighted Effect Size
Effect size (d )
Study N Measure CI (95%) Average d  Within Study
Study 1 233 English (n =135) 0.39 *** (0.18, 0.66)
Mandarin (n =98) -0.28 ** (-0.54, 0.02)
Study 2 101 English (n =57) 0.34 * (-0.05, 0.69)
Mandarin (n =44) 0.11 (-0.30, 0.54)
Study 5 181 English (n =91) 0.34 ** (-0.62, -0.03)
Mandarin (n =90) 0.11 (-0.17, 0.41)
0.15
Effect size (d )
0.06
0.23
0.23
Average Weighted Effect Size
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Table I2. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) of time metaphor responses across studies based on 
between-cultures comparisons 
 
 
 
*** p < .001 
Note: Effect sizes were computed based on the extent to which they fit this thesis predictions. A 
positive sign indicates that English-speakers were more likely to use ego-moving metaphor 
compared to Mandarin-speakers.
Study N CI (95%)
Study 1 233 2.11 *** (1.78, 2.42)
Study 5 183 3.35 *** (2.89, 3.78)
Study 6A 205 3.44 *** (3.00, 3.86)
Study 6B 162 1.73 *** (1.36, 2.08)
2.67Average Weighted Effect Size
Effect size (d )
 226 
References 
Abel, T. M., & Hsu, F. L. K. (2010). Some aspects of personality of Chinese as revealed by the 
Rorschach Test, Rorschach Research Exchange and Journal of Projective Techniques, 
13(3), 285-301 
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining 
the future: common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and 
elaboration. Neuropsychologia, 45(7), 1363–1377.  
Ahrens K., Huang C. (2002). “Time is motion in Mandarin Chinese. Parameterizing conceptual 
metaphors,” in Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium of Chinese 
Languages and Linguistics (Jiayi: National Chung-Cheng University), 27–47.  
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). Easy on the mind, easy on the wallet: The effects 
of familiarity and fluency on currency valuation. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 
15, 985-990. 
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2006). Individual differences in the phenomenology 
of mental time travel: The effect of vivid visual imagery and emotion regulation 
strategies. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(2), 342-350 
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004). Phenomenal characteristics associated with 
projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: influence of 
valence and temporal distance. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(4), 844-858 
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